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Cover
An F/A-18C Hornet approaches the flight
deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
on 30 October 2001 for a landing. The
Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) is visible
astern on plane-guard station. The Theodore Roosevelt battle group was participating in Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM against Taliban and al-Queda
targets in Afghanistan, embodying the
nation’s leadership in the global fight
against terrorism. Such campaigns, however, are only one element (most prominent since the events of 11 September
2001) of the role of the United States in
the world—several aspects of which are
taken up by articles in this issue. Judge
James Baker, who was in the White
House during the 1999 Nato Kosovo
campaign, assesses the obligations of legal
advisors to the president in contemporary
warfare; a panel of distinguished scholars
exchange views on the nature (and limitations) of transformation of the U.S.
military to meet its global responsibilities
of tomorrow; and Professor Roger Barnett
of the Naval War College argues that,
thanks to a number of factors, the scene
depicted on our cover—the U.S. Navy in
the forefront, influencing events ashore
with great effectiveness—is emblematic of
the future.
U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer’s
Mate Johnny Bivera.
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WHEN LAWYERS ADVISE PRESIDENTS IN WARTIME
Kosovo and the Law of Armed Conflict
James E. Baker

T

he events of 11 September changed how we perceive national security as a
society, a government, and as individuals. This is as true of national security
specialists, who have been aware that America has been at war with terrorism
since at least the 1990s, as it is for those whose sense of geographic security was
shattered in New York and Washington. There is talk of “new war” and “new
rules,” and concern that we not apply twentieth-century lessons to a twentyfirst-century war.
Over time, 11 September and its aftermath will test our interpretation and
application of domestic law. It may also test the traditional framework under international law for resorting to and applying force. But much will, and should,
stay the same for lawyers. As a result, my objective remains, as it was when I
spoke at the Naval War College before 11 September, to give some personal insight into the application of the law of armed conflict to the 1999 Nato Kosovo
air campaign from the perspective of a lawyer serving the president as commander in chief. I offer these observations not out of any desire to tell my story.
Almost all of my instincts as a lawyer, former national security official, and judge
run against my doing so. However, I have overcome my reticence because I am
committed to constitutional government, and I believe that national-level legal
review is critical to military operations, not just in determining whether the
commander in chief has domestic and international legal authority to resort to
force, but also in shaping the manner in which the United States employs force.
Lawyers also have an important role to play in sustaining “good-government”
process, offering a degree of detachment and long-term perspective.
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Constitutional government means that every decision should be made according to law; it also means that, as a matter of process, certain elected and appointed officials should be involved in decisions to resort to force as well as
decisions on use of force, even when the need is immediate and the military option clear. Knowing how lawyers performed these tasks during the Kosovo conflict will not answer today’s contextual legal questions, but it may offer insight
on how to lawyer better and how policy makers effectively use their lawyers as
part of a national security process that is necessarily secret.
Kosovo underscores that process and legal judgments are contextual. The
contextual parameters in responding to terrorism are different from those for
responding to a Balkan crisis. Clandestine and remote military operations
against a hidden enemy will dictate different decision processes
In short, it was my job to make sure that in
doing the right thing the U.S. government was than do Nato air operations
against fixed targets, as will the
doing it the right way.
different political and policy parameters of both situations. As a result, I have not sought to modify an August
text about limited air operations against a conventional military into a global
text about use of force against terrorists. The legal framework is also different.
For example, some of the concerns I anticipated after Kosovo and discuss below
about dual-use targets may be less relevant to a war on terrorism, but they remain just the same and may arise in other contexts.
At least at the outset of current operations against terrorism the United States
and its allies will operate within a more permissive legal context. Unlike Kosovo,
in responding to 11 September, the jus ad bellum is self-evident and beyond rational debate. Those nations responding to terrorism are doing so pursuant to
an inherent right of self-defense under customary international law and recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The domestic legal context is
equally clear—the president’s authority as chief executive, as commander in
chief, and in conducting foreign relations is at its broadest when defending
United States territory. The executive branch acts militarily as well with the unqualified statutory authority of the Congress expressed in Public Law 107-40,
the “Authorization for Use of Military Force.” Enacted on 18 September, this
joint resolution authorizes the president “to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nationals, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.” As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote half a century ago,
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in such cases the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
1
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”
Even when threshold legal questions involving resort to force are settled, decision makers must continue to make judgments involving application of the
law of armed conflict to the use of force. Regardless of how a conflict is characterized, and regardless of the reciprocal application of the law of armed conflict,
U.S. military actions are subject to the law of armed conflict. Title 18 U.S. Code
2441 may also apply. It is long-standing U.S. policy and doctrine to apply the law
of armed conflict to U.S. military actions regardless of circumstance. This is
good. This is who we are. As I discuss below, how these principles are applied—at what decisional level and with what degree of specificity (e.g., targetby-target, category of target, with what rules of engagement)—will depend on
context.
As I also discuss below, the protection of innocent civilian life remains the
fundamental principle behind the Geneva Conventions and, more broadly, the
law of armed conflict. Indeed, part of our revulsion and contempt for terrorism
lies in the indiscriminate, disproportionate, and unnecessary nature of terrorist
violence against civilians and noncombatants. Therefore, the moral imperative
and relevance of this legal regime is even more apparent today than it was before
11 September. As with Kosovo, policy makers will appreciate that these principles are not only found in domestic and international law; they make for good
policy where international public and state support is essential and, particularly
in a global contest, where economy of force is imperative.
KOSOVO, 1999
Kosovo was a campaign during which the law of armed conflict was assiduously
followed. The campaign was conducted with uncommon, if not unprecedented,
discrimination. I believe the process for reviewing targets within the U.S. government worked well. Where there were mistakes, they were not mistakes of analytic framework or law. Where the process did not work smoothly or effectively,
the idiosyncratic nature of a Nato campaign likely came into play. We should not
lose sight of the fact that the combination of diplomacy and military operations
that constituted the campaign was successful in achieving Nato’s objectives.
I intend to focus on a particular aspect of Kosovo—the process of reviewing
targets going to the president. At the outset I would like to correct a
misperception. I have asked military friends what they would be interested in
hearing explained on this subject. I was struck by the number of times thoughtful officers asked me why the president insisted upon approving all air targets—invoking images of President Lyndon Johnson crouched over maps of
Vietnam. As a matter of fact, the commander in chief did not approve all targets
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during Kosovo but only a subset, which I describe later. Carrying the analysis to
the next step, in my opinion presidential review did not impede effective military operations in Kosovo. Rather, such review was efficient, contributed to the
rule of law, and allowed the president to engage more effectively with Nato allies.
My military friends have also asked about the role of lawyers, and particularly
the role of a civilian lawyer at the National Security Council (NSC), in the conduct of military operations. Therefore, I will begin by describing and assessing
my role in applying the law of armed conflict. I will close with a few concerns
about the impending collision among the law of armed conflict, the doctrine of
effects-based targeting, and a shared desire to limit collateral casualties and consequences to the fullest extent possible.
TARGETING PROCESS
Before, during, and after the air campaign, I performed three integrated roles
with respect to the law of armed conflict.
Preparation
First, I educated and advised the president, the national security advisor, the
Principals and Deputies Committees,* and the attorney general on the law of
armed conflict before (as well as during and after) the air campaign. As with any
client, the time spent in education at the outset pays huge dividends when the
law has to be applied in a live situation (a secure conference call at four o’clock in
the morning is not the time to introduce any client, especially the national decision maker, to the concepts of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination).
At the most practical level, I provided background and advice in the form of
memoranda, e-mail, and oral input. My sources were customary international
law (including those portions of Protocol I recognized by the United States as
customary international law), the Geneva Conventions, the Geneva Convention
Commentaries, U.S. military manuals and academic treatises, and all who
taught me along the way.
I have often thought that questions about the president’s domestic authority to
resort to force are driven by one’s constitutional perspective and doctrinal convictions. In contrast, the principles underlying the law of armed conflict are generally
* The NSC Principals Committee, chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, included the following core members during the Kosovo conflict: the secretary of state, secretary of defense, assistant to the vice president for national security affairs, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. representative to the United Nations, and the director of central intelligence.
The Deputies Committee, chaired by the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, included the deputy secretary of state or under secretary of state for political affairs, the
undersecretary of defense for policy, deputy assistant to the vice president for national security affairs, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations,
and deputy director of central intelligence.
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agreed upon: necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and military objective. It is
the different application of these principles to decisions to resort to force and to
decisions regarding how force is used (targets) that generates most debate.
The law of armed conflict is not law exclusively for specialists. We expect junior personnel to apply the same principles on a tactical level. These are principles that policy makers must understand and apply to their most solemn
responsibility—the exercise of force and the taking of human life. I would add
that in this respect government lawyers share a common duty with law professors and other experts to educate the policy maker of today and tomorrow in advance of the crisis—not just to comment after the fact.
Advance guidance on the law of armed conflict also helps establish lines of
communication and a common vocabulary of nuance between lawyer and client. In a larger, more layered bureaucracy than the president’s national security
staff, where the lawyer may be less proximate to the decision maker, I imagine
that the teaching process is even more important. Not only does a good advance
law-of-armed-conflict brief educate the policy maker, but any policy maker who
hears such a brief will be sure his or her lawyer fully participates in the targeting
process. In addition, the policy maker will understand in a live situation that the
lawyer is applying “hard law”—specific, well established, and sanctioned—and
not kibitzing on operational matters.
I say that in part because some policy makers treat international law as “soft
law,” and domestic, particularly criminal, law as “hard law.” The law of armed
conflict is, of course, both. Indeed, in some of the literature on Kosovo, limitations on collateral casualties and consequences seem always to be referred to as a
political constraint and rarely as the legal constraint that it also is. Whether this
reflects lack of knowledge about the law or merely recognition that the policy
hurdle was often the first encountered is hard to say. Nevertheless, under 18 U.S.
Code 2441, specified war crimes committed by or against Americans violate U.S.
criminal law.
Target Categories
My second role related to the law of armed conflict was the review of target categories identified by certain rubrics, such as air defense or lines of communication, under which specific targets were almost always approved in-theater.
Among other things, I would ensure that such categories were consistent with
the president’s constitutional authority and with his prior direction. How did I
play this role in practice?
Where specific targets or categories of targets were briefed, suggested, or debated at Deputies or Principals Committee meetings, I was immediately available—in the room—to identify issues and guide officials around legal rocks and
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shoals. It might be asked why principals discussed military targets at all. First, as
General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe during the Kosovo
campaign, has made clear, Nato alliance operations involved the careful orchestration of nineteen national policies and—I will add—nineteen legal perspectives, many of which hinged on the nature of targets selected and the risk of
2
collateral casualties. If the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, was to address
an appeal from one foreign minister or another to change the course of the campaign, she needed to understand the campaign.
Second, policy makers brought to bear extraordinary regional knowledge, including insight into Serbian pressure points. The principals had perspectives on
the effects of targeting that a military staff officer might not have.
Principals also bore a heavy responsibility for the policy outcome of Operation ALLIED FORCE. I believe it was their duty to test the scope of operations to
ensure we were doing all that we should do to achieve Nato’s objectives, but in a
way that would hold the alliance together. This was a duty fulfilled.
Targets
My third law of armed conflict–related role was to review specific targets. If the
president was going to be asked to approve a target, it was my duty to ensure the
target was lawful. Time and again I returned to the same checklist: What is the
military objective? Are there collateral consequences? Have we taken all appropriate measures to minimize those consequences and to discriminate between
military objectives and civilian objects? Does the target brief quickly and clearly
identify the issues for the president and principals?
It might be asked why the NSC legal advisor, and not a military lawyer, was
doing this. There are at least three reasons.
First, the European Command staff judge advocate and the legal counsel to
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other military officers, were
performing these reviews as well. The system of legal review, however, was sufficiently streamlined that it was advisable for me to serve as a fail-safe to ensure
that review had in fact occurred on targets going to the president. Moreover, authority to approve is also authority to modify or change, and it was essential that
any such changes received legal review prior to final approval by the president.
There is a propensity in government to adopt smaller and smaller decision-making
circles in the interest of operational security. The circle can become too small. A
decision-making process limited to cabinet principals may ask too much of too
few if those principals are to address issues of policy and law on operational time
lines. In my view, there should be at the most senior policy level a lawyer who is
directly responsible (and feels responsible) for applying at that level the law of
armed conflict to each decision involving the use of force.
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Second, it was in Washington—at the Pentagon, the State Department, and the
White House—that issues of law, policy, and operations came together. At the
“political” level, a Nato alliance objection to a particular target might be couched
in both policy and legal terms. Having a lawyer involved helped to avoid “default
judgments” when legal issues were raised by foreign heads of state or ministers.
Finally, and importantly, I implicitly assumed an additional role as a trustee
to the process. I was not self-appointed; rather, this is what the national security
advisor, then Samuel R. Berger, expected from his lawyer.
In short, it was my job to make sure that in doing the right thing the U.S. government was doing it the right way. I had a standard mental checklist. Are all the
relevant facts on the table? Do the president and his principal officials know
what they are reviewing? Have the longer-term repercussions of striking a target
been identified? Have the right
process
steps been taken? These
Whether actors like it or not, Kosovo may serve
as a harbinger of the manner in which specific are, of course, not inherently legal
U.S. military actions, down to the tactical sor- questions, but the lawyer in the
room may be the staff person best
tie, will receive legal scrutiny.
positioned to test the process, detached from commitment to any particular policy approach and with an eye to
what Justice Jackson referred to as the “enduring consequences” of the decision.
It is also important to think broadly about who may be missing from a particular process. For example, I would ask, is this a matter that the attorney general,
Janet Reno, should review? If not, might she nonetheless be asked by the press or
the Congress for her legal view on whether an action is consistent with the president’s constitutional authority? In responding to such queries, it might be asked,
would the attorney general be substituting her judgment on military matters for
that of the commander? Of course not. Wishing to understand the military objective of an action is not to question the military recommendation. It is, however, central to evaluating constitutional authority and the application of U.S.
law to particular facts—and that is a lawyer’s task.
At the level of practice and lessons learned, the critical process link was between
the National Security Council and the legal counsel to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs—then Captain (now Rear Admiral) Michael F. Lohr, who worked in concert with the Department of Defense (DoD) general counsel. As the national-level
military lawyer closest to the operational line, Admiral Lohr served as my primary
contact, through whom I could track and review target briefs as they came to the
White House from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and secretary of defense. This
communications channel kept me ahead of, or at least even with, the operational
time line and ensured that the president, and not just the Pentagon, had the benefit of military and DoD legal expertise. It also provided for a single chain of legal
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communication, thereby avoiding confusion. Working together on hundreds of
targets, we came to understand each other’s vocabulary, tone, and expressions.
When I could, I provided my input and advice in writing. First, I felt I should
be no less accountable for my legal concurrence than the president would be for
his decision. Second, I wanted to make sure my advice was received. Relying
solely on oral communication is to run the risk that the process will move forward without your input, if the principal does not have time to meet or talk before operational time lines dictate a decision. Finally, I found that my advice was
cumulative and that policy makers were likely to apply the principles of the law
of armed conflict in other contexts, perhaps during conversations and meetings
that I did not attend.
ASSESSMENT
Having given a sense of the legal process in the White House involving target review, let me now assess how that process worked, focusing first on the commander in chief and then on the lawyers.
The Role of the Commander in Chief
Briefings for the president on military operations by the chairman included all
proposed categories of targets (such as air-defense or ground-force units in
Kosovo). The president also reviewed a subcategory of individual targets. Such
targets were for the most part targets of heightened policy concern. They might
raise, among other things, potential negative allied reactions and, especially,
pose potential risks of collateral casualties. Not surprisingly, these were the targets that also raised more difficult questions under the law of armed conflict. Of
the approximately ten thousand strike sorties against some two thousand targets
during the campaign, the national security advisor and I reviewed two or three
hundred individual targets, of which the president examined a subset.
The president’s review of targets was crisp: he would hear the descriptions,
review the briefing materials, and at times raise questions. He expected issues to
have been addressed before they reached him and that any still requiring resolution—perhaps those involving an ally—be quickly and clearly presented. This
was not a ponderous process but the kind of decision making that one might expect of a commander in chief.
There is a school of thought that would have preferred that the president review fewer targets, and a qualitatively more limited category of target, than the
president did in this case, on the grounds that such review amounted to
micromanagement of the armed forces. In this view, which has its genesis in the
Vietnam era, the president should issue strategic guidance—a statement of
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mission and commander in chief ’s intent—and blanket authorization to pursue
necessary targets.
While I think it is prudent to test whether the right balance was struck between military efficacy and civilian control in this or any other context, I disagree with the “minimal review” school as applied to Kosovo. In my view, the
right balance was struck between national-level and theater-approved targets in
this context. I believe the success of the campaign is highly relevant in this debate—the alliance was sustained, and Nato’s objectives were achieved.
Why was presidential review important? As General John P. Jumper, U.S. Air
Force,* and others have pointed out, Kosovo was a highly idiosyncratic campaign involving coalition warfare by nineteen democracies—fourteen of which
had deployed forces. In this context, some individual target decisions assumed
strategic policy implications. A government might fall. A runway might no longer be available. Nato consensus might collapse. In my view, those are implications of presidential dimensions. When allied concerns about targets arose, the
president was called.
Further, I would argue that some of the targets the president reviewed required his approval in a context where force was being employed pursuant to the
president’s constitutional authority and the president had not provided the regional commander in chief blanket authorization to employ force. At the very
least, his review removed any possible legal question as to whether select targets
went beyond existing presidential authorization.
Finally, a president is accountable to the American people for U.S. operations
and casualties. Whether a target was approved at the tactical, operational, or national level, its consequences would ultimately, and usually immediately, rest
with Nato’s political leaders—and on none more than the president of the
United States. This last argument may be a truism, and it was not unique to this
campaign—but it applies to an analysis of Kosovo, just the same.
If I were asked to strengthen the process, I would make doubly sure that national-level target suggestions, or nominations, are processed in the same manner as targets originating in the military chain of command—that there are no
shortcuts and that there is no deference to grade or position. This would ensure
that all targets receive the same measure of staff review and analytic scrutiny. I
am not in a position to know just how many times senior officials sought to curtail the process through backchannel communications, but during the campaign I sometimes heard that this or that senior official was pushing for a certain
proposed target to be included in the next presidential brief, without the regular
chain of review. Whenever I became aware of such “advice” I would channel it
* From December 1997 to February 2000 Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Commander,
Allied Air Forces Central Europe.
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into the normal process of selection and review. In any event, the potential for
error diminishes if target nominations all receive the same stepped process of review up the chain of command. Where operational necessity dictates speed, my
answer is to make the process work faster and smarter but not to accept
shortcuts.
The Lawyers’ Role
Although I think legal review at the NSC worked well with respect to Kosovo targets, there is no single “best” process. Indeed, one scenario is likely to be so different from the next in terms of policy and military context that it would be
dangerous to generalize—or to insist that one template fit all conflicts. Kosovo
was not DESERT STORM. DESERT STORM was not DESERT FOX. One has to maintain
situational awareness, to find the measure of process and approval that ensures
application of the law of armed conflict and meets operational time lines, in part
through appreciation of the difference between the strategic, theater, and local
targets, as well as of the difference between a fixed and mobile target. If there is
no one right way to lawyer, however, there is a wrong way—and that is to absent
oneself from the decision-making process or simply defer to others’ conclusions.
Lawyers are not always readily accepted into the military targeting team. This
reluctance has to do with concerns about secrecy, delay, “lawyer creep” (the legal
version of mission creep, whereby one legal question becomes seventeen, requiring not one lawyer but forty-three to answer). Also, of course, there is the fear
that the lawyer may flatly say no to something the policy maker wants to do. I
was fortunate that the national security advisor, secretary of defense, and chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed no persuading as to
the need for close-up lawyering. During the Kosovo campaign, legal advice may
not have always received warm and generous thanks, but policy makers never
hid from it or sought to shut it out.
In return, I think the lawyers fulfilled their responsibilities under the contract. We kept the number of participants to the absolute minimum. For example, if knowledge of a matter of domestic legal authority needed to be limited
within the Justice Department to the attorney general alone, then the attorney
general alone it was. Within the U.S. government, NSC legal review met all but
one operational deadline—one fixed target was put on the president’s brief before legal review was complete. When the Oval Office briefing reached that target, I asked that it be set aside until the review was done.
While I always felt pressure, I never let it dictate my analysis. One source of
pressure that I had not fully anticipated, however, was the extent of international
legal scrutiny that U.S. actions received. In any event, we applied the law because
it was the law, not because there was an audience.
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Whether actors like it or not, Kosovo may serve as a harbinger of the manner
in which specific U.S. military actions, down to the tactical sortie, will receive legal scrutiny—from nongovernmental organizations, ad hoc tribunals, and perhaps in the near future, a standing International Criminal Court. The latter two
may attempt to assert jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. As a result, policy makers
should anticipate that public statements intended to influence an adversary
might also influence legal observers. Policy makers, and not lawyers, should
surely decide what points to emphasize in public statements, but they should do
so conscious of the legal implications of what is being said. The review of the
1999 Kosovo action by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is an illustration. That review concluded that Nato military operations
were indeed lawful, but the very fact that it was carried out served notice that doing the right thing, and doing it well and carefully, will not necessarily immunize
actors from international legal scrutiny under the law of armed conflict.
AREAS OF FUTURE TENSION
I will close with a few words of caution involving three areas where I would forecast
that tension is likely to arise between doctrine, policy, and the law of armed conflict.
Proportionality, Necessity, and “Going Downtown”
First, there is a potential tension between proportionality and necessity on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, the military importance of striking hard at the
outset of a conflict to surprise, shock, and thus effect a rapid end to a conflict.
There has been commentary about the incremental nature of the Nato air campaign, and the merits of delivering an all-out attack—“going downtown,” in the
American vernacular—earlier. On one level this aspect of the campaign was dictated by the fact that Nato’s combined political leadership had approved specifically a phased air campaign; that fact, therefore, defined the limit of authorized
military operations and alliance.
Legal considerations did not drive this result. Indeed, the political self-restraint
agreed to by the alliance was reached well before any legal constraint based upon
necessity or proportionality was reached. In my view, at the strategic and national level, as a matter of law, these principles provided significant leeway for
response given Nato’s legitimate objectives of preventing ethnic cleansing and
avoiding a larger regional war. But looking forward, we should not lose sight of
the fact that there is a legal facet to any decision to “go downtown.” Legal judgments depend on factual predicates and judgments. If policy makers believe a
symbolic show of force alone (for instance, a flyby) will accomplish the permitted goal, a lawyer will find it difficult, applying the principle of necessity, to
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concur in a significant use of force, such as the bombing of national-level military targets in a capital city.
Dual-Use Targets
Similarly, so-called dual-use targets embrace any number of inherent tensions.
The law of armed conflict attempts to posit, in the distinction between military
objective and civilian object, a clarity that may not exist on the ground. I found
that dual-use targets—like media relay towers or factories—largely fell on a continuum between objects that were distinctly civilian and those that were distinctly military. This seemed particularly true because we were dealing with a
dictatorship with broad, but not always total, control over potential dual-use
targets. In such an environment, facilities can be rapidly converted from civilian
to military to civilian use at the direction of a government not bound by Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (that is, a domestic legal regime that recognizes
that the head of state or of government does not have unlimited authority over
private property even in time of war, as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1952,
when it barred President Harry Truman from authorizing the government seizure of private steel mills in the face of a Korean War steel-mill strike, absent leg3
islative authorization to do so).
In such a context, “effects based” targeting (roughly, a framework for targeting that starts with the identification of a political objective from which flow target selections based on their potential effect on an enemy’s decision-making
process, rather than the identification of targets based on the direct and immediate military advantage of their destruction) and the law of armed conflict may
be on a collision course. The tension is particularly apparent where a facility or
enterprise financially sustains an adversary’s regime, and therefore ultimately
the regime’s military operations, but does not make a product that directly and
effectively contributes to an adversary’s military operations. The policy frustration is that these may be exactly the targets that if attacked might not only persuade a dictatorial adversary of one’s determination but also, more importantly,
shorten the conflict and therefore limit the number of collateral casualties that
would otherwise occur.
I am not arguing here for a change in the law; I am very conscious that too
malleable a doctrine of military objective will send the law hurtling down the
slippery slope toward collateral calamity. Nor, I should be clear, am I suggesting
that the United States applied anything other than a strict test of military objective, as recognized in customary international law and by those states that have
adopted Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. My purpose is to identify a very
real area of tension that warrants further review and that will confront lawyers
in the future.
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Protection of Noncombatants and Traditional Understandings
of Military Objective
The law of armed conflict generates a number of potential ironies in the interest
of higher principles and clarity. For example, the law of armed conflict prohibits
“treacherous killing”—for instance, the hiring of a noncombatant to poison a
military leader—but permits the use of more dramatic force, even with significant
collateral consequences, to attack the same military leader or a military headquarters with the same objective—disrupting command and control. During
the Kosovo campaign, lawyers were never squarely confronted with a target that
was of sufficient financial or symbolic value to the regime that it might well end
or shorten the conflict with minimal collateral consequences but that nonetheless failed a traditional test of military objective because it did not make a direct
and effective contribution to military operations or was civilian in nature. But I
sensed that such an issue could have arisen.
Without diminishing the paramount principle of protection for noncombatants, I wonder whether the definition of military objective deserves another
look, in the interest of limiting collateral casualties. Are traditional definitions
adequate, or do they drive military operations toward prolonged conflict and
ground combat? Do they provide enough guidance to shield the commander
from prosecution for legal judgments made in good faith?
These are more than academic questions of passing interest. The potentially
poor fit between traditional categories of military objective and the reality of
conflict in which targets fall on a continuum of judgment between military and
civilian becomes more perilous in an age of international scrutiny where
good-faith differences of view can take on criminal implications. Those who do
evaluate such actions should do so in the awareness of the factual and temporal
context in which the decisions were made. National security decision making is
not judicial decision making. Time is more of the essence, and information is
not necessarily of evidentiary quality.
Just as conflicts with low military casualties, even none at all, have resulted in
a public expectation—some suggest a de facto policy constraint—regarding the
scope of U.S. military action, some have used Kosovo to advance a legal view that
the law of armed conflict virtually prohibits collateral civilian casualties. This is
an honorable and worthy aspiration, but not law. Nor should it be law, or the tyrants of the world will operate with impunity.
The law of armed conflict does not prohibit collateral casualties any more
than international law prohibits armed conflict. It constrains, regulates, and
limits. War is almost never casualty free, and we will be extraordinarily lucky if
future conflicts incur as few collateral casualties as Kosovo did.
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I hope that these recollections and perceptions give some insight into the process of legal review at the commander-in-chief level during the Kosovo air campaign. I also hope that they have given a sense of the issues, at least in a manner
consistent with my duty to safeguard the deliberations that took place. In turn,
such a review, I hope, will inform current and future policy-legal teams as they
address America’s conflicts.
My messages are clear. First, lawyers are integral to the conduct of military
operations at the national command level. They must be in the physical and
metaphorical decision-making room.
Second, lawyers can perform their duties to the law in a timely and secure way
that meets operational deadlines and needs. Those who uphold the law of armed
conflict bring honor to the profession and to the armed forces.
Third, the law of armed conflict is hard law. It is U.S. criminal law. Increasingly, it will also serve as an international measure by which the United States is
judged. The law of armed conflict addresses the noblest objective of law—the
protection of innocent life. The United States should be second to none in compliance, as was the case in Kosovo.
Finally, application of the law of armed conflict is a moral imperative. If international law regulates but does not prohibit war, the law of armed conflict provides a framework to ensure that force is used in the most humane and
economical manner possible. Whether we agree on the precise definition of military objective, or on each and every Kosovo target, I am confident that all can
agree on the moral imperative of minimizing civilian casualties and suffering to
the fullest extent possible.
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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “TRANSFORMATION”?
An Exchange
Andrew L. Ross, Michèle A. Flournoy, Cindy Williams, and David Mosher

W

hat exactly do we mean by “defense transformation”? How might it affect
the nation’s strategy and the military forces that it deploys? How long
might a process of transformation take, and what might it cost? The Secretary of the
Navy’s Current Strategy Forum held at the Naval War College on 12–13 June 2001
asked one of its four discussion panels to address these issues. Its members had long
grappled with such questions from different vantage points.
MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
I think transformation is one of the most important topics that the defense community needs to grapple with today. Accelerating transformation of the U.S.
military and of the Department of Defense more broadly will be a major theme
of the new administration’s defense strategy when that is unveiled. To be successful, however, the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, will have to be more
clear in the guidance he gives on transformation, in terms of the objectives we
are striving for, the desired capabilities we want the process to yield, and the
trade-offs we are willing to make to accelerate transformation.
I want first to ask, why transform? Why is it so important? Second, I wish to
articulate what I think are the primary objectives of transformation. Third, I
want to give an assessment of where we are in the process today. Fourth, I will focus on some of the “long poles in the tent”—the things that are hardest to do and
take the longest—before concluding with some recommendations. This material is drawn primarily from my own experience in the trenches of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense but also from an opportunity I had to serve on the Defense Science Board task force on transformation.
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Coming Soon to a Theater Near You: Reasons and Objectives
I see many reasons why we should be treating transformation of the U.S. military as a priority. One is that tomorrow’s wars will not be like today’s. The primary lesson for any potential adversary of the Gulf War was not to be so stupid
as to confront the United States head-on, militarily. Look for weaknesses to exploit; look for strengths to undermine; look for asymmetric means of attacking
the United States. A principal asymmetric means will be to deny and delay our
access to their regions, to use anti-access strategies against us. The scenarios for
which we are currently planning do not adequately reflect those challenges.
They do not represent some of the most likely future challenges we will face.
Another reason is that the future is coming sooner than we think. The real
challenges to our ability to project power in the face of anti-access challenges do
not lie twenty or twenty-five years off. We do not have to wait for the rise of a
near-peer competitor in 2025. The proliferation of key technologies and capabilities means that lesser countries, regional powers, will be able to pose significant anti-access challenges to us within the next decade. As I like to say, this
threat is “coming soon to a theater near you.” Current U.S. capabilities and concepts of operations will be severely challenged, absent transformation.
We should also transform the U.S. armed forces because of the opportunities
this allows. New technologies offer new opportunities to be more effective in future warfare. Examples include information technologies, biotechnologies, directed energy—the list goes on. Of course, fiscal pressures will continue, and
they will continue to require the Defense Department to do things in smarter
ways, to get more efficient. Transformation should support that.
Finally, transformation takes time. If we want to be ready ten years down the
road—twenty years, for some new challenges—we need to start the process now.
There must be time for the inevitable missteps, failures, and blind alleys, and for
learning from them.
Let me turn to the objectives of transformation. I think the primary objective
is ensuring continued U.S. military superiority and, with that, our ability to advance and to protect our national interests in the face of emerging and future
threats. This means several specific things, such as an ability to project rapidly
and then sustain combat power in the face of strategies designed to thwart our
ability to do that. It entails an ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict—not only high-end warfare but smaller scale contingencies, presence, and
so forth. It means underwriting deterrence and “shaping” with a force that remains combat credible in a changing environment. That involves the transformation of forward presence. In sum, it requires maximizing the effectiveness
and efficiency of U.S. forces. Those are the objectives of transformation, at a very
broad level.
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The Good News and the Bad News
How are we doing? Here is the good news. The “transformation” section of the
Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997, not so long ago, was virtually blank for at
least one service. There was not much happening in transformation in
1997—but today there is a great deal. Transformation became a recognized defense priority of the previous administration, and certainly it will be for this one.
The military has articulated an ambitious joint vision for 2020. That vision is
very broad, with little specific guidance, but it is compelling. Each of the services
individually has established transformation “road maps” and “battle labs”; they
are conducting transformation activities, war games, concept development, and
experimentation. We have come a long way toward translating rhetoric into real
activity and action. The establishment of Joint Forces Command has increased
the importance, and improved the resourcing, of transformation in the joint
arena.
But there are still barriers to transformation, and that is the bad news. The
Bush administration will have to address these barriers if it is serious about
transformation. Perhaps the largest obstacle is complacency, the absence of the
pervasive sense of urgency that has existed in the past when transformations
have occurred. “Of course we will transform,” the services seem to say, “but at
our own evolutionary pace and without making any hard trade-offs. This will
naturally happen, over time; that is how we do business.” Another barrier arises
from the fact that, historically, periods of low operating tempo have been most
conducive to urgent military innovation; today, we are trying to transform even
as we are responding to major international challenges.
Not the least of the problems is a general underestimation of what it takes
actually to change the status quo in a large organization like the Department of
Defense. There is no department-wide strategy or road map laying out or translating the very broad Joint Vision 2020 into more concrete mission objectives
and priorities. There are no clear metrics for measuring progress. There is no
lens through which we can judge investment priorities and trade-offs, no
Defense vision linking the transformation of the military to the transformation
of the department and of its business practices more broadly. We have stated
that the linkage exists, but we have not fleshed it out in specific terms. In any
case, transformation has not been given “teeth,” has not been made a priority by
the department in the services’ planning, programming, and budgeting
processes.
While I would applaud many of our experimentation efforts, some of them
have been too constrained, infected with a “zero defect” culture that promotes
showcasing as opposed to true experimentation. There has been an inadequate
emphasis in some cases on real discovery, which requires a tolerance of failure.
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Sometimes the most productive experiment is one that fails; we have not seen
much of that. Further, many of the models and measures of effectiveness by
which we evaluate results do not adequately reflect how a transformed force
would operate. Finally, joint experimentation has tended to focus too narrowly
on the seams between the services rather than on new “concepts at large” for utilizing the joint force.
Relatedly, there is an inadequate process for translating the results of experimentation into real programs. Suppose the experimentation process discovers
something promising. Do we have an adequate way of making sure that it gets
into the defense program? The answer is yes, theoretically; but there are not
many success stories yet. What we learn from experiments should lead us to reassess our priorities and resource allocations, with respect not only to matériel
but to doctrine, concepts, and organizations.
A further barrier is the shortage of institutional advocates; there is as yet no
full-time staff in the Pentagon dedicated exclusively to transformation. There
are no adequate mechanisms for consistently focusing high-level attention on
this issue. If we are going to get transformation, it will require impetus from the
top. On the other hand, short tours of duty—that is, rapid rotation of key personnel—limit the impact of many military professionals who are at one time or
another responsible for transformation activities. They stay only two or three
years in the job, and that tends to limit their efficacy in those roles.
We must also acknowledge the specter of interservice rivalry, a Pandora’s box
that senior leaders are so afraid to open that they do not create fora where ideas
and concepts of operations can really compete. Relatedly, even a very promising
concept developed and experimented with by a particular service may be viewed
with suspicion by the others if it is brought into the joint arena—as if the service
in question were bent on using the innovation to increase its own budget share
and decrease others’.
Finally, as I have hinted, we face the reality of near-term demands. Any new
strategy, even one that would genuinely increase the emphasis on transformation, must deal with the demands of the real world, the here and now. Transformation often gets crowded out by more immediate concerns. Those concerns
include the effects, which are still with us, of the procurement holiday of the
1990s. A number of recapitalization needs are in direct competition with transformation priorities.
The Long Poles in the Tent, and Recommendations
Let me turn now to the two most important areas upon which we should focus.
The first is development of new concepts of operations for priority mission areas. Concept development has not been given high enough priority; too few

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/27

28

War College: Winter 2002 Full Issue
ROSS ET AL.

31

“racehorses” are dedicated to the task. The services typically give the task either
to contractors or to small “futures groups,” not core elements of their own staffs.
In the joint realm as well, there are too few avenues for vetting and testing new
concepts. Joint Forces Command is a tremendous addition, but it cannot do it
all, certainly not at its current size and level of staffing.
Within the headquarters, there has been a general lack of incentives to break
with current doctrine or current approaches; there is a general sense that if you
are too innovative, you may dash your promotion opportunities. Now, contrast
that with how the Germans, before World War II, came up with the concept that
eventually yielded the blitzkrieg. The German army told a group of lieutenant
colonels and colonels that, in effect, they could not be promoted unless they
came up with something that broke current doctrine.
What I am really arguing for is a fundamental change in culture from one of
consensus—which would pursue a transformation that causes no one to be uncomfortable—to a productive and open forum where ideas and concepts for
solving priority mission problems or tasks can truly compete.
The other “long pole in the tent” is organizational change—the transformation, or more broadly the rationalization, of the Department of Defense itself. If
transformation focuses only on the fighting “tooth” and ignores the supporting
“tail,” it will ultimately fail. We have to reduce unnecessary duplication between
the services in key support areas like logistics, C4ISR*, possibly even some aspects of training. We need acquisition reform. We have to eliminate unneeded
infrastructure, to outsource and commercialize functions like accounting,
health care, long-haul communications, and so on. If the Defense Department
does not transform the way it does business, it will not have the resources to
transform the U.S. military. Nor would it be able to support effectively a transformed force. There are huge political and bureaucratic barriers to surmount
here, but this issue has to be put on the table if transformation is going to
succeed.
The recommendations I would offer are largely drawn from the Defense Science Board task force on transformation. The number-one recommendation is
to establish a sense of urgency at the top. Such a sense may be growing inside the
office of the secretary of defense, but not in all of the services. It is largely absent
on Capitol Hill, among the people who control the purse strings. Next, we need
an implementation road map to energize and focus transformation efforts. The
broad vision of Joint Vision 2020 has to be converted into much more specific articulations: what are the key operational challenges? On what mission areas will
we focus? What capabilities do we want the transformation process to yield?
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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Then we need to establish and use appropriate metrics to assess progress. Also,
we should strengthen the voice of joint force commanders; they will be the people in the field upon whom we will rely in the future, and they should be engaged
today to help articulate needs.
I am urging us to change organization cultures and incentive structures, so as
to allow and reward real experimentation, open competition between concepts
and ideas, and innovation. I am also calling for an overarching vision that links
military transformation with the department’s own transformation and that ultimately creates a cadre of professionals who are committed to and, very importantly, accountable for progress in transformation.
CINDY WILLIAMS
Let me begin by agreeing wholeheartedly with Michèle—the Department of Defense and the U.S. military have been stuck for a decade in a Cold War mindset.
They need to change, and change quickly, both to overcome the challenges of the
future and to take advantage of new technologies. Instead of the term “transformation,” however, I prefer the old-fashioned words “innovation” and “change.”
“Transformation” has come to evoke specific solutions, like precision weapons
or the Army’s current transformation plan. In that regard, the term is often associated with a view of military change that starts with the technologies and then
seeks problems for the technologies to solve, instead of the other way around. In
looking to the future, it is critical that we start with the military problems and
then seek solutions. Some of the solutions will be technical, but others may be
procedural or conceptual.
Another reason I shy away from the term “transformation” is that transformation as often touted—large and fundamental change in every aspect of military affairs—may be too much to hope for. Transformation, or revolution, is
relatively rare in large institutions, which are conservative by nature; how do we
make it happen unless something big and bad occurs? In industry, for example,
transformation is most likely not when a firm is riding high, but when it has lost
market share and is worried about its very survival. Military transformation is
most likely not when a state enjoys overwhelming primacy, as the United States
does today, but when the military has lost a war or otherwise lost the confidence
of civilians. The fact is, an institution that is already best-in-class typically finds
it difficult to make even modest changes, let alone transform itself. I worry that
when the vision of large-scale transformation is not realized, disappointed advocates may lose confidence that even more modest change is possible or worth
pursuing.
For both these reasons, I prefer to talk about spurring the military to solve
specific problems that it will face in the future. I look for innovation or change to
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meet concrete needs, rather than lists of technologies and top-down efforts
to find ways to use them—which often seem to be the unspoken goal of
“transformation.”
Strategy and Resources
When the Quadrennial Defense Review for 2001 began, the services did not
want to repeat the method used during the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997,
a process they called “budget driven”or “cost driven.”They wanted instead a “strategy-driven” review process. I agree completely that reviews should be driven by
strategy. But my understanding of strategy is quite different from the concept those advocates have in mind. Proponents of a “strategy-driven review” say
they want first to look at what the nation needs to do in the world, and second to
make a list of everything the military should be capable of doing. Next they
would decide what forces are needed to do all those things. Finally, they would
figure out the cost of those forces in the future, add up the bill, and present it to
the American public in the expectation that taxpayers will pay it in full.
That is not strategy. If the military has all the resources in the world, if it can
bring all the forces in the world to bear at every point, it does not need a strategy.
The whole point of strategy is to set priorities and make choices among competing alternatives when resources are constrained. What the proponents of the
laundry-list approach have derided as a “budget-driven process” is the essence
of strategy itself.
Setting a top line for defense and working within it is fundamental to devising
a strategy. The Defense Department needs to know how much money it will
have, in order to know how deeply it will have to cut into the areas where, as
Michèle Flournoy likes to say, it can accept greater risk. But that does not apply
when setting the top line for the individual services. In the 1997 quadrennial review, the defense budget “pie” was divided up among the services using the same
formula as was used year after year during the Cold War.
That is counter-strategic. The department needs not only a joint process to determine its requirements but a joint view to determine its strategy. We must decide
priorities not on the basis of what is best for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine
Corps, but on the basis of what is best for the nation. If this means that the Navy’s
share of the defense budget grows while the Army’s shrinks, so be it.
Allowing the services’ budget shares to shift from year to year may benefit innovation. As I discussed earlier, bringing about innovation in a large institution
that is already the best is not easy. Unless the military faces substantial competition from the outside or fails in war, it is not predisposed to change. But one way
to promote change is to reward it, not only in individuals but in services. A service that has more innovative ideas, that looks to the future rather than back to
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the Cold War, might be rewarded with a larger share of the budget. It is possible
to set up an incentive structure that could at least reward and thereby encourage
innovation, if not the more ambitious goals of sweeping transformation.
Nothing Comes Free
Ten years from now, keeping today’s strategy, all of today’s forces (equipped in
the way that is currently planned), with today’s infrastructure, is going to cost
somewhere between thirty-five and fifty billion dollars a year more than it does
today. However, it is possible instead to have strong forces and a military strategy
that meet the challenges of this century instead of the last one, and to do so at today’s, or even last year’s, level of funding—that is, with a budget held constant
for the next decade, adjusted only for inflation every year.
In fact, at least three possible military strategies and plans would allow the
Defense Department to hold the line on defense budgets but at the same time to
stimulate a significant degree of innovation, pursue a strong modernization
program, and still pay the troops as currently planned.* Each of the three would
produce a very strong military, certainly stronger than today’s and probably
stronger than the military we will have if we continue down the present path,
even spending that extra thirty-five to fifty billion dollars. Of course, nothing
comes free. Saving tens of billions of dollars means giving something up. In the
three future plans I have looked at, the main engine of savings is force-structure
reduction. Each of these three plans cuts forces that are less useful and keeps
those that will be more useful in the world of the future. Each also makes modernization cutbacks in areas that do not fit in with its strategic concept.
Of these three plans, one would resonate with a naval audience, and also, I believe, with the Bush administration, much more than would the other two. It assumes that the dangerous fault line that existed on the Eurasian landmass, where
Nato and the Warsaw Pact stared each other down across the inter-German border, is gone, more or less for good. Instead, it posits a need for more attention to
Asia and the Pacific. It assumes that the United States enjoys overwhelming primacy today but that with that primacy come some pitfalls. One of them is that
weaker, and poorer, countries who oppose us are going to look for the cheapest
ways they can find to defeat our very expensive systems. That means mines,
cheap submarines that operate in coastal waters, and man-portable air defenses—the kinds of things that are often referred to as “asymmetric threats.” It
assumes, as Michèle Flournoy argues, that access to theaters is going to be increasingly difficult to come by.

* See Cindy Williams, ed., Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the 21st Century (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), reviewed in this issue.
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On the basis of these assumptions, it emphasizes forces that can self-deploy—
especially maritime and space-based forces—more than the nation has emphasized them in the past. It tries through military means to avoid reliance on fixed
bases and ports. It emphasizes weapons, techniques, and tactics to defeat other
countries’ cheap asymmetric threats. It recommends that the Army be cut back
substantially and reorganized, but along the lines of the Army’s own transformation proposals, and equipped with lighter and self-deploying forces. It recommends that the Air Force be reduced in size somewhat and that its fighters be
made more easily deployable. It recommends that the Navy stay at its current
size and suggests the innovative use of information technologies and other
equipment that might allow us to defeat cheap asymmetric threats.
A force like this is affordable at today’s level of spending. It is one that would
seem to fit within the world view and the strategy embraced by the Bush administration. Though it is substantially smaller, especially in the Army and to some
degree in the Air Force, it is stronger in the areas where strength will be most
needed over the long term.
DAVID MOSHER
Missile defense is our future. We are headed there. It is not a matter of if, but
when—and also, to some degree, how. The very things that are driving us to
transformation—preserving freedom of action, concern about asymmetric
threats—are compelling reasons why we need theater missile defense, national
missile defense—and the term du jour—“allied missile defense,” the current administration’s proposal to provide missile defense to our allies.
In some sense, missile defense is at the heart of transformation: if the nation
could protect itself easily from ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, the effectiveness of asymmetric strategies would be reduced significantly. In part it is the difficulty of missile defense that is driving this push to transformation. The whole
effort could be significantly affected by our ability to predict accurately what
missile defense will cost, what its capabilities will be, and what the timetable is
likely to be.
That is what I would like to talk about here, focusing on two things—first,
why missile defense costs seem to rise so inordinately quickly, seemingly faster
than almost anything else, and for national missile defense (NMD) in particular;
and second, why those costs matter.
Costs Grow and Schedules Slide
In acquisition programs generally, the historical cost-growth rate has been
somewhere between 20 and 30 percent, but missile defense seems to grow a lot
faster than that. Early in the 1990s, the cost of a single-site hundred-interceptor
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system was thought to be about five billion dollars. A few years later, it was eight
billion dollars. Today we are talking about twenty billion dollars or more—a
fourfold increase for a system that has essentially not changed. Other examples
are theater missile-defense programs. The Navy Theater-Wide program is rising
quickly. SBIRS-Low* was estimated at four billion dollars originally; now we are
talking eight billion, and it will not get beyond where it presently is without a
significant infusion of cash.
Why are ballistic missile defense programs fundamentally different from others? I have a theory, involving three basic factors: the ballistic missile defense debate is taking place in an extremely political environment; it is responding to
what is perceived to be a very urgent threat; and, perhaps most important, the
technical challenges of missile defense have been significantly underestimated.
As a result of all this, costs grow and schedules slide. The implication is that if we
do not get those problems under control, missile defense is going to keep sliding
farther and farther to the right.
Missile defense was born in the crucible of ideological combat. Those who
want missile defenses and those who are opposed to them approach the topic
with religious zeal. The only other debate that elicits similar passion is that on
abortion. In fact, that comparison suggests the highly moralistic and political
tone of the missile defense debate and the kinds of pressures that give rise to
these programs. Visionary thinking often underlies missile defense programs,
but it is frequently not consistent with technical reality. Ronald Reagan’s “Star
Wars” (Strategic Defense Initiative) speech in 1983 was highly visionary, but the
needed technology was decades away. Another example is the Navy Theater-Wide
System. It has never hit a target, and yet there is a core of people, some in the
Navy but most of them outside, who say that it can do not only theater defense
but national defense, boost-phase defense, midcourse defense, ascent-phase
defense. Any one of those capabilities will cost, they claim, only two billion
dollars.
This political warfare is amplified by concern that there are looming threats
to our forces and to the United States—the enemy is at the gates. This leads to a
crash-program mentality, and that introduces some real problems. Urgency
leads to optimism, then overoptimism—we can do this technically difficult
thing, very quickly, and for not much money. Missile defense proposals are not
fully matured, well conceived acquisition projects but ideas, concepts floated in
a “crash environment.” Because of the sense of urgency, however, they are treated
as well-constructed programs. Rough cost estimates are assigned to them, which
the budgeteers in the Pentagon and Congress accept as well-crafted figures—but
* Space-Based Infrared System.
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they are not, because they lack the thorough analysis and pessimism needed for
good cost estimates.
Particularly, there has not been enough thinking about the technical complexity of missile defense in general. The result is poorly designed programs
with insufficient attention to testing, to system integration, to the reduction of
technical risks. All that, in turn, leads to unrealistic estimates of what the systems
can do, when they will be able to do it, and how much they will cost. A few examples are in order here. The Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
system was proposed in the George H. W. Bush administration. Its goal was to
protect the United States against up to two hundred Soviet warheads launched
by a rogue commander. The price tag was forty-two billion dollars for the
national missile defense component, which included a thousand satellites to intercept missiles and 750 ground-based interceptors. Today, for thirty billion dollars, or three-quarters the cost, we are likely to get only a hundred ground-based
interceptors. GPALS also had a theater missile-defense “underlay,” which was
advertised at twelve billion dollars. Today, for the Army’s Theater High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) and the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) programs alone, we are talking about over twenty billion dollars.
When William Perry, secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997, started thinking
about this issue, he challenged the Defense Department and the services to
develop over two years missile defense systems that could be deployed, if the
threat required, in two additional years. It was an insurance program, and
there was no cost estimate placed on it. The “two-plus-two” idea grew into a
“three-plus-three” plan that envisioned a cost of eight billion dollars. As I mentioned, the cost today for essentially the same system has risen to twenty billion
or thirty billion, depending on which version of the hundred interceptors you
are talking about, and those estimates keep climbing. The Bush administration
is now proposing a system with five interceptors by 2004 with no national missile defense radar, at least not initially. The goal is to get something done quickly
and to worry about the details really later—another example of the rush to deal
with the perceived urgent threat.
The Bush administration of 1988–92 strongly believed in missile defense and
wanted to do a great deal with it; that produced pressure to underestimate. The
Clinton administration did not like national missile defense but was backed into
a corner by a Congress that wanted missile defense, and then by the Rumsfeld
report; the Clinton White House also underestimated the program’s costs, but
for different reasons. However, the net result is the same—missile defense programs that promise, if not the moon, at least a great deal, and for a small amount
of money.
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But crash programs do not save money; they cost more. There are large technical risks, and because a crash program is by definition in a hurry, it deals with
those problems in ways that cost a lot of money and even then may not solve
them. If a threat is urgent and a nation wants a crash program, it has to put real
resources into it, to have at least a shot at solving the technical challenges.
This Has Not Been Done Before
The technical challenges of a national missile defense system have been significantly understated. If theater-level missile defense is difficult—and it obviously
is—NMD will push the state of the art in more dimensions than any other
weapon system—“hit to kill,” sensors, radar, interceptors, “man in control,” data
fusion. The list goes on and on; NMD will be very tough to do. Consider, for example, the systems integration. It is as if we wanted to build, in five or ten years,
the nuclear deterrent that we have now—all the warheads, bombers, missiles,
submarines, command and control systems, early warning sensors—from
scratch, all at once, and properly tie them all together. Actually, for NMD the
systems-integration problem is even worse, because the tolerances are far lower;
for our nuclear deterrent, times are measured in minutes, but for missile defense
times are measured in milliseconds—and the distances in centimeters. This has
not been done before.
Three elements are necessary to deal with this technical challenge. They are
familiar to anyone who has worked in the acquisition world: robust risk mitigation, careful system integration, and proper testing.
Robust risk mitigation requires alternative technologies developed in parallel. If we are pushing fast on something and it fails, we need to be able to throw it
out and fall back on something that is working. An example was the Polaris
submarine-launched ballistic missile program, which pursued parallel development efforts in the mechanism by which the missile was ejected from the tube.
One of them was not working; the managers just brought in the other one, and
the program continued apace.
That does not happen often in missile defense programs, because of the cost.
Risk mitigation is expensive—a billion, two billion dollars a year, maybe higher.
The THAAD program would be, I would argue, much farther along today had it
not settled on a single contractor so early. The program needed competitive approaches—in the sensor, in the interceptor itself—and it did not have them. In
case after case, alternative approaches were in the baseline plans of missile defense programs but were among the first things thrown over the side when costs
started to go up.
The second element of managing the technical risks of missile defense is system
integration, which cannot be emphasized enough. It is not part of development; it
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is central to development. It is not cheap, either—a billion dollars a year was
planned for system integration in the GPALS effort, and that was clearly not
enough.
The third element is testing, but proper testing for missile defense puts us in a
new paradigm. In the old days, to develop, say, a ballistic missile, you tested by
launching a lot of them—for Minuteman I, fifty-six in the initial flight test program; for Polaris A-1, forty-two; for Polaris A-3, fifty-five. A ballistic missile goes
from point A to point B—it does not try to hit a moving target—and that is a
much simpler task than missile defense. Trying to hit a rapidly approaching,
perhaps maneuvering, target is much more like air defense, where, for example,
the Safeguard system had 165 flight tests, Patriot conducted 114, and the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 111. Extensive system testing is also
required on the ground for all the hardware “in the loop.” The right facilities are
needed for all of it.
Somebody Else’s Problem
Why do we care about NMD costs? It is rather arcane. It is somebody else’s budget, somebody else’s problem. That is the wrong attitude, because the budget is
tight. We are not going to have enough money for everybody’s needs, even with
budget increases. If the costs of missile defense keep growing and not enough
money is available, it is going to eat up transformation and modernization. The
missile defense budget is now five billion dollars a year; maybe it will grow to ten
billion a year. That is not a lot in defense-budget terms, but if it takes from other
programs the marginal billion dollars that would have allowed them to achieve
their goals, that will be a problem.
There are also national concerns. To get support on Capitol Hill, a system has
to look credible, and its cost estimates have to be credible. Systems that keep going over budget, running into technical difficulties, and being delayed are eventually perceived as weak—and are then cut back or killed. If the administration
wants missile defense, it will have to push very strongly for it.
What the Bush administration is going to do, we do not know for sure. What
is clear is that it wants “layers”—a ground-based component and probably some
sea-based component. The system may be designed to attack missiles in the
boost phase, or maybe in midcourse; in any case, the administration wants it
quickly. The problems I have warned of here are going to arise. Transformation
and missile defense are not scientifically or even politically incompatible. They
may be budgetarily incompatible, however, unless we are realistic and honest
about what missile defense is going to cost, what the challenges are, and how long
it will take to do it right. We must soberly decide how the costs and uncertainties
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of a crash program for missile defense should be weighed against other defense
priorities. Missile defense will crowd out transformation if we do otherwise.
ANDREW ROSS
I would like to go back to a point that Michèle Flournoy and Cindy Williams
raised. We used to speak of the “revolution in military affairs.” “Transformation”
sounds less radical than “revolution.” Are they the same thing? Should we be
thinking about this somewhat less ambitiously? What we are engaged in is innovation, but transformation advocates are talking about innovations that are
rather far-reaching, that change what our military looks like in a fundamental
sense. We have not restructured since the end of the Cold War; we are just
smaller. So, what is it we should be engaged in here—fundamental transformation, evolution, or merely a series of innovations?
CINDY WILLIAMS
I am skeptical of the notion that we are really engaged in transformation or revolution. When I use the word “transformation,” I am talking about Admiral
Owens’s* notion: a combination of information technologies and precision
weapons that can completely transform the way that our military fights, by essentially lifting the “fog of war.” I have already discussed the institutional reasons why transformation is not likely to happen in the way visionaries have in
mind. A second problem is that lifting the fog of war is not entirely a technical
problem and cannot be addressed entirely by technical means. No amount of
technology will tell you the opponent’s strategy, what he is thinking, what his
goals are, what he wants.
But even the technical aspects involve technology that we thought ten years
ago we would have by now but that is nowhere near being deployed. Advances
that we imagined would be made in the private sector—like communication
systems that were going to make bandwidth virtually free—did not happen, for
business reasons. A third reason is operational. In many ways, we are not going
to be entirely happy with the implications of lifting the fog of war. Already, individuals in the field complain of information overload, of “cyber-rubbernecking”
by the leadership in Washington.
Finally, information technologies are not free. People seem to think that they
are cheap compared to platforms, but today we are spending about sixty billion
dollars to buy and operate command, control, communications, intelligence,
and information systems. That is about a fifth of the defense budget; it is not far
from the size of the entire budget of the U.S. Army.
* William A. Owens [Adm., USN (Ret.)], Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2000).
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MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
First we had the “revolution in military affairs.” We decided that had too much
“baggage,” and we came up with “transformation.” Now that too has come to
mean all things to all people. If we substitute “innovation,” in four years it will
suffer from the same problem. Words matter, and choice of terms is important,
but in this case what matters is operational challenges. What are the specific missions that we want to be able to carry out, in what operating environments?
What capabilities do we want? I do not care what we call the process; I want to
know what are we talking about.
ANDREW ROSS
Let us get to what is at the heart of the matter—cost. The Chief of Naval Operations has warned that there are inadequate resources to transform for the future,
that there may be a trade-off between current and future readiness. It has been
widely agreed that significant additional increases in defense spending are unlikely. How big a problem is that for transformation? Some, on the other hand,
have said the problem is not more money but creativity and management. Who
is right?
MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
My sense is that in the near term, money is not the problem; concept development and organizational change are the immediate deficiencies. Down the road,
translating the results into new programs will involve some real costs and
trade-offs. Throwing money at the problem is easy, in a way, but it puts the cart
before the horse. In the near term, the problem is to change a culture, to foster
concept development and innovation, and that is much harder.
The specific technologies that people associate with transformation are not
always cheaper. The unmanned aerial vehicle is an example. People call them
“drones”; it sounds like a cheap replacement for an airplane, one that would not
cost much to operate because it does not have a pilot inside. It turns out that the
Global Hawk System would cost fifty-five million dollars a copy—an air vehicle
plus its ground control center. That is very comparable to the price we paid for
the U-2s, which it can be thought of as replacing. Will there be savings in operational costs because there will be no pilots on board the aircraft? No—the Air
Force plans to have two pilots on the ground running it. Unmanned aerial vehicles have many advantages, but they are not necessarily cheaper.
DAVID MOSHER
There are inherent internal pressures in the defense budget, aside from transformation, that force trade-offs. One is the mysterious fact that operations and
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maintenance costs climb every year. The migration of money from procurement
into the operating accounts keeps growing, and no one really knows why. It is
something to keep in mind.
ANDREW ROSS
Among the barriers to transformation that have been mentioned is complacency. Some of the visionaries feel a sense of urgency regarding transformation,
but the larger defense establishment and the country as a whole do not. In striking contrast, in the national missile defense realm there is a great sense of urgency; it has become highly politicized, and that has led to problems. The
ballistic missile defense testing program has been characterized as a “rush to failure.” If somehow a sense of urgency is generated for transformation, will we see
the same kinds of problems?
MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
It is a double-edged sword. Historically, major transformations and innovations
have been driven by military failures. We can certainly wait for that to happen,
but that would be an unfortunate way to proceed. The day after some catastrophe, there will be enormous pressure to do something substantial—and quickly;
of thirty choices made then, ten are likely to be bad. So what I advocate is not
waiting for that to happen but taking a measured approach that values serious
threat assessment.
I would rather see the Pentagon and the services look closely at threat assessments—what regional powers are procuring, what their doctrine says, what they
are writing about, how they say they would take on the United States, what they
are doing with their own defense investment. Two things are blocking such an
assessment. One is that countering those threats may call for systems that would
compete with preferred procurement programs already in the pipeline. Many,
many potential transformation ideas never get off the ground; they are seen as
threats to established priorities, and they have no natural institutional advocates. That is a mistake. I recognize the downsides of a sense of urgency, but I
think that they can be managed.
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THE BEIRA PATROL
Britain’s Broken Blockade against Rhodesia
Richard Mobley

B

etween 1966 and 1975, the Royal Navy, primarily, conducted one of the
more unusual blockades of modern history—a maritime-intercept operation that became known as the “Beira patrol.” The Royal Navy and Air Force
monitored shipping in the Mozambique Channel in an attempt to ensure that
no oil reached landlocked Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) via the port of
Beira, in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Although the military executed
these operations skillfully, Britain’s overall oil embargo against Rhodesia, which
had unilaterally declared its independence in 1965, failed. Well aware of oil
“seepage” to Rhodesia, London did not (and could not) extend maritime interception operations to other ports in Mozambique or elsewhere. On the other
hand, it refused to abandon a mission that was, because of substantial and growing resource constraints, increasingly unpopular within the Navy. The Beira patrol had become too visible a component of London’s
Richard Mobley, a career naval intelligence officer, was
commitment to the maintenance of United Nations
assigned to the Defense Intelligence Liaison Office in
sanctions against its rebellious colony. Whitehall (that
London between 1998 and 2001. A graduate of the Nais, the British government) would relieve the Ministry
tional War College and Georgetown University (M.A.,
history), he completed a series of overseas assignments
of Defence of this mission only when Mozambique
in the Middle East and Asia. He was assigned to the staff
gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and
of Commander, Sixth Fleet, and made several Mediterranean and Indian Ocean deployments. Commander
could credibly assure the UN that no oil would cross
Mobley recently retired from the Navy and is teaching
its territory to Rhodesia.
college-level history in Houston.
Today, in the light of dozens of recently declassified
The views expressed in this article (and all Review artiBritish documents, the Beira patrol is a cautionary
cles) are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
tale for states that must decide upon, and commandDefense or the U.S. government.
ers who must then orchestrate, maritime interception
Naval War College Review, Winter 2002, Vol. LV, No. 1
operations. It illustrates the challenges of shaping an
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appropriate force for maritime sanctions and shows vividly how demanding
even a small blockade can be, especially if prolonged. It reveals the difficulties of
fashioning credible rules of engagement and the complexities of the interplay
between rules and force posture. It also exemplifies the legal, resource, and political obstacles to modifying a blockade once it has started.
Most important, Britain’s experience in the Beira patrol demonstrates that
the symbolic utility of naval forces can be compelling in unforeseen and unwelcome ways. Implementing a naval blockade with carriers, frigates, and
land-based aviation, Britain established a dramatic and public commitment to
sanction enforcement. But the use of such highly visible forces (ultimately mandated by an unusual, British-crafted UN Security Council resolution) had a
downside—Whitehall found it awkward to cease or reduce maritime interception operations when it might have wished to do so. Diplomatic objectives consistently outweighed Ministry of Defence protests that the patrol had become of
questionable utility and that demands upon naval resources were disproportionate. Because warships off Beira were such powerful symbols, the Royal Navy
found itself in an open-ended campaign. A prisoner of its own Security Council
resolution, the United Kingdom could not end its maritime sanction enforcement—however ineffectual—as long as it remained committed in principle to
sanctions against Rhodesia.
THE “UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE”
The Beira patrol originated from a dispute between the United Kingdom and its
increasingly rebellious colony, Rhodesia. In 1964, the two northern portions of
the colonial Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved independence as
black majority–controlled states—Malawi (once Nyasaland) in July and Zambia
(the former Northern Rhodesia) in October. London anticipated that the whites
of Southern Rhodesia, who controlled the colony although they constituted a
small minority of its population, would attempt to preempt the domestic and
international pressure for black-majority rule by establishing Southern Rhodesia
as a white-controlled state. Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain outlined in
October 1964 his government’s preconditions for granting the colony independence: a guarantee of unimpeded progress toward majority rule; guarantees
against unconstitutional amendment of the 1961 constitution (a document that
had implied movement toward majority rule); an immediate token of improvement of the political status of Africans; progress toward cessation of racial discrimination; and agreement on a settlement acceptable to the entire population,
1
using a general referendum or similar device.
Instead, on 11 November 1965, Salisbury (later Harare, the capital of Southern Rhodesia), issued a “Unilateral Declaration of Independence,” asserting the
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existence of the sovereign state of Rhodesia, under Prime Minister Ian Smith.
The Security Council retaliated on 20 November with a regime of voluntary
2
sanctions. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 217 called on all members of the United Nations to withhold recognition of Rhodesia, refuse assistance to its government, sever economic relations with Salisbury, and embargo
3
petroleum shipments to the rebellious colony. This resolution was to serve as
the original (if flimsy) legal justification for later British maritime intercept operations, giving the United Kingdom reason to expect the cooperation of the flag
4
states of suspect tankers. In December, London banned selected imports from
5
Rhodesia and prohibited the export of British oil to it.
Unwilling to invade its colony, Britain publicly forswore outright military intervention, thus eliminating a potential tool for coercion. Indeed, Wilson at first
ruled out (in a statement of 21 December 1965 to the House of Commons) even
a blockade of products going to Rhodesia. Believing that a potential oil boycott
by certain Middle East producers and cessation of oil exports by governmentcontrolled British companies would be sufficient, the prime minister did not
6
then intend to submit an oil-blockade resolution to the United Nations. Instead, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office sought to formulate a strategy of limited sanctions to erode Smith’s domestic white,
middle-class support. London would ultimately declare a series of unilateral
sanctions and also support several UN sanctions that gradually increased pressure upon Salisbury.
Unfortunately, London had other, conflicting objectives as well, especially a
desire to lure Rhodesia back into the colonial fold. Whitehall therefore sought to
treat its problems with Rhodesia as a conflict between metropole and colony.
Even when urging UN involvement in the dispute, London would discourage
multilateral military action against Rhodesia or any extension of sanctions to
Rhodesia’s backers in white-ruled South Africa and Mozambique. However, a
major bloc in the UN, comprising especially the newly independent African and
Asian states, wanted military measures taken directly against Rhodesia, along
with expanded sanctions. Britain attempted to blunt such initiatives; a regime of
economic sanctions, particularly maritime, would become Britain’s way of containing the international repercussions while pressuring its colony. This overarching desire to limit the dispute would later lead Wilson’s cabinet to reject the
Defence Ministry’s own plans to extend the blockade.
“ACTIVE AND URGENT STEPS”
Even before the naval blockade was started in March 1966, the British bureaucracy sent mixed signals about the utility of sanctions against Rhodesia. In October 1965, the Joint Intelligence Committee (the United Kingdom’s highest
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estimative body) advised the political leadership that even a full trade embargo
would “not in itself [have] crippling effects on the Rhodesia economy.” However,
the committee also suggested that prolonged and severe economic pressure
7
“might in time induce the white electorate to throw out the rebel government.”
Prime Minister Wilson, for his part, had high hopes that these sanctions
would work. On 7 January 1966, he told the Jamaican prime minister that sanctions were “beginning to bite.” He estimated that in three months the rebels
would at least rescind the unilateral declaration of independence and reconsider
8
their stance on minority rule. He made an even bolder prediction in a convocation of Commonwealth foreign ministers on 10 January 1966—that the cumulative effects of economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to
an end “within a matter of weeks rather than months.”9 Wilson based this
prediction on several factors: feedback he was seeing in the Rhodesian press, a
presumption that South Africa and Mozambique would honor the British sanctions in order not to escalate the crisis, and optimism that Zambia would agree
10
to freeze the movement of goods across its territory to and from Rhodesia.
As Wilson made these optimistic statements, nevertheless, the Foreign Office
was beginning to look at the possibility of a maritime embargo. On 7 January, as
an aside to a statement that Britain had no formal contingency plan for a blockade, it observed that the carrier HMS Eagle and two frigates were near Mombasa,
11
Kenya, and could be available for such a task within days.
This early planning proved prudent. The government’s grounds for optimism
were dashed during the first week of February, when British press reports of
tanker-truck shipments of oil from South Africa to Rhodesia raised serious
questions about South African neutrality and the possible effectiveness of oil
sanctions. Rhodesia had in the past received oil through three primary routes: by
road, across the Beit Bridge from South Africa; by rail, through Mozambique
from either South Africa or the port of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo); and
12
by pipeline, carrying crude oil from Beira to the Rhodesian refinery in Umtali.
The prime minister became increasingly frustrated over the oil “seepage” into
Rhodesia by land. On 16 February Wilson directed his personal secretary to issue a warning to key cabinet departments: “The Prime Minister is very concerned about reports in the press which indicate that the oil embargo in
Rhodesia is being circumvented with increasing effectiveness. . . . [T]here is
clearly very serious leaking in the oil sanction machinery. . . . [T]he Prime Minister’s view is that the oil leakage into Rhodesia is serious, must be taken seriously
and he hopes that the Departments concerned will take active and urgent steps
to have it stopped.”13
Two days later, the foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, warned Wilson that
the black African states might push for more “urgent” sanctions in view of the
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continuing oil flow into Rhodesia. Indeed, they might raise the issue at the UN at
14
any time. Against this backdrop, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Britain’s senior
purely military decision-making body, opined on 24 February that “pirate”
tankers could arrive in Beira “un-noticed.” In response to a request from an interagency Rhodesia contingency steering committee, the committee directed
that a maritime surveillance plan be prepared for submission to the prime minister. This would be no mere planning exercise; the likely operational commander would prepare the plan, which would involve both surface and air
components. Headquartered in Aden, Middle East Command would control the
operation until relieved of this responsibility by Far East Command in May
1967. The committee had in mind Majunga (now Mahajanga), in the Malagasy
Republic (as Madagascar called itself from its independence in 1960 through
15
1975), as a staging base for Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft.
In other words, oil smuggling had become the issue of the day, and the naval
blockade planning effort was about to get a big push. Later in February 1966 the
Rhodesian crisis as a whole developed a maritime flavor when the British government (and the world press) started to focus on tankers carrying oil for Rhodesia. The Rhodesians themselves had set the stage. On 25 February, the
Rhodesian minister of commerce and industry had announced that a tanker
16
would arrive at Beira with oil for Rhodesia “in the foreseeable future.” Some
days later he predicted, “The day our first tanker arrives in Beira we shall have
17
won this economic war.” London had already received numerous reports of
tankers. Between 7 January and 1 March, Whitehall, working with a host of commercial and intelligence sources, had investigated thirty-two reports and found
18
them to be “phantom tankers”—nonexistent or innocent.
This mixture of Rhodesian public relations “spin,” rumor, solid intelligence,
and unwanted publicity forced Britain to “do something” to prove its commitment to sanctions; on 1 March, accordingly, it established the Beira patrol. The
Royal Navy stationed the Rothesay-class antisubmarine frigate HMS Lowestoft
off Beira and directed it to prepare for intercept operations, to start on 4 March.
Gannet Mark 3 airborne early warning aircraft flying from the carrier HMS Ark
Royal (which had been diverted from a transit to the Far East) joined the search
19
in the Mozambique Channel on 6 March.
The need for the patrol was immediately confirmed—the government soon
received evidence that two tankers might be making for Beira with crude oil for
Rhodesia. The Joanna V, a Greek-flag vessel, had been making an unusual voyage; after steaming from the Arabian Gulf to Rotterdam via the Suez Canal, it
had entered the Atlantic as if to return the long way, around Africa. Its Greek
owner, it developed, had contracted with a South African shipping agent to deliver a total of twenty-seven cargoes—about a year’s supply for Rhodesia—to an
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unspecified customer. A second tanker, the Manuela, was also reported en route
20
to Mozambique across the Indian Ocean from Bandar Mashur, Iran.
Meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was refining its arrangements and
prospects for success. On 8 March, in light of evidence it had received of construction in progress of six oil tanks in Beira, the committee concluded that oil
had (as the Rhodesian commerce minister had already asserted) become emblematic—if oil reached Beira, sanctions of all kinds would appear to be failing.
The committee assessed, though, that Rhodesia already had sufficient oil stocks
21
to maintain morale even if Britain could impose an effective embargo.
In a message on 10 March to the prime minister of New Zealand, Keith J.
Holyoake, Wilson elaborated on the criticality of the oil embargo, despite the apparent policy turnabout it represented:
I am worried at the possibility of a dramatic breach in the oil embargo such as would
result from a tanker entering Beira with a cargo for Rhodesia. . . . [I]f a tanker were
to arrive we should face increasing pressure from African states for a Chapter VII [of
the UN Charter] resolution [i.e., authorizing the use of armed force] in the UN. It remains our view that we should try and avoid this. If we once admit that Rhodesia is a
threat to peace, there is no knowing where we may find ourselves. . . . Nevertheless,
we recognize that the pressure for a Chapter VII resolution would probably be irresistible and our aim would have to be to channel it in a direction of an embargo
solely directed to oil supplies for Rhodesia.22

The Commonwealth Relations Office elaborated on this objective in a message sent to British embassies worldwide in early April:
Our immediate and urgent purpose is to obtain authority to prevent the arrival at
Beira by vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil to Rhodesia. . . . You should,
therefore, emphasize importance of our decision which reflects determination of
British government to end rebellion in Rhodesia as soon as possible. There will no
doubt be pressure to extend the resolution, e.g., to cover South Africa in relation to
the oil embargo, and possibly to extend other economic sanctions generally. . . .We
have already approached the South African government with the object of persuading them to modify their policy vis-à-vis Rhodesia and so avoid a confrontation between themselves and the United Nations. If this approach is to have any prospect of
success we must avoid reference to South Africa’s position in the Security Council.23

SURVEILLANCE, INTERCEPTION, AND DETERRENCE
The initial British commitment of naval forces soon comprised a carrier, two
frigates—Lowestoft and HMS Rhyl—and a logistical support ship. If the carrier
had to depart station, the Royal Navy would deploy a third frigate. Either Ark
Royal or Eagle would have patrol responsibilities until 25 May 1966, when Britain eliminated the requirement for a carrier. For the remaining nine years of the
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blockade, a succession of Royal Navy “small boys”—two destroyers or frigates at
any one time (until the last months of the operation)—carried the burden of the
surface blockade.
The warships, operating twenty to forty miles off Beira, were to intercept suspect tankers that had been detected by shore-based maritime patrol aircraft,
upon which they would rely, once the involvement of carriers ended, for surveil24
lance, alerting, and vectoring. Difficulties in securing basing rights, however,
delayed the participation of maritime patrol
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Durban
Indian Ocean
SOUTH AFRICA
early weeks of the operation London was required in that time to approach the tankers’
Port Elizabeth
flag countries and arrange to stop and board
the ships, if necessary; with the passage in April of Security Council Resolution
221, Britain would no longer have to secure this approval, and early airborne de25
tection would become less critical.
On 16 March the French relented, and by 19 March a detachment of three
Shackletons was flying daily single-aircraft patrols from Majunga, at first com26
plementing the carrier-based patrols and then replacing them. Although in
1969 the Royal Air Force was to reduce the Shackleton detachment from three to
27
two aircraft, the Navy would enjoy dedicated maritime air support until 1971.
At first, each Shackleton flew daily twelve-hour missions, normally from 6
A.M. to 6 P.M. local time; in June 1966, the patrols dropped to three a week. The
bombers would fly at maximum speed along the shipping lanes to the northern
end of the Mozambique Channel and then south to a point fifty miles south of
Beira. Radar was their primary sensor; it covered a swath between forty and sixty
nautical miles on each side of track. When the Shackletons acquired contacts,
28
they would fly over them to investigate. The aircraft were required to report the
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location, course, speed, and identity of all tankers, bulk carriers, and warships
sighted to the officer in tactical command—the senior Royal Navy warship commanding officer present. (The officer in tactical command might order a surface
unit to investigate, but only the Ministry of Defence could authorize it to stop or
divert a suspect tanker.) The aircraft were also to notify that commander should
they sight any previously designated “suspect tanker,” any tanker not on the
weekly “innocent list,” or any tanker on the list that was apparently steaming for
Beira after having declared for another port. In such a case the officer in tactical
command would send a “flash” (highest-precedence) report to the Ministry of
29
Defence.
The Defence Ministry prepared a comprehensive press release to be issued in
April 1966. It noted that aircraft from Ark Royal and Eagle had flown by then
nearly a thousand surveillance sorties. Four different frigates and destroyers, as
well as seven auxiliaries, had supported the operation. Three Shackletons had
30
been involved, each initially flying four hundred patrol hours a month. Although the sortie rate soon dropped to only three missions a week, the
Shackletons still flew 220 operational sorties between March 1966 and April
31
1967. During the same period, the two carriers and seventeen other combatants, in addition to Royal Fleet Auxiliaries (resupply vessels), had participated in
the patrol at one time or another.
The Middle East Command characterized the period starting in mid-June
1966 as the patrol’s “deterrent phase.” The military now hoped to deter future attempts at oil-sanction “busting” by means of highly conspicuous surveillance
over the Mozambique Channel. “It would soon become common knowledge
throughout the merchant fleets that it was impossible to get through the Mozambique Channel without being investigated by a Shackleton. They would
warn the frigates off Beira who would intercept and arrest with the probable loss
32
of an expensive cargo. The game was not worth it.”
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
At least four sets of rules of engagement—issued by Flag Officer Middle East on
the basis of guidelines supplied by the Ministry of Defence—governed the Beira
patrol between 1966 and 1968. The successive changes were significant because
they reflected the evolution of British understanding of the legal basis of the operation. With one early exception, the rules became successively tougher; eventually, following an embarrassing incident in 1967 involving the French tanker
Artois, London would authorize, if all else failed, gunfire directly at a tanker’s
bridge.
The first set of rules, issued on 15 February, delineated the responsibilities of the
blockading ships. Flag Officer Middle East instructed his frigates that if ordered
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to intercept a tanker bound for Beira, they were to direct it to another port. If the
vessel did not comply, the commanding officer was to take a series of escalatory
steps, including firing shots across the bow and training guns directly at the ship.
A boarding party might then be sent to order the master to divert; if he refused,
the party was to “take over ship with minimum force” and steam it out of the
33
area. To preclude untoward incidents, however, Flag Officer Middle East also
warned that none of these actions would occur before the United Kingdom had
secured permission from the tanker’s flag state. The patroller’s only initial action
would be to interrogate and shadow the tanker until Britain secured this approval.
Reviewing this plan, Prime Minister Wilson became concerned with ensuring
that the Royal Navy would scrupulously respect the limits of British authority under international law, particularly in light of the voluntary nature of Security
Council Resolution 217. Speaking through his personal secretary on 11 March,
Wilson warned that “before any action to intercept is taken the consent of the flag
state should have been obtained.” He also desired that commanding officers be
34
given a “clear understanding that any force used must be kept to a minimum.”
Defence Ministry guidance to Flag Officer Middle East had assumed that a
tanker’s flag state had given Britain permission to divert the ship. A week after the
prime minister expressed his concerns, the Defence Ministry modified its guidelines; now, if a tanker refused to turn away when challenged, a boarding party
would warn the master, in the name of the vessel’s flag state, to change course. If
that did not work, a shot across the bow was authorized. Gone was any option of
commandeering the ship. Indeed, if a tanker absolutely refused to comply, the
warship could only escort it, and then only to the Mozambican six-mile territorial
35
limit. In other words, the tanker could proceed to Beira unhindered.
These modified rules of engagement tightened up considerably when the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 221 on 9 April 1966. The unusual voyage of
the Joanna V, which had drawn British attention in early March, had ended on 5
April in a highly embarrassing way—the Greek-flag tanker had entered Beira after all, unmolested, under escort by the frustrated HMS Plymouth, and with
wide publicity. The day before, still at sea, the frigate had attempted to persuade
Joanna V to go to another port; Greece having refused permission to divert it,
36
Plymouth could not use force. Consequently, it was the Royal Navy that was deterred, before the watchful eyes of the world press.
Whitehall’s legal advisors still warned that Britain would be liable if it attempted to force a diversion without permission of the flag state. They added
on 7 April that use of force must be in accordance with an appropriate Chapter
VII resolution. That same day, the Commonwealth Relations Office sent a
flash-precedence message to British embassies that Britain would seek an
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emergency meeting of the Security Council to obtain UN authority to use
37
force to stop vessels carrying oil to Beira.
Over the next several days the United Kingdom lobbied furiously in the
Security Council for a new resolution that would give a stronger legal basis for
its embargo. It argued that continued seaborne deliveries of oil were a threat to
peace, because if sanctions failed, violence might erupt in southern Africa. Britain argued that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, preventing their failure
might justify the use of force. (The United Nations had used the provision only
38
once before, at the beginning of the Korean War.)
The British drew up such a resolution, crafting it to limit the risk of escalation. It confined the blockade to Beira only and specifically authorized only the
United Kingdom to employ force. For reasons that will be discussed below, the
Defence Ministry was leery of allowing other navies to participate. In the event,
the new resolution, passed as UNSCR 221, was to have the unintended and costly
effect of forcing the Royal Navy (aside from assistance for several years from the
Royal Air Force) to maintain the nine-year blockade entirely alone.
The resolution called upon Portugal “not to permit oil to be pumped through
the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia” and “not to receive at Beira oil destined for
Rhodesia.” All states were to ensure the diversion of “any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for
39
Beira.” The teeth of the resolution, however, were in paragraph 5, which
“[called] upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of
force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying
oil destined for Rhodesia, and empower[ed] the United Kingdom to arrest and
detain the tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the
40
event her oil cargo [was] discharged there.”
With this resolution, the Defence Ministry liberalized, from the blockading
force’s viewpoint, the rules of engagement but continued to limit the use of force
to “the very minimum.” Ministry approval would still be required for diversion
of vessels, and the Royal Navy had to remain outside Mozambique’s territorial
waters. The Middle East Command acknowledged that the “resolution radically
altered the whole concept of our operations. With a tight ring of frigates around
Beira having authority to stop any suspected runners, the early warning to give
41
maximum time for diplomatic action was no longer essential.”
The Royal Navy felt, however, that Mozambique’s six-mile limit was problematic. Soon after the Security Council issued its new resolution, the Defence Ministry advised Prime Minister Wilson that it was possible for a tanker to transit to
Beira from Durban, South Africa, entirely within South African, and then
Mozambican, territorial waters; without authority to enter those waters, the
Navy would be unable to act. Fortunately, no “pirate tanker” ever tried to challenge
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the Beira blockade in this way. Had one taken advantage of the territorial limits
of an unsympathetic power, the British blockade force would have been hard
42
pressed to stop it without creating an international incident.
The new system stood until late the following year, when the French forced
the Royal Navy to reconsider what constituted “minimum force.” On 19 December 1967, HMS Minerva challenged the French-flag tanker Artois as it made for
Beira. Artois was not on the “innocent list,” so Minerva requested the ministry to
clarify its status. Meanwhile, the tanker continued to approach Beira. Minerva
signaled “Stop or I will open fire”; Artois refused. By the time London finally notified the frigate that Artois could legitimately enter Beira, “because it was not
carrying oil destined for Rhodesia,” Minerva had already fired warning shots; the
tanker had ignored them and entered Mozambican territorial waters.43
Fearing that a smuggler might emulate Artois, the minister of defence, Denis
Healey, castigated the existing rules of engagement for “lack of precision”: “Not
only does it place an unfair burden on commanding officers to leave them in any
doubt about how far they are expected to go in the enforcement of their requests,
but it exposes the Royal Navy to the risk of international discredit should an illegal tanker disregard the threat of force and be allowed to get away with it.” He
presented the cabinet with two options: restricting the Beira patrol simply to
identifying smugglers, or directing commanding officers to use disabling gun44
fire against tankers that failed to heed other warnings.
The attorney general reviewed the proposal and gave as his opinion that the
Navy had to satisfy two criteria to remain within the bounds of UNSCR 221. The
force used had to be “necessary,” and the United Kingdom had to have a “reasonable belief ” that the tanker was carrying oil consigned to Rhodesia. The attorney
general also opined that UN responsibility was political only—“Any legal re45
sponsibility would almost certainly fall on ourselves.”
The foreign secretary, George Thomson, replied that Britain could reasonably meet both criteria. Though the Ministry of Power (the source of much of
the Royal Navy’s tanker-movement intelligence) had expressed “some anxiety”
about its ability to meet the second standard absolutely, the foreign secretary
concluded that it had taken “every possible precaution” to do so. Consequently,
he concurred with stiffening the rules of engagement and issuing a stern warn46
ing to the United Nations about what might happen to blockade runners.
On 21 March 1968, the Defence Ministry informed the Commander in Chief
Far East (who, in Singapore, had assumed responsibilities as operational
commander of the Beira patrol from his counterpart in Middle East Command
in 1967) that the rules of engagement were being “clarified” and that UN member states were being notified that blockading ships would “enforce their requests to stop, if necessary by opening fire on the vessel.” The ministry directed
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the commander to issue new instructions immediately—if naval headquarters
at the Defence Ministry ordered that a tanker be diverted, the intercepting warship was to challenge it. If the tanker did not stop, the frigate or destroyer was to
take a series of escalating measures: firing across the bow with small-arms tracers, 20 or 40 mm shells, or a 4.5-inch (for a few ships, four-inch) round; then, approaching to point-blank range and warning that it would open fire; and finally,
firing surface-practice (that is, not high-explosive) ammunition at the ship’s
funnel. If these successive measures did not stop the tanker, the frigate was to fire
a series of antisubmarine “mortar bombs set shallow about one cable [some two
hundred yards] astern of the ship.” Finally, if all that failed, the unit was to “open
fire with 4.5/4" service ammunition at either the bridge or the engine room or
47
both and continue until the ship does stop.”
The British delegation to the United Nations issued a warning to the member
states: “[Her Majesty’s] ships have been instructed that if their requests to stop
are not complied with they may enforce them, if necessary, by opening fire on
the vessel. The master of such a vessel would thus, by refusing to stop, put at risk
the lives of his crew and the safety of ship and cargo. . . . [A]ll member states will
take the necessary action to ensure that the masters of vessels subject to their jurisdiction are made aware of the terms of Security Council Resolution No. 221. . . .
[Her Majesty’s government] would also urge member states to ensure that operating companies subject to their jurisdiction give advance notification to any
[British] diplomatic or consular missions of a proposed call on Beira by an oil
48
tanker.”
The new rules of engagement were apparently sufficient. After the Artois incident there were no more attempts to disregard the Royal Navy blockade of Beira
and no further major revisions to the rules of engagement.
FASHIONING A MORE EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE
The government and the vocal Conservative opposition were well aware that the
blockade was porous. In September 1966, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs reported a “leakage” of 220,000 gallons of oil daily to Rhodesia;
under strict rationing, the self-declared nation required only two hundred thousand.49 Considerable staff work was therefore devoted to making the blockade
tighter or to finding ways to share the burden with other navies. All such initiatives failed, for a variety of reasons. Some exceeded resources; for instance,
blockading both Mozambican ports capable of transshipping large quantities of
oil (Beira by pipeline, Maputo by rail) would be too demanding for the Royal
Navy. Others required confronting South Africa, a Commonwealth member, directly, or risking an expanded debate in the UN—neither of which London was
willing to do.
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As early as 1966, the Navy had calculated what forces would be needed to extend the blockade. To blockade all ports in Mozambique and South Africa would
require seven carriers and thirty escorts, which meant, allowing for rotation of
50
ships on and off station, at least sixty frigates. The Defence Ministry, for its
part, doubted that the entire UN could mount such an ambitious effort, U.S.
51
Navy assistance being unavailable due to the war in Vietnam. Even had the
forces been available, the United Kingdom lacked the political will for such a
grandiose operation. A member of the Foreign Office advised in January 1967,
“I must repeat what we have said in the past, namely that we think it is at present
outside of the bounds of political reality to envisage the need for such large scale
52
naval enforcement.”
To blockade even only the two major Mozambican ports (Beira and Lourenço
Marques) would mean keeping six or seven frigates on station, for a total of between fourteen and seventeen if selected export sanctions were to be enforced as
well. A pessimistic ministry staff study warned the minister of defence that such
a force “would amount to the greater part of the total overseas frigate strength of
the Royal Navy and would go far to denude the Mediterranean, Middle East and
53
Far East stations.” The Royal Navy could stop oil going into the two major
ports, but the blockade would “not really bite since oil could still reach Rhodesia
via South Africa.”
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom continued to toy with the idea of an expanded blockade. In March 1968, an internal Defence Ministry document noted
that whereas Rhodesia was still getting “all or more oil than it needs,” and
whereas Security Council Resolution 221 was still binding on Britain, the minis54
try was searching for ways to make the blockade more effective. The matter was
taken up also by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, which was chaired
by the prime minister personally. The DOPC’s conclusions about expanding the
blockade to both major Mozambican ports were pessimistic; such an effort,
which would cost 1.5 million pounds monthly and tie up fifteen frigates and
four or five auxiliaries, would oblige the Royal Navy to abandon most of its other
55
worldwide commitments. In other words, despite early optimism, a comprehensive naval blockade against even Mozambique alone would be beyond the
Royal Navy’s capabilities.
A second approach considered was to request a commitment from Portugal
to guarantee that no oil would reach Rhodesia via the territory of Mozambique,
its colony. Lisbon had consistently challenged the legality (and binding nature)
of Security Council Resolution 221, and the United Kingdom saw little hope of
Portuguese cooperation. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office laid out a proposal in
which the Beira patrol would be suspended in return for such a commitment. In
March 1968, Whitehall again predicted that Portugal would not acquiesce in
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such a scheme unless the South Africans were willing to refrain from making
good Rhodesian shortfalls caused by loss of the Mozambique connection. It
seemed certain that the white-minority government of South Africa would not
cooperate; hence, the Defence Ministry concluded, “We cannot therefore count
56
on the acquiescence of the Portuguese.”
The Foreign Office visited this scenario yet again in December 1969. This
time, the concept was to co-opt the Mozambique railways and pipeline
company—in return for financial compensation, they would agree not to tranship oil to Rhodesia. To make the proposal attractive to the United Nations,
however, the foreign ministry sought and received prior agreement from the
Royal Navy to reimpose the blockade quickly should such an arrangement break
57
down. However, London proved unable to obtain the necessary agreement of
58
Portugal or commitments from the other parties that would have been involved.
In addition, the idea of naval burden sharing arose several times during the
course of the blockade. There were inherent complications. UNSCR 221 authorized only the United Kingdom to use military force to enforce the blockade; other
nations that might wish to participate would need to seek similar legal protection for their navies. That would reopen the UN debate about sanctions enforcement and, because of the widespread hostility in the General Assembly to the
white Rhodesian regime, would risk widening the sanctions in ways Britain
59
wished to avoid. In any case, the Defence Ministry was ambivalent: “We certainly would not want to get involved with help from embarrassing sources, e.g.
60
[the] USSR, from whom it might be difficult to refuse any offers.” The ministry
saw no prospect that the UN would allow Britain to select its partners. It also
foresaw additional costs; Britain, it presumed, would be required to provide logistical support to units of foreign navies. In any case, the ministry was skeptical
61
that even “Old Commonwealth” navies could be persuaded to participate.
Nevertheless, in June 1969 Prime Minister Wilson decided that the government should consider inviting other countries (such as Canada) to participate in
62
the patrol. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (or FCO, as the previously
separate bodies were now jointly known) was “not entirely pessimistic” that the
Royal Navy might be able to secure naval assistance. The Defence Ministry did
not share this view. In November 1969, the FCO ruled out U.S. participation,
given its “full scale re-examinations of their policy in southern Africa—and of
their overseas commitments generally.” Sweden and Norway had the capability
to support the embargo and might be willing to do so, but the Foreign and Commonwealth Office felt that Western European Union countries should be ap63
proached first. However, the FCO soon cooled even to that possibility:
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The potential savings to our resources accruing from foreign participation in the patrol between now and the completion of our withdrawal from the Far East at the end
of 1971 is not sufficient to outweigh disadvantages and to justify the substantial risk
inherent in such an initiative of embarrassment at the UN and of a rebuff from the
governments we approach. Financially, there would be a modest savings in foreign
exchange. Operationally, the weight of argument is against it; there might also be in64
creased difficulties of disengagement.

Nonetheless, the FCO left open the option of approaching foreign navies as
Royal Navy force reductions made it increasingly difficult to maintain the blockade. The cabinet secretary echoed this prospect to Wilson in March 1970.65 None
of these approaches was fruitful.
“GETTING SHOT OF THE COMMITMENT”
However professionally the Royal Navy and Air Force conducted the blockade,
this inevitably ineffectual operation, conducted so far away from home, became
increasingly unpopular within the Defence Ministry. Indeed, many of the burdensharing initiatives discussed above were outgrowths of an underlying desire to
eliminate the commitment entirely. The ministry raised persuasive arguments
about the costs of the patrol for a nation that had decided to end its commitments east of Suez. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, fought to
maintain the patrol because of its political visibility; the prime minister was to
endorse that position. As long as Britain attempted to reverse Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence, it would be committed to sanctions;
as long as it was committed to sanctions, it was tied to UNSCR 221 and the Beira
patrol.
Queried by the Commonwealth Office in February 1968 as to the costs of the
patrol, the Defence Ministry eagerly responded: “We are very willing to play our
part in an exercise [exchange of correspondence] which will give ministers a
broad indication of the savings to be had from stopping the Beira patrol. From
the Navy’s point of view the patrol reduces ship availability and it is not a task
66
from which we derive any great training value.” The ministry argued that
maintaining the patrol, particularly after 1971, would “greatly reduce” the na67
tion’s ability to respond to contingencies outside of Europe. Nevertheless, in
March 1968 the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee concluded that the time
“was not ripe” to end the patrol, although from the purely military view “one
68
should be glad to get rid of the tasks.” The DOPC concluded that the political
disadvantages of ending the patrol outweighed any financial gains or opera69
tional relief to be expected from its cessation. However, the committee agreed
70
to reconsider cessation of the patrol “if the balance of advantages changed.”
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In November the Defence Ministry tried again, asking the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whether the Beira patrol could be ended unilaterally. The reply was that the patrol would have to remain in effect until such time as
71
Parliament should grant Rhodesia independence. (In the event, Parliament did
not accede to a settlement of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean issue, which was to become wide-reaching and infinitely complex, until 1979.)
In May 1969, the Ministry of Defence again raised the cost issue and the risk
of “overstretching” the Navy’s frigate force. In a draft memo, the minister
pointed out that a total of six frigates was being required to maintain two on patrol. He cited the low training value of the patrol, operational flexibility penalties, the longer frigate deployments involved, the necessity of permanently
deploying fleet maintenance assets and, for all these reasons, a resulting lowered
standard of operational readiness. “There would be clear advantages in terms of
ship availability and operational flexibility if the patrol could be given up as
soon as possible. The operational penalties imposed by the task will be substantially greater if it is necessary to continue the patrol after the withdrawal of our
forces from east of Suez.”72 The minister’s staff continued this refrain the next
month: “There is no training value in the patrol[,] for the Royal Navy and the
Royal Air Force aircraft cannot combine it with their antisubmarine role. Because oil products are patently reaching Rhodesia through other routes[,] the
men employed on the patrol cannot be expected to derive any satisfaction from
it and it is not a popular task with the Royal Navy.” The staff urged its minister to
push the sanctions bureaucracy to study ways and means of “getting shot of the
73
commitment.”
In June 1969 the Defence Oversea Policy Committee agreed to review burden
sharing and ending the patrol, but it warned that the “present juncture is not one
at which we can afford to give the impression that we are weakening on sanc74
tions.” Nonetheless, the committee commissioned “in great secrecy” a parallel
study to investigate “unobtrusively” the prospects of ending “sanctions alto75
gether or at least reducing their scale and cost.” These studies were still under
way when in September 1969 Wilson made it clear that he was not about to
abandon the patrol—the patrol’s future “involves wider issues than those relat76
ing merely to defense.”
In the next year the Defence Ministry was still unable to shake the political
leadership’s commitment to the patrol. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
forestalled even a proposal to reduce the patrol temporarily from two to one
frigate that spring; elections in Britain were about to take place, and the government required that two ships be kept on station. On 16 June 1970, the personal
secretary to the defence minister predicted, “Until the election is over, the political
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significance of the number of ships engaged in the patrol would make it ex77
tremely difficult to agree to any reduction.”
The elections brought in a new government, that of Edward Heath and the
Conservatives. Despite rumors in the press, the new cabinet supported the Beira
patrol. In July 1970, the new foreign minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, con78
firmed that the United Kingdom would continue it. Ultimately, however, unalterable external factors—the elimination of the British military commitments
east of Suez in 1971 and reduction of the fleet—would force further reduction of
the resources committed to the patrol.
Although the Defence Ministry had lost its battle for a policy decision to
eliminate the patrol outright, the force itself was whittled down between 1971
and 1975. By the spring of 1975, the patrol was to be a shadow of the carrier, frigate, and Shackleton force of 1966. The reduction occurred in several stages. In
March 1971, within a year of its election, the Heath government allowed the
Royal Navy to patrol Beira with one frigate instead of two. This relaxation produced a drop from 717 ship-days on patrol during 1970 to 354 ship-days in
79
1972.
The patrol then lost its air component. In June 1971, the Malagasy Republic
80
asked the Royal Air Force to eliminate the Shackleton detachment at Majunga.
Thereafter, because of an overall drop in the number of frigates in the fleet, the
Royal Navy was allowed to make the patrol intermittent; in 1973, the Navy assigned frigates to the station for only 161 ship-days (typically by diverting ships
81
transiting to or from the Far East). “Gapping” the patrol could be justified by
the argument that the Umtali refinery was inoperable; not having refined oil
since January 1966, the facility could resume doing so only after a lengthy
recommissioning process.
The Beira patrol finally wound down completely on 25 June 1975, the day
Mozambique became independent, having assured the United Kingdom that it
would not transship oil to Rhodesia. On that day HMS Salisbury went off station, and the Royal Navy was finally off the hook. Whitehall was likely reassured
in this decision when Mozambique gained independence and then sealed its
border with Rhodesia in March 1976. Still, the effort had been demanding: seventysix Royal Navy ships had supported the patrol during its ten-year history. One
82
estimate placed total operating costs at a hundred million pounds.
The Beira patrol, a useful case study of a unilateral approach to naval sanctions
enforcement, offers interesting lessons at several levels. For all of the ship-days
and aircraft sorties it required, the patrol appears to have accomplished remarkably little. During its heyday (March 1966–March 1971), the force intercepted a
total of forty-seven tankers bound for Beira. Of these, forty-two were allowed to
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proceed. The other five did not stop or were escorted from the area. Meanwhile,
as the government continuously documented, oil got through to Rhodesia from
South Africa and the port of Lourenço Marques. The Portuguese announced that
between April 1966 and May 1967, 169 tankers entered Lourenço Marques;
84
fifty-eight, the Portuguese reported, had flown the British flag.
Yet the British government was convinced throughout that the patrol was
useful as a symbol of the nation’s commitment to sanctions against the separatist
Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith—a commitment London was obliged to sustain
by the legal box in which it had put itself in the UN. Because Security Council
Resolution 221, which Britain had drafted, mandated British military action, the
government (at least the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices) considered the political costs of discontinuing the patrol greater than the concrete
costs of conducting it. Even the Defence Ministry acknowledged that Rhodesia
had to expend more foreign exchange moving oil by rail from Lourenço Mar85
ques than it would have had the Beira-Umtali pipeline been open.
At the level of practice, the role of the news media proved critically important. At first overconfident about the speed with which sanctions could take effect, the Wilson cabinet was forced to react rapidly in March and April 1966
when world attention focused on two “pirate tankers” steaming toward Mozambique with oil for Rhodesia. Far more oil than such tankers carried was already
moving across land borders; nonetheless, the publicity given their approach
forced Britain to take action quickly or be accused of weakness.
Had the vessels’ arrival in Beira been discovered only after the fact, Whitehall
might have been able to draft a less reactive, more thoughtful Security Council
resolution. As it proved, Britain learned that while such a resolution can be the
ultimate stamp of international legitimacy, it can also be oppressively binding.
The United Kingdom felt naturally obliged to use its own navy to deal with its
breakaway colony, but the burden could have been made less painful at the onset. For example, British diplomats might have considered calling, in what became paragraph 5 of UNSCR 221, upon all UN member nations, not just the
United Kingdom, to contribute military force to enforce the blockade. The
blockade, of course, would then not have been under total British control, and
ships of the Royal Navy might have found themselves steaming alongside those
of its nation’s adversaries. Nonetheless, had London realized that sanction enforcement would last so long, it might have welcomed participation by other
navies.
Inherently, a multinational force would have further complicated the formulation of rules of engagement, a task that was difficult enough as it was. As vital
as rules of engagement are in all such cases to the credibility of sanctions enforcement, it took Britain time (and a Security Council resolution) to create a set
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sufficiently robust to allow its ships to stop “pirate tankers.” Even then, it was
shown that the blockade could be challenged with impunity, and the rules had to
be toughened again (in December 1967). Until that was done, and thereafter to
the extent that it could still be evaded, the Beira patrol gave the impression of
ineffectiveness.
Still, the most effective sanctions are not necessarily the most visible ones. If
Security Council Resolution 221 and the naval blockade it mandated did not really deprive Rhodesia of oil, they were only part of an array of United Nations
measures against Rhodesia that ultimately isolated Salisbury and drained the
Rhodesian economy. But the process took years, not weeks.
The Beira patrol represented Britain’s hurried response to a highly publicized
challenge from its breakaway colony of Southern Rhodesia. The patrol allowed
London to limit the escalation of a potentially volatile situation while providing
a credible demonstration of its commitment to sanction enforcement, which
was the course Whitehall wanted to pursue. The experience ultimately proved,
however, that Security Council resolutions—public and formal pronouncements with the authority of the United Nations and the stature of international
law—can, when used as weapons, turn in the hands of their wielders. A resolution that had mandated a multinational response would appear to have been less
painful for the Royal Navy; it would also have allowed the patrol to be made
more effective by generating enough naval force to extend the blockade to other
ports. The flexibility offered by a more broadly conceived instrument would
have been worth the challenges of preparing and implementing it.
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he 1999 air war over Kosovo re-ignited a feud between the military and the
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however, these reporters incurred the wrath of the official establishment for
1
their contrary accounts of the war’s progress.” Paradoxically, according to this
view, media-military relations may have been better when censorship was in
2
force, as in World War II.
This article will argue, however, that the strained relationship between the
media and the U.S. military has nothing to do with censorship—for the simple
reason that media-military relations have always been rocky, never more than in
World War II. The difference between World War II and Vietnam was not the
presence of censorship but the absence of victory. In other conflicts, victory has
erased memories of a troubled relationship; after Vietnam, the media was
caught up in the quest for a scapegoat. Furthermore, the nebulous goals of the
War on Terrorism, the fact that it is likely to be a prolonged operation, and the
inherent difficulties from a media perspective of covering a war fought from the
air and in the shadows virtually guarantee a degeneration of the relationship between two institutions with an inherent distrust of each other.
How then do we account for chronically poor media-military relations in
America? The basic explanation is that the natures and goals of the two institutions are fundamentally in tension. For its part, the military, like most bureaucracies, prefers to do its business behind closed doors—all the more so because
the nature of its business is so often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on
whose support it must rely. Therefore, the military inherently sees the media as a
subversive, rather than a positive, element. The press, however, responds to the
requirement of democracy to expose the actions of the government—including,
especially, the military—to public scrutiny. Moreover, in recent years, the tendency to formulate U.S. foreign policy with little or no formal debate between
the administration and the Congress has left a vacuum that the media has
rushed to fill. Even were that not the case, however, the press has a responsibility
to question the matching of policy to strategy.
Theoretically, this interaction is mutually beneficial, for it could allow the two
institutions to work symbiotically to build support for policy and to tell the military’s story. Nevertheless, there is a shadow over media-military relations, which
the legacy of the Vietnam War has darkened.
Finally, future trends are likely to make media-military relations more, rather
than less, difficult. An increase in humanitarian operations, the reliance on air
campaigns and stand-off weapons, the difficulties of covering a “terrorist war,”
the emergence of “information operations,” and changes in the media environment pose severe challenges. Nevertheless, the two institutions must recognize
that it is in the interests of both to make the relationship work.
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FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO VIETNAM
Poor media-military relations are in reality symptomatic of a deeper issue for
civil-military relations in the United States. One of the sources of misunderstandings between the media and the military is the widely held perception
among conservatives, both inside and outside the military, that the press was
largely responsible for America’s defeat in the Vietnam War. This “subversion” is held to have been a new departure in media-military relations, perpetrated by a new generation of skeptical “liberal” reporters, different from
their predecessors.
In fact, however, the relationship between the media and the military did not
suddenly collapse during the Vietnam War. Animosity between the two is as old
as the foundations of the Republic itself. During the Revolution, George Washington complained that loyalist newspapers undermined patriotic morale, while
patriotic ones lacked the most elementary notions of military secrecy. Soon afterward, officers sent by President John Adams to impose taxes on Pennsylvania
farmers publicly flogged newspaper editors who criticized their actions. In 1814,
during the New Orleans campaign, Andrew Jackson jailed and attempted to
court-martial a local editor who had dared to publish an article without submitting it for censorship. The Mexican War of 1846 was the first in which papers
competed to publish stories sent back by the newly invented telegraph and the
Pony Express. This produced a nineteenth-century “CNN effect”; political
leaders as well as the general public learned of developments from press stories
that arrived before the official reports. The Associated Press was founded in
1848 to pool reporting resources, disseminate correspondence from soldiers at
the front, and communicate the government’s war goals to the public. Also in
that war, the military published “camp newspapers,” an early public-affairs attempt to keep up troop morale. The civilian press used them as sources “from
the seat of the war.”
During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln realized early on that newspapers
would be a key component in sustaining support in a deeply split North. In April
1861 the government took control of telegraph lines leading to Washington and
in August threatened court-martial should any of the five hundred Northern
journalists covering the war breach security. The noncombatant status of the
150 or so correspondents who reported from the front was seldom respected.
General William T. Sherman, a firm believer in press censorship, blamed the Union defeat in the first battle of Bull Run on the publication of orders of battle in
Washington and New York newspapers. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
seized newspapers that were too liberal with military information, while manipulating others into publishing false reports. This did not prevent “Copperhead”
papers in the North from vehemently attacking Lincoln and the war.
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Neither is press-driven policy a recent phenomenon. The “yellow journalism”
promoted by rivals William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer is often
blamed for provoking the popular agitation that led to the Spanish-American
War of 1898. Major General Nelson A. Miles replicated Stanton’s manipulation
of the press, deliberately misleading reporters about the location of his intended
landing in Puerto Rico. The Espionage Act, which accompanied America’s entry
into World War I, followed by the
Sedition Act of 1918, severely reThe 1999 air war over Kosovo re-ignited a
feud between the military and the news media stricted the ability of the press to
publish information on military
that is generally believed to have been a permanent undercurrent of media-military rela- operations or war production, let
alone disparage the uniform and
tions since the Vietnam War.
the flag. Woodrow Wilson established a Committee on Public Information that both regulated censorship and
produced propaganda for the American cause. Credentialed war correspondents, sworn to tell the truth, reported from military camps well behind the lines
in France. General John Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary
Force, accredited only thirty-one reporters and forbade even these to travel to
3
the front lines. Fear of a “stab in the back” lurked behind these measures; censorship was justified by the need “to keep up the spirit of the armies and people
4
of our side.”
WORLD WAR II AND KOREA
World War II is often viewed as the golden age of media-military relations—a
time when the country stood fully behind the war effort and the press reflected
the patriotic mood. Civilian reporters were treated as part of “America’s team,”
willingly acquiescing to “press codes” as a condition of accreditation by the War
Department. The identities and movements of forces and materiel, production
figures, casualties, and locations of archives and art treasures were forbidden to
reporters; even weather forecasts and temperatures in major cities were censored. But the press accepted censorship with barely a murmur, and the reward
for compliance was substantial—relatively free access to combat theaters.
Wearing the uniforms of officers, journalists joined press camps attached to
and moving with combat forces. Print journalists, more or less “embedded” in
units, wrote, often poignantly, of the horrors of battle and the suffering of the
GIs. Twenty-seven reporters accompanied the D-day assault in Normandy. The
precursor of the modern “press pool” emerged among radio correspondents,
serving as a “neutral voice” representative of all correspondents. Some servicemen who had been journalists before the war were made “combat correspondents” after basic training; their stories and photographs were released, after
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censorship, by the various service departments. Overall, the Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship exercised their control through persuasion,
though the Espionage Act always lurked menacingly in the background.
Both pools and “embedded reporters” foreshadowed recent practice; many
broader patterns now thought of as contemporary also emerged in World War
II. In the first place, the press sometimes shaped policy and influenced strategy.
For instance, descriptions of valiant Britain beneath the German “blitz” in the
summer of 1940 helped to firm up the destroyers-for-bases arrangement and
ultimately Lend-Lease. “Press and radio commentators were uniformly hostile,
some passionately so,” to the agreement General Mark Clark struck in November 1942 with Vichy admiral Jean Darlan to halt the fighting between Vichy
French and Allied troops in
North Africa. “I have been called
In fact, the relationship between the media
a Fascist and almost a Hitlerite,”
and the military did not suddenly collapse
General Dwight Eisenhower,
during the Vietnam War. Animosity between
5
Clark’s superior, complained.
the two is as old as the foundations of the RePress criticism of the Darlan deal
public itself.
propelled the “unconditional
surrender” policy adopted by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.
Newsweek continually pointed up the disparity between American goals in Europe and the resources available, as well as differences among the Allies over the
6
future of Europe, reviving the arguments of congressional isolationists.
The press also, as now, heavily influenced the fortunes of prominent commanders; even the most popular generals could be second-guessed. Drew Pearson
was prepared to deflate the most exalted reputations in his syndicated column,
“Washington Merry-go-Round.” In the opinion of Eisenhower’s son John, the
7
press came perilously close to ending Ike’s career. His decision in September
1943 to maintain Marshal Pietro Badoglio, one of Mussolini’s ex-henchmen,
and King Victor Emanuel in power in Italy was denounced by the New York
8
Times as the continuation of military dictatorship supported by a puppet king.
After the Normandy breakout in August 1944, Newsweek allowed retired British
general J. F. C. Fuller to criticize Ike for violating the principle of “concentration
of force.” Even in making Eisenhower its “Man of the Year” in December 1944,
Time cautioned that Hitler’s Ardennes offensive cast doubt on the Supreme
9
Allied Commander’s strategic judgement.
It is often forgotten that some officers who received favorable press coverage
assiduously cultivated reporters. “Without preaching or complaining, [Eisenhower] told [correspondents] frankly about what was going wrong, and made it
possible for them to see the problems with their own eyes. He then counted on
10
them to make the country aware of what was needed.” One correspondent who
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had expected to find Eisenhower “jumping all over the place issuing orders right
and left” instead discovered a man “more like a big industrial executive who, on
the day the plant is breaking production records, will show visitors around the
11
mill as if he had nothing else to do.” In contrast, commanders whom reporters
thought inadequately prepared were particular targets. The press, for instance,
alerted the American public to shortcomings revealed by the Louisiana Maneuvers of August–September 1941.
Further, “investigative journalists” sought out opportunities to roast aloof or
abusive commanders, like George S. Patton—who slapped and cursed soldiers
hospitalized for shell shock. A “gentlemen’s agreement” initially suppressed that
incident, but in an egregious departure from journalistic ethics, war correspondents demanded that Eisenhower remove Patton, under threat of going public.
When Eisenhower tried to compromise, Drew Pearson broke the story on his
syndicated radio show. The subsequent public tempest was so violent that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had to justify to the Senate Eisenhower’s decision
not to court-martial Patton. That incident, and others like it, demonstrated the
high price political leaders had to pay to defend generals who offended norms of
12
democratic behavior.
In the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur was notorious for pressuring reporters to file stories that reflected positively on him. However, he could not control
reporters not accredited to his command. In January 1944, the American Mercury suggested that MacArthur’s heroic image was a Republican-manufactured
myth to use against Roosevelt. The Army War College library distributed the article to American servicemen all over the world; Republicans in the Senate
blasted the War Department for carrying out a “smear.” A blistered War Department subsequently prevented Harper’s Magazine from publishing a second unflattering article; its editor objected, “This situation is intolerable in a free
country.” In the summer of 1944 the press publicized the fact that MacArthur
was the only senior general allowed to have his wife in theater. It also reported,
unfairly, that he made his headquarters in luxurious colonial mansions while his
13
troops battled malaria.
The surprise attack that opened the Korean War in 1950 found the military
completely unprepared to handle the reporters who arrived to cover the panic
and confusion of the war’s early days. This inevitably provoked criticism that an
uncensored press was giving information of use to the enemy and undermining
the morale of United Nations forces. Local commanders responded with their
own rules; ultimately the Overseas Press Club petitioned the Pentagon to replace
this patchwork of “voluntary guidelines” with formal, standard ones. MacArthur (now supreme commander of UN forces in Korea) imposed formal censorship, forbidding reporters to criticize, among other things, military reverses,
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failures of U.S. equipment, or the South Korean government; true to form,
15
MacArthur also banned all articles critical of his leadership. His successor,
Matthew Ridgway, virtually barred the press from the armistice talks.
The Vietnam War and Its Legacies
Vietnam has been called the “first TV war,” a test of the American public’s tolerance for battle brought into its living rooms. Journalists were allowed practically
unrestricted access, accompanying units and freely filing stories, photographs,
and film. The idea that reporters opposed to the war used this freedom to publish negative stories that contributed significantly to the final defeat quickly became standard; it was espoused by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon, as well as by the U.S. commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, General
William Westmoreland.
16
This explanation, however, has been discredited by numerous studies. In
fact, press coverage was generally favorable until the Tet offensive of 1968. As
later became clear, that dramatic campaign was a military disaster for the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong; nonetheless, it blasted the credibility of claims by the
White House and Westmoreland that the United States and South Vietnam were
on the threshold of victory. The critical tone adopted by the press thereafter
“confirm[ed] the widespread public view held well before Tet, that the people
had been victims of a massive deception” and that the prospects for success were
17
in fact doubtful. Arguably, then, the press did not create public skepticism but
simply reflected public concern about casualties and the lack of tangible progress. Certainly, neither the White House nor the military was honest with the
press. Official briefings in Saigon—dismissed by the press as the “Five o’Clock
Follies”—were remarkably uninformative, when not deceptive. On the other
hand, coverage of the increasingly violent antiwar protests shored up support
for the war, because it showed the peace movement in an unflattering light.
One cannot blame the press for asking searching questions about a poor policystrategy match. That is its duty. Nevertheless, the impact of the Vietnam War
on U.S. media-military relations has been profound. The press today regards the
practically unrestricted access and uncensored reporting that it enjoyed in Vietnam as the norm, not a historical anomaly. The more superficial, or arrogant, of
its members further believe that Vietnam confirmed and validated the power of
the press to influence public opinion and, by extension, policy.
The military, for its part, saw proof of its long-standing suspicion that the
18
press is an adversary and must be kept at arm’s length during conflicts. The
Army in particular feels that a new, and distinctly destructive, press was born in
Vietnam—skeptical of authority, liberal in political outlook, and invariably
hostile to military values and missions. The mistake of Vietnam, many military
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people feel, was to give the media free rein, license that they used to subvert popular support. A piece of “military wisdom” emerged from Vietnam: “Real men
19
don’t talk to the press.”
THE ROOTS OF POOR MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS
If the poor media-military relations of today are not wholly a product of the
Vietnam War but have existed throughout the nation’s history, how does one
account for them? First, the institutional cultures of the two communities are
virtually antithetical. Whether or not the media have a liberal bias, it is certainly
true that journalists see it as their role to expose abuses of power by large institutions, and in the military arena to publicize instances where democratic and military values clash. As a practical matter, however, the press is fragmented into
many competing and self-regulating subgroups; there are no broad professional
standards. “The great strength of American journalism is its amateur nature,”
insists one correspondent. “Anyone can become a reporter. This guarantees
20
many different perspectives.” It also guarantees that journalists have a great
deal of competition; each must not only collect information but package it in a
form that will sell to the general public—and therefore be blessed by editors—before other journalists do. Reporters are therefore under great pressure
to bend, even break, rules in pursuit of a “story”—and a by-line.
If the world of the journalist is freewheeling and entrepreneurial, the task of
managing violence imposes on the soldier an organization and attitude that is
hierarchical and disciplined. The soldier is a “team player” in an institution with
strict professional and ethical standards as well as rigorous, even ritualized, procedures. “The natural tendency of the military [is] to keep things under control,”
21
an Army public affairs officer observes. The military man or woman particularly values loyalty and is deeply suspicious of, even offended by, the “publish
and be damned” journalistic ethos. Further, if recruitment, outlook, and technology make the “Fourth Estate” a heterogeneous institution—if it is an “institution” at all—a number of factors, especially the fact that soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen live apart from civilian society, tend to impose insularity
upon them and to homogenize their attitudes. The political outlook of military
22
people tends to be conservative.
Second, the goals of the two institutions are different. The journalist seeks to
tell a story of such interest that the public will pay for it; every member of the
military, however, is to pursue national objectives by fulfilling specific missions
assigned by political leaders. Moreover, the mechanism by which the military
performs its role is war, or the threat of war—and war is an awful thing, a job the
military is understandably reluctant to perform in public. Military people typically believe that reporters, untutored in the fundamentals of the military
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profession, are psychologically unprepared to deal with the realities of combat.
They fear that reporters, in quests for sensationalism rather than truth, may
publish stories or images that breach security, cost lives, or undermine public
support. For their part, reporters insist upon their professional obligation and
constitutional duty to report the news. They consider the military’s culture
closed, its insistence on operational secrecy exaggerated, and its “command climate” a barrier to outside scrutiny.
These two dichotomies are in themselves the raw material for deterioration of
the media-military relationship, but a third factor, some journalists argue, aggravates it—the increasingly haphazard way U.S. foreign policy is formulated.
All concerned recognize, at least in theory, that media scrutiny is an aspect of a
healthy civilian control of the military and also an exercise of free speech—both
cornerstones of the Constitution, which military people are sworn to uphold. In
that light, media activism becomes especially necessary when military operations are undertaken after only minimal public debate among elected officials.
Many journalists argue that Washington seems to assume a public grant of “virtual consent” for the employment of military force whenever the president
23
chooses, what one reporter calls a “fire-and-forget foreign policy.” They hold
that the media have a charge to step into this policy vacuum, to supply the information and provide the deliberation that officials and politicians withhold and
shirk—and even to shape policy. In retrospect, it seems hardly surprising that
good will crumbled (as we will see) during the Kosovo conflict and appeared to
be on shaky ground during the early stages of the assault on Afghanistan. The
real question is why such deterioration was a surprise at the time; it had been
foreshadowed in every American military involvement since Vietnam, especially
in the Persian Gulf.
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Warfare is a political act. Political leaders, in democracies at least, must inform
the public about foreign policy goals; the military must convince the public that
it can achieve those goals at an acceptable cost; and both must do so largely
through the press. Press reports of success and progress strengthen and extend
public support. The media also familiarize the public with the military and
with the complexity of its tasks. In short, the media offers the military a means
to tell its story. The press, as we have seen, has its own incentives to report on
military affairs, and it needs the military’s cooperation to do so effectively.
Therefore, both the media and the military have reasons to work with the other
in a symbiotic relationship.
For the military’s part, the necessary first step is to recognize that the press is a
fact of life, a feature of the battlefield environment—“kind of like the rain,” as
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24

one Marine put it. “If it rains, you operate wet.” Unfortunately, past attempts to
establish effective, let alone harmonious, arrangements have foundered on hostility and distrust bordering sometimes on paranoia.
Press Pools
In the 1980s, the media and the Pentagon agreed on ground rules for cooperation. Each major command was issued public-affairs guidance acknowledging
the right of the public and Congress to “timely and accurate information” about
military operations, to the extent compatible with security. It set out precise
rules on the accreditation of reporters, standards for stories, security reviews,
and the support of media in combat zones.
The plans were first tested in URGENT FURY, the 1983 operation that rescued
U.S. medical students on the island of Grenada. Two serious flaws quickly
emerged. First, rather than integrating media affairs in its planning, the command simply handed off the press to a specialized corps of public affairs officers.
Because these officers were themselves kept in the dark, they were unable to satisfy the press’s curiosity about military goals, preparations, and progress. The
second problem grew from the first—the military was logistically unresponsive
to press needs, largely because the media had not been factored into operational
planning. As a consequence, over six hundred disgruntled reporters were marooned in comfortable exile on Barbados while the story played out, unseen and
hence unreported, on Grenada.25
26
The resulting media outcry prodded the military to review its practices. A
commission was convened under Major General Winant Sidle, U.S. Army, to
reconcile press access with operational security. The Sidle Commission’s major
accomplishment was the Department of Defense National Media Pool, created
in 1985. Journalists nominated by the major news organizations and agreeing in
advance to abide by security regulations and to share reports with nonpool reporters would be ready to move to the “seat of war” at a moment’s notice. The
Media Pool would operate as a group only until the “main body” of reporters appeared. Practice deployments in Central America suggested that the pool was logistically manageable, would produce a core of reporters versed in military
affairs, and would ensure prompt coverage of events.
The pool was first mobilized operationally during EARNEST WILL, the
reflagging of Kuwaiti merchant ships in 1987–88; it encountered problems that
would become acute in subsequent deployments. The next opportunity came in
December 1989, when U.S. troops were ordered into Panama. Unfortunately,
that experience showed that old attitudes had not yet died. The secretary of defense, Richard Cheney—who held the media responsible for undermining
public morale in Vietnam and “did not look on the press as an asset”—delayed
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calling out the pool. The result was that nonpool reporters simply traveled to
Panama on their own, to practice “four-wheel-drive journalism”; when the press
pool was finally mobilized, its members, all specially prepared for the job, were
28
fobbed off with briefings and not allowed to cover the action.
If Panama did little to foster trust between the media and the military, the war
in the Persian Gulf lifted matters to a new plateau of acrimony. At the outset of
DESERT SHIELD, things looked generally promising. Cheney quickly activated
the seventeen-member Media Pool—only to learn that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia refused to grant visas to reporters. Some journalists simply flew to Bahrain
and crossed the border into Saudi Arabia illegally—the “unilaterals,” prowling
on the margins of the conflict, in
“The great strength of American journalism is constant fear of expulsion by the
29
U.S. military or the Saudi police.
its amateur nature. Anyone can become a reWhen CNN began to broadcast
porter. This guarantees many different
from Baghdad, however, Fahd was
perspectives.”
persuaded to lift his ban. The pool
got its initial briefing five days after the first U.S. troops deployed in Saudi Arabia in early August. It remained in existence for three weeks, even as the forces in
Saudi Arabia were being swamped by 1,600 other reporters. In response to this
massive media interest in the first large-scale military deployment since Vietnam, the military organized new, ad hoc press pools; accredited reporters who
agreed to abide by security regulations would be escorted in small groups to visit
military positions and be briefed by unit commanders. “Noncompetitive”
ground rules made photographs, notes, and stories available to reporters not in
the pools; the military would transmit the stories back to parent news organizations, using a communications facility in Dhahran.
Despite appearances of success, however, the pool system as practiced in the
Gulf War had several problems. The primary issue was what seemed to journalists to amount to censorship and manipulation, arising from tight restrictions
on all media travel. Press veterans of Vietnam were rapidly disabused of the notion that they would be free to flit about the war zone, then return to Dhahran to
file stories. In fact, most reporters never saw the war; only 186 reporters ever
joined the news pools, less than 10 percent of the journalists enrolled by the
Central Command’s Joint Information Bureau.
Also, journalists rapidly concluded that logistical support for the pools was
low in the military’s priorities, and that this was intentional. Requests to visit
units were frequently rejected because of lack of transport (when not declined
for security concerns). The system was cumbersome and unresponsive to breaking news. The military did not file pool products expeditiously. The media tours
were “too canned.” Ultimately, chafing under restrictions, journalists charged
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that delays and press-shy officers reflected a command mandate that there were
30
to be “no bad stories.” Worse, from the press viewpoint, “When the war hap31
pened, we couldn’t see it.” Veteran reporter Walter Cronkite later insisted that
“the Pentagon’s censorship policy”
“I have been called a Fascist and almost a
in the Persian Gulf “severely reHitlerite,” General Dwight Eisenhower
stricted the right of reporters and
complained.
photographers to accompany our
troops into action, as had been
32
permitted in all our previous wars.” Two Australian scholars concluded that
“the campaign to liberate Kuwait was perhaps the most underreported and
33
media-managed conflict in history.”
The U.S. Marines—who perhaps realize more than the other services the
value of the press—welcomed journalists, but ironically, even this openness
backfired. The media later claimed that it had been unwittingly co-opted into an
elaborate deception designed to draw attention to the Marine amphibious force
off the coast—a force that the joint commander in chief, General Norman
Schwarzkopf, did not intend to employ—so as to distract the Iraqis from the
true objectives. The press charged that General Schwarzkopf had deceived it in
other ways as well. One was the false impression given that precision, laserguided ordnance dominated the air campaign. Another was exaggeration of the
success of Patriot missiles in intercepting Iraqi Scuds (although these claims had
been made in good faith). To such complaints the military simply replied that it
could not have allowed the media to reveal the coalition’s true plans—especially
34
not the “left hook” through the desert of southern Iraq into Kuwait.
If it strained media-military relations, the pool system also—by its emphasis
on collective effort and shared products—divided the journalistic fraternity itself. Journalists are competitors by nature, not team players. “[Competition] is
their livelihood. They don’t like the other guy’s take on a story. [A public affairs
35
officer] cannot tell other reporters what each is working on. That’s death!” Unable to compete freely for stories, reporters in the Gulf and their employers
sought ways to circumvent the rules. The larger press organizations plotted to
exclude members of smaller or independent ones from pools or groups selected
for particular visits; certain “nontraditional” media in the field, like women’s
magazines, fought to be included. Reporters jostled to lobby public affairs officers or generals for priority. Such infighting, combined with arbitrary selection
procedures for pool trips, sometimes pushed aside reporters experienced in mil36
itary matters in favor of novices. A few journalists evaded pool restrictions by
becoming “pet journalists,” willing to report favorably on a general or unit in
return for access to the front.
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Ultimately, in the view of media cognoscenti, the Gulf War pool system produced a mediocre product. It seemed to these veteran reporters an undifferentiated pap, distilled from the collective observations of the few journalists allowed
into the field, rather than the creative perceptions of individual reporters free to
fashion stories out of the raw drama they observed. They thought the journalistic quality of pool stories “depressing. . . . [A]bout one in ten has anything in it
37
that’s useful. . . . It’s really pretty superficial stuff.”
Pools, therefore, are not popular with the press, which sees them as attempts
to limit access and thereby censor, even manipulate, information. The immediate postwar result was the issuance of new guidelines declaring, “Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military
operations.”38 The directive retains the option of censorship—a clause that the
media decided not to protest, believing that “security reviews” would soon become unenforceable, for reasons discussed below.
Embedded Media
The advent of “operations other than war” and journalists’ objections to the
pool system revived the concept of “embedded media,” an approach first used in
World War II and Vietnam, applied in Haiti in 1994, and expanded for the
Bosnia intervention the next year. In this arrangement, a reporter is assigned a
unit, deploys with it, and lives with it throughout a lengthy period of operations.
All in uniform are considered spokespersons for the military and for their missions. However, interviewers must nevertheless respect soldiers’ privacy, as well
as operational security. Rules also prohibit reporting on intelligence collection,
special operations, or casualties.
“Embedding” reporters in units has much to offer both sides. These reporters,
who usually bond with their units, are likely to appreciate the difficulties of the
39
mission and tend to file favorable reports. On the other hand, the military cannot hope to mask bad policy or hide incompetence from such journalists. In
general, living together breaks down media-military hostility, allows the press to
blend into the operational landscape, and in turn makes soldiers far less
self-conscious about the presence of reporters—whom they often respect for
sharing their dangers and hardships. The reporters get their stories, and the military gets free and generally favorable publicity for a job it performs with great
credit. “I learn stuff every day with a unit,” a veteran correspondent observes.
“I’ve never been in a front line unit that didn’t enjoy having reporters. . . . [They
see it] as a sign that the American people are interested. The troops really love it.
40
I was called ‘our reporter.’”
“Embedding” also attracts criticism, however. The media worry that reporters may identify too closely with “their” units and lose journalistic objectivity.
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For its part, the military dreads the off-the-record conversation or the minor or
poorly understood event that produces an unflattering story. Loose lips sink not
only ships but careers—and few officers who run afoul of the press today are
41
likely to receive the sustained high-level support needed to save General Patton.
In Bosnia, reporter Tom Ricks once reported in print that an American battalion
commander had told African-American troops in his command, by way of
warning, that Croats are racists. The subsequent ruckus produced in the military
what is called the “Ricks Rule”—that all conversations with journalists are off
the record unless otherwise specified. Even that is considered weak protection
against reportorial bad faith: “Any [public affairs officer] will tell you that there
is no such thing as ‘off the record.’ There is no legal basis for it. There is only a
42
thin journalist ethic.” Ricks himself argues, however, that the “rule” betrays unwillingness of seniors to support subordinates, and ultimately distrust of civil43
ian control of the military: “The amount of stuff I don’t publish is astounding.”
KOSOVO AND THE FUTURE
The last decade has produced factors likely to make media-military relations
more difficult than ever to manage. They include the advent of humanitarian
operations, an increasing use by the United States of airpower and stand-off
weapons, the “war on terrorism,” and the emergence of “information operations.” Further, changing technological and institutional features of news coverage have outpaced formal attempts to order media-military relations. These
factors first began to manifest themselves in the Nato attempt in 1999 to expel
Yugoslav troops from the province of Kosovo.
Kosovo
Both the media and the U.S. military embarked upon Nato’s bombing campaign
with deep reservations. The media was profoundly skeptical of the undertaking,
44
an attitude that got its dealings with the military off on the wrong foot. Kosovo,
the first war that Nato nations had fought since DESERT STORM, was scripted in
the same way, less the ground invasion. Nato’s fundamental assumptions—that
airpower alone was sufficient, that President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia
would bend to the alliance’s will without a ground assault—had been debated
only in private, within alliance councils and the U.S. executive branch. In agreement with broad sectors of expert and popular opinion, most correspondents
believed that these assumptions amounted to wishful thinking. Most newsrooms sensed that the air strategy was simply the “lowest common denominator” available to an irresolute and deeply fractured alliance. Nor did Nato bolster
its credibility with the press when its miscalculation of Milosevic’s resolve became
clear. Far from capitulating in a matter of days, if not hours, Milosevic remained
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defiant and intensified his torment of Kosovo Albanians. In the view of many
journalists, neither the American nor the British peoples had an emotional investment in the conflict; both governments, the media concluded, would aban45
don the effort rather than undertake a ground invasion.
Inevitably, then, the press was wary of information supplied by the military.
Press conferences evoked the media’s unhappy Gulf War memories of press
pools, denial of access, obfuscation, and apparent manipulation; the press resolved not to be fooled twice. Because reporters had scant access to Kosovo, it
46
could not see “ethnic cleansing.” Nor could it effectively cover the air war.
Nato-supplied videos of precise
The media offers the military a means to tell
strikes made the strikes appear to
its story. The press has its own incentives to re- be extremely accurate—but so
port on military affairs. Therefore, both the
had they appeared during the
media and the military have reasons to work
Gulf War, when only a small perwith the other.
centage of the coalition air arsenals turned out to have been
precision guided munitions. The fact that Nato aircraft were ordered to fly
higher than fifteen thousand feet over Serbia and Kosovo seemed to confirm me47
dia pessimism over the ability of air strikes to prevent ethnic cleansing.
Humanitarian Operations
On the surface, the advent of humanitarian operations has removed several
sources of tension in media-military relations. Censorship is seldom an issue;
operational security is not paramount, and the military is usually unable to
deny the press access to the theater even if it wished to. In fact, humanitarian
intervention has stood the traditional relationship between the American military and the press on its head. Unlike wartime, national survival is not at stake;
the main effort is political, not military. The deployed force is only one of several
organizations involved, and its mission is merely to facilitate the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civilian governmental organizations,
48
which have the primary tasks. “In the end, it is the NGOs’ war to win or lose.”
Therefore, press pools, if deployed, are merely temporary expedients, quickly
abandoned. In fact, the media usually arrive before the military does; where in
wartime the military briefs reporters on the situation, in peace operations re49
porters are usually better informed than the soldiers.
Still, the tensions inherent in media-military relations do not dissipate at a
stroke. On the contrary, they are complicated, particularly by the presence of
nongovernmental organizations. Military commanders often believe the media
have drawn them into operations that they view as dilutions of their true mission
of fighting wars. The root problem seems to be that humanitarian operations
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50

typically lack high-level direction; policy vacuums form, in which the media
are susceptible to the influence of NGOs—which “are increasingly involving
51
themselves directly in social, political, and even at times, military matters.”
NGOs, the argument goes, depend for funding on publicity and accordingly
solicit the media to disseminate pictures of starving children and desperate refugees, thereby generating pressure on the politicians, who in turn catapult soldiers into altruistic but poorly conceived missions.
Perhaps, as some correspondents believe, the isolation from the media of intervention forces, in their protected compounds, puts them at a distinct disadvantage in any battle with NGOs to sway public perceptions. Others are not so
sure; because nongovernmental organizations are frequently international, they
lack drawing power for an American press corps focused on a national news
market. Additionally, the media often find it difficult to understand a contradictor y NGO culture that combines hard business att itudes w ith a
“flaky-do-gooder” image.52
The Somalia intervention of 1992–95 began as an object lesson in mediamilitary cooperation. The media were waiting on the beach when Navy SEALs
landed as part of a “signal” to the Somali militias about the power of U.S. forces.
However, relations soon went downhill. The media categorically refused thereafter to submit to military control. As the security situation deteriorated, the
media images of starving Somalis were blamed for the decision to intervene in
the first place, for contributing to “mission creep,” and finally, for undermining
popular support by focusing on casualties. For the military Somalia offered fur53
ther proof of the media’s power to inflict a “stab in the back,” as in Vietnam.
The operation in Haiti in September 1994, however, saw a much more harmonious relationship. Ground rules were worked out in advance, and the press willingly complied with most of the military’s operational security concerns. A Joint
Information Bureau, set up by the intervention force in Port-au-Prince, processed requests from 1,300 journalists to visit units. No escort officers were requested or supplied. The only hint that media might be driving policy occurred
when news reports caused the U.S. military to intervene to stop beatings of Aristide
supporters by paramilitary forces loyal to deposed President Raoul Cedras.
Air Campaigns and the Media
Whatever progress was made during the humanitarian operations of the 1990s
was disrupted, as we have seen, in Kosovo—in part because Nato chose to fight
that war with airpower alone. From a media standpoint, the air campaign meant
renewed dependence on the military for information. There are only three ways,
all unsatisfactory, to cover an air war. A reporter can “hitch a ride” on an aircraft;
this may give technical insights into how an air war is prosecuted, but a
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correspondent is unlikely to be able to gauge its effects from fifteen thousand feet
in the air. The second option is to sit through military briefings and look at videos
of precision strikes—that is, what the military wants the press to see. This leaves
the third option, which is for reporters to cross the lines to get the other side’s
version.
The press received a particular incentive to elicit Serb and Russian accounts
when Nato and Pentagon spokesmen and the Supreme Allied Commander
contradicted each other in their responses to the mistaken bombing of a convoy
of refugee tractors near Djakovica on 19 April 1999. Nato “couldn’t get its own
54
story straight.” Collateral damage, rather than ethnic cleansing and the refugee
crisis, threatened to become the central issue of the Kosovo conflict, undermining the moral credibility of, and hence public support for, the campaign. The
problem was compounded by the fact that Nato’s stand-off air campaign made
the alliance look like a ponderous Goliath assaulting a nimble David—a prob55
lem repeated in Afghanistan.
Information Operations
Information operations, an outgrowth of “information warfare,” emerge from
the idea that instantaneous communications have revolutionized warfare. They
have certainly revolutionized press coverage—with the result, some argue, that
open media information is a more important dimension of information opera56
tions than familiar technical issues like “cyber attack.” Kosovo focused attention on the role in conflict of media images; the view emerged that the will of a
population to prosecute a conflict can be undermined by media-generated
images, and that therefore the media strategy must be an integral part of a campaign plan. “Public information is a battle space,” it was argued, “that must be
57
contested and controlled like any other.”
The room for improvement was obvious. A militarily weak Milosevic repeatedly forced the Nato allies onto the defensive by showcasing collateral damage
caused by bombing. Nato’s slow and sometimes inaccurate responses wounded
its credibility. Nato’s press offices were understaffed and lacked specialists able to
monitor Yugoslav media and anticipate propaganda ploys. Nato had no integrated, forceful public-relations/information campaign. Separate briefings in
London, Washington, and Brussels often sent conflicting signals.
However, concentration on information operations is a potentially dangerous development in media-military—even civil-military—relations. It has led
enthusiasts to view information as a commodity to be manipulated for operational advantage, rather than as a shared trust. In any case, the concept is nothing new in war; in 1870, for instance, Otto von Bismarck edited the “Ems dispatch”
to goad Louis Napoleon into declaring war on Prussia. A new element was the
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press’s willingness to go to the enemy for sources—as in Kosovo, and in Peter
Arnett’s famous broadcasts from Baghdad during the Gulf War—opening a
channel for the enemy’s own information operations. Osama Bin Laden,
and even the media-shy Taliban regime, discovered Al-Jazeera and the small,
Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic News Agency to be useful vehicles for disseminating their messages in the Muslim world, messages that invariably found
echoes in the Western news media. The perceived need to do so stems in part
from the reluctance of the military to supply information, to impose
“gray-outs” that leave the press hungry for material and instigate charges of secrecy and manipulation.
Some even in the defense community argue that to treat information as a
“battle space” has “dreadful implications,” that mixing public affairs with information operations could do great harm.58 BBC news set the “gold standard” for
millions during World War II precisely in that, unlike its Axis competitors, it
vowed to broadcast the bad news as well as the good. By manipulating media
images for operational advantage, the military courts skepticism and hostility.
The 1999 bombing of Serb television facilities suggests that in future conflicts
journalists may be regarded as military targets. Foreign governments may retaliate against Western reporters, closing off an important information channel.
In the end, the public may become inoculated against government pronouncements of success, as during the Vietnam War, and withdraw its support.
Finally, to treat information as “battle space” confuses operational success
with strategic victory. If goals are clear, popular, and achievable at reasonable
cost, no amount of media manipulation by either side will decide the issue. U.S.
public support for the Kosovo war remained unshaken despite pictures of collateral damage, despite even the Chinese embassy bombing. The effectiveness of
Serbian media ploys—such as posting its stories on the World Wide Web, in
59
English—should not be exaggerated.
Changes in the Media Environment
Two trends in the media world—one technological, the other market related—seem
to offer contradictory indications about the future of media-military interaction. Technological advances are likely to make information increasingly available to the press and independent of military control. Market trends, however,
suggest that the media’s dependence on the military for sellable material will
increase.
In future operations in which security risks are high, the military will no
doubt insist on control of information; however, “security at the source” (that is,
at the level of the individual service member) will necessarily become the rule,
because media infrastructures like “joint information bureaus” are already
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becoming irrelevant. Journalists can file directly from the field, anywhere on the
globe, using cell phones, the Internet, and remote-area network data systems
transmitting compressed video signals. Satellite, microwave, and fiber-optics
systems are becoming miniaturized and increasingly mobile. Reporters have access to commercial satellite images that can reveal such things as troop deployments—making refusals for reasons of security to guide press pools to deployed
60
units less credible and effective. In fact, the security issue may soon be reversed:
an enemy missile could home on a reporter’s signal. Commanders in the future
may have to ask reporters willing to take that risk to move several hundred yards
away from their positions first.
The advances in technology, of course, cut both ways. Satellite imagery can be
easily modified. Video images are for the moment more difficult to alter, but that
will change. Manufactured videos and misleading stories can be posted on the
Internet. The media itself should be the first line of defense, filtering this information to determine its credibility. But if journalists suspect that they are being
censored, denied information, manipulated, or deceived by their own military,
they may be more inclined to give the other side’s version of events the benefit of
the doubt.
Notwithstanding the media’s new ability to collect and disseminate information independently, it is unlikely to go entirely its own way. A balance will probably be struck, not least because the long-term market trends are poor for foreign
news coverage in general, and for military stories in particular. Today the media,
though multinational in organization, must increasingly focus on regional
niche markets. News is a business, and polls and focus groups inform editors
that the priorities of the public are local news first, foreign news last. CNN, for
instance, has begun regional production to feed “foreign” news to the markets
where it is not foreign. In the United States, the international news most likely to
be covered is that which produces the most dramatic footage or has an American
connection. To obtain such material, the U.S. media needs the military; in that
framework, the military itself is the story.
The media perceives that the American public suffers from “compassion fatigue.” What sells a story is not the crisis but the fact that the military arrives to
do something about it. “Unless U.S. troops are involved, it is difficult to convince
61
an editor that a story is worthwhile.” In any case, there is strong marketing
pressure on the media to conform to audience expectations; it is not in the interest even of an international news organization like CNN to show footage, or give
its reporting a slant, that will offend the sensibilities of the American public.
In fact, the criticism of the allegedly “liberal” American media after 11 September 2001 was that they became cheerleaders for the War on Terrorism, “a
knee-jerk pandering to the public,” according to Australian journalist Carwyn
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James, “reflecting a mood of patriotism rather than informing viewers of the
complex, sometimes harsh realities they need to know.” For his part, CNN president Walter Isaacson confessed, “If you get on the wrong side of public opinion,
62
you are going to get in trouble.” This creates a great initial advantage for the
63
military—if, that is, it embraces the media rather than shuns them.
Indeed, ignorance and misinformation are far more dangerous for the military
than is informed reporting, however critical in tone. But the media need help
here. Because the press is fragmented, competitive, sometimes ignorant of military realities, and constantly whiplashed between the demands of the market
and those of journalistic ethics, however defined, the quality of coverage of military events is inevitably uneven at best. Today, however, the situation is aggravated by the fact that newsrooms are no longer “old-boys networks,” inclined to
accept some of the military’s more traditional ways as part of the journalistic
landscape. The tendency of unprepared reporters, charging from crisis to crisis,
unaware of the issues at stake or of how the military functions, is to frame complex matters in simplistic ways—or even to indulge in “gotcha” journalism (focusing on errors and misstatements). For its part, the military owes access to
information both to Congress and the American people. Furthermore, it needs
to get its story out—for the military will be competing with other groups, and
enemies, eager to put their “spin” on events. To do this, it needs the media.
It will be impossible in the future to embargo news, as has sometimes been
done in the past. An artificial news vacuum would be filled by “on-line correspondents,” nongovernmental organizations, and even the enemy. The media
gravitates toward the sources that are most obvious and available; tyrants and
terrorists like Saddam, Milosevic, and Bin Laden learned to welcome reporters.
Future enemies can be expected to develop sophisticated media strategies to
draw attention to, and assign external blame for, the suffering of their people;
the possibilities available to them for distortion, manipulation, and disinforma64
tion are growing. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. military establish a
solid working relationship with the media, that it integrate them into its strategy—and not keep reporters at arm’s length, as if they were hostile interlopers in
a private domain.
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This “letter” marks the beginning of a new department wherein
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OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

LETTER FROM IRAN

Geoffrey Wawro

AZER.

TURKMENISTAN
Caspian Sea

In Frankfurt airport, I witnessed an unexpected
phenomenon. The Iran Air flight that will carry me
Tehran
IRAN
KHORASAN
Qom
to Tehran is disgorging its Frankfurt-bound load of
Kashan
Tabas
passengers, Iranians all. As they disembark, the
Desert One
Isfahan
AFG.
Yazd
women stop in the departure lounge to remove
IRAQ
Pasargadae
Kerman
their hejabs—chador, rouposh, and head scarf—and
Persepolis
Shiraz
KUWAIT
PAK.
Bam
brazenly comb out their hair before applying
Persian
AN
T
IS
Gulf
makeup to face and nails. Already I begin to doubt
Bandar Abbas
UCH
BAL
BAHRAIN
SAUDI
the severity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. BackQATAR
ARABIA
Gulf of Oman
sliding like this in the early days of the revolution
U.A.E.
OMAN
would have been punished by black-shirted “morals police.” When my outbound flight is called, dozens of homeward-bound
women irritably unpack their hejabs and put them on.
The airliner descends on Tehran through a noxious haze of carbon and nitrogen monoxide, ozone, and sulfur. The classic panorama of the Elborz Mountains
and snow-capped Mount Damavand is nowadays seen through a chemical fog
that all but bleaches the mountains from view. On the ground, I am confronted
with grim-faced women in black chadors who scrutinize my passport and then
very cordially let me in. I change a hundred dollars at Bank Melli and suddenly
have more money than I know what to do with. Wherever one goes in Iran, a fine
dinner will cost no more than three dollars, a long cab ride twenty-five cents.
The traffic in Tehran is deadly. Though the city contains the usual array of
traffic lights, signs, and crosswalks, no one pays the slightest attention to them.
This is not like Rome or Paris, where pushy motorists will clog up the streets or
nudge you off the pavement; this is a place where every traffic signal is routinely
Mashad

Dasht-e Kavir
(salt desert)

x

Qeshm I.
Tumbs I.
Abu Musa I.

Hormuz I.
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ignored. Cairo is the only other place I have been that is even remotely like this.
On the first day, visitors are frozen with fear. By the last day, they have adjusted
and get around the way everyone else does—by wits, eyes in the back of the head,
and imploring eye contact with every approaching motorist, at risk of death. Because of drought while I was there, Tehran was cutting off the water in a different
part of the city every day. If one’s hotel was in such an area, bad luck—no shower,
no toilet, no running water.
I visited the former American embassy, a vast, forested compound in the
heart of Tehran, now occupied by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC, Sepah for short). Anyone who thinks the size of the place connotes
American neo-imperialism must drive by the British and Russian embassies.
Built on land deeded over in the nineteenth century (when Britain and Russia
vied for control of Persia), they are much bigger—town-sized, high-walled
tracts on Ferdosi Street, the most desirable artery of central Tehran. The wall
outside the U.S. embassy is painted with anti-American slogans (“The U.S. will
be made to suffer a great defeat”—“America, our most hated enemy after the
Qods [Jerusalem] occupier regime”—“We shall mourn on the day that America
praises us”) and murals depicting the 1988 USS Vincennes shoot-down of Iran
Air flight 655. Though 290 Iranian passengers and crew were killed in that incident, no pedestrian or motorist pays the least attention to these incitements;
rather, they hurry past without glancing at them, or sit in traffic without looking
over. Next to the gate, the seal of the United States of America has been chiseled
off, though its traces are still discernible. Peering through a crack in the gate, one
sees that the embassy (which will revert to the United States in time) is in a sad
state of decay. The fountains are dry, the steps broken up and strewn with gravel,
the cypresses parched, the lawns dried up, the building thrown open to the elements. A passerby hazarded to me that the Pasdarans (revolutionary guards) are
“probably” using the main building as a school. Another thought it might be a
military headquarters, which is more likely, for the walls are manned by sentries.
The National Archaeological Museum, built by the Pahlavis in the 1930s to
exalt Iran’s pre-Islamic past, is a beautiful, French-designed building, now decreasingly visited because of the heroin addicts that lounge around the entrance.
Next to it is a horrid, poorly ventilated building put up since the revolution to rival
its pagan collection with an Islamic one that, I thought, failed to impress—calligraphy, pots, jugs, scimitars, and so on. The building itself was vintage East
German, thin marble facades pasted onto cement, cracked tiles, and plenty of
glass to let in the roasting sun.
Waiting on the tarmac at Mehrabad Airport to board the flight that would
take me south to Kerman, on the dusty edge of Baluchistan, I studied the plane.
It looked like a Boeing 727 but cruder. I looked closer and saw that it was a
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Tu-154. Observing my interest, the pilot strolled over and invited me to fly with
him in the cockpit. I accepted and sat the whole way on a jump-seat between the
pilot and copilot. This was fortunate, because Iranian flights are heavily subsidized; a two-hour flight costs no
more than twenty dollars, so every
seat on every flight is taken, no exceptions. The Tupolev is an uncomfortable plane, only superficially like the
Boeing; it has feeble air conditioning,
and the seats hardly recline. The flight
engineer was a Russian who had come
with the aircraft. He was a big, amiable Slav with a ready smile; he winked
when I asked what he did for vodka.
The pilot had been a lieutenant in the
Hazrat-é Masumeh, Burial place of Fatimah, Qom
Imperial Iranian Air Force before the
revolution. Trained in Texas, where he had learned to fly F-5 Freedom Fighters,
he loved America; indeed, like so many of the shah’s veterans, he seemed American, having absorbed its ways in the United States and in his dealings with the
large American military advisory group based in Iran in the 1970s. However, like
everyone I met who had been in the shah’s armed forces, he refused to criticize
the new regime; rather, he seemed to see himself as an Iranian patriot, whatever
the form of government. On our approach to Kerman, we flew at ten thousand
feet over “Desert One,” a speck in the desert of Dasht-e Kavir between Yazd and
Tabas, where the hostage rescue mission came to grief in April 1980.
Deplaning in Kerman, I was shoved aside by a horde of chador-clad pilgrims
returning from the Shia holy places at Karbala in Iraq. They swarmed into the
arrival hall and gazed in awe at the baggage carousel. Clearly they had never seen
anything like it. They would shriek and gesticulate wonderingly each time the
bags circled the conveyor and reappeared. This was my first glimpse of the gulf
between town and country in Iran. In Kerman, I met my guide and interpreter.
An Iranian Kurd and another ex-pilot in the IIAF (also F-5s), in the next two
weeks he would take me anywhere I wanted to go and translate virtually any conversation I wanted to have. He also had little love for the Islamic Republic, but,
like the pilot who had flown me to Kerman, he was an Iranian patriot through
and through.
We drove two hundred kilometers to Bam, a sprawling walled city and citadel
begun two thousand years ago by the Parthians. Abandoned in the early nineteenth century, it has been a ghost town ever since, baking under a hard sun against
a backdrop of craggy, brown mountains. The Pahlavis kept a small garrison here
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until 1931, and one can stand in the commandant’s lodge in the citadel and look
out at the bleak vista of desert and dust, experiencing for a moment the isolation
and hopelessness that must have afflicted every soldier posted here. The drive to
Bam and back gave a glimpse of the Islamic Republic’s war on drugs. Since we were
near the Afghan and Pakistani borders, we were continually stopped by heavily
armed police looking for heroin and opium. Nowhere was there the least hint of
baksheesh-seeking corruption; rather, the police would glance at my U.S. passport and wave us on with a smile and without even popping the trunk. There are
quite a few Afghans in southeastern Iran, and Gypsies too—whom the Iranians
call “Kabuli,” believing them to have originated there. Also, there are many Baluchis; their straw lean-tos and campfires are to be seen along the road. They have
returned to their traditional nomadic ways since the Pahlavi years, when they
were forcibly settled. Those forced settlements—also visible from the
road—bake mostly empty in the sun. Squat, windowless, mud blockhouses, they
look as inhospitable as Palestinian camps I once visited on the West Bank.
Most of Iran is desert, though whenever I would say this, my guide would protest. He would wave at a blighted, glistering plain of sand and stone and pronounce it fertile and green. “Desert” to an Iranian is a salt desert, like the Dasht-e
Kavir; everything else can be
sown with dates, figs, and pistachios and watered with sprinklers or the ancient subterranean
canals called qanats. We drove
through many small towns and
villages. Most are clean and tidy,
in a very un-third-world way.
Each is placarded with the regime’s cult of death—portraits
of martyrs everywhere, almost
always men killed in the 1980–88
war with Iraq. A typical mural
depicts a martyr lying on a bed of red tulips, blood gushing from a neck wound.
Underneath it says, in tall letters, “He is gone; what have you done?” No one pays
any attention to the bloody pictures or their exhortations—“A martyr is a true
man,” “Martyrdom is another word for honesty.” It is interesting that these billboards are not faded and weathered but fresh. The Iraq war has been over for
fourteen years, but the Iranian government keeps the memory alive. Death,
blood, and suicidal sacrifice are the keynotes of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
and his hard-liners. The majority of the population, born or matured since the
war, resents this morbid cult of blood and tulips.
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From Kerman we drove in my guide’s Iranian Peugeot for seven hours at high
speed to Shiraz. The roads are good. The government has invested heavily in
public works, to solve the unemployment problem (25 percent or higher), and
the roads reflect it—few potholes and a good surface, though no shoulders. The
road crews I saw throughout the trip were state employees or contractors, all
with modern equipment. I had read that the basiji (paramilitary youth brigades)
were being press-ganged into this kind of work but saw no evidence of it anywhere. The drivers are bad. Deadly wrecks litter the roadside; we passed a large
truck on its side, steel pipes scattered like matchsticks, the driver hunkered over,
grimacing with pain. My driver flew past without stopping, like everyone else on
the road. As we sped along, Radio Iran announced a gasoline price hike; the first
eight gallons would continue to cost twenty cents a gallon, but every gallon over
eight would now cost sixty cents. My driver spat curses and furiously thumped
the steering wheel for a full minute—though in fact gasoline is cheaper than bottled water in Iran, which, at twenty-five cents per liter, costs five times more.
Having pledged to right the wrongs of the Pahlavis, the Islamic Republic has created a kind of socialism. Gas is subsidized, as are utilities, rents, and food. In the
cities, people line up in front of state depots to collect cut-price bread, meat, rice,
and cooking oil, for which they are issued monthly coupons.
Shiraz was balm to my tired, dusty soul. It is the most elegant and sophisticated city in Iran. Once famed for its vineyards—the Syrah grape originated
here—it is dry now, but it has other charms, namely its gardens, lively streets,
and beautiful women. The latter disdain, in much larger numbers than anywhere else but Tehran, the chador and appear in what might be called “sexy
hejab,” a snug-fitting manteau, or housecoat, a scarf barely covering their hair
and full makeup. They stare and giggle shamelessly and flirt with the young men.
Mullah Sada Street, the fashionable zone of Shiraz, is a wonderful place, with
restaurants, shops, and handsome young people rummaging with wild, materialistic abandon through clothing and electronic stores. I first saw an Iranian
prostitute here, a homely, middle-aged woman in full hejab standing on the
curb. She would engage men in conversation, which I thought strange in this
land of feminine modesty.
My guide put me in the picture. All of this behavior is proscribed by the prim
Islamic Republic, but in Shiraz no one seems to care. Shiraz also has more
“cafénets”—Internet cafés—than other places. When I called up Yahoo mail in
one of them, I found that my Iranian predecessor had forgotten to close his
mailbox. I curiously scanned the subjects of his messages. They were all about
girls, love, and sex: “Where the girls are”—“How to meet single women”—“Sex,
sex, sex”—and so on. The mullahs are in a losing battle with human nature and
hormones, and they know it. The editors of Tehran’s English-language dailies,
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the Iran News and Tehran Times, rail every day against sensuality, decadence,
“consumerism,” and “westernization,” and they vow (unconvincingly) to extirpate all four from Islamic life.
Meanwhile, the front pages speak only of the economy, a daily litany of high
unemployment, low living standards, and interminable recession. With its
young population, Iran needs eight hundred thousand new jobs a year, but it is
falling short. Unless they fix the economy—this failed “socialism in one country”—the mullahs are in trouble. But to do that, they must open to the West,
which they fear would bury the Islamic Republic under Gaps, Tower Records,
Blockbusters, and Burger Kings. So it is that Iran goes nowhere, throttled by its
internal contradictions and its dread of the global economy.
On the outskirts of Shiraz I visited the military museum, which is really the
last Pahlavi’s gun collection on public display. Shah Muhammed Reza, who
reigned from 1941 to 1979, was truly eccentric, obsessed to an unnatural degree
with weapons and firearms. We know that he personally ordered every piece of
hardware for the imperial armed forces (after hungrily devouring the catalogs
and brochures of the foreign manufacturers), but did we know that he collected
virtually every rifle and sidearm made in the world from the eighteenth century
to 1979? The museum is also interesting for its ideological laziness—labels mentioning and even exalting the shah have not been changed. Like the Krupp howitzers and Bofors guns rusting in the courtyard, the labels are curling and
yellowing to dust, fading alongside the photos of Muhammed Reza’s jackbooted
colonels supervising construction of the museum in the 1960s.
To stand in the palace of Darius I at Persepolis and look out at the vast sweep of
fields and mountains is to grasp the vastness of the ancient Persian Empire. As for
Persepolis, a capital built by the Achaemenian dynasty for the purpose of entertaining vassal nations and accepting their tribute, one wonders how Alexander the
Great even found the place, let alone conquered it. Today the ruins and tombs fill
with a steady stream of Iranians on holiday and large numbers of foreign tourists.
It is a spectacular site; the ruins are
better at Ephesus, in Turkey, but nowhere else are bas-reliefs like these to
be seen. They are 2,500 years old but
as clean as if they were carved yesterday. Most depict envoys of subject
nations—Parthians, Bactrians,
Arabs, Thracians, and many other s — p ay i n g h om a g e to t h e
Achaemenian emperors, who ruled
Iran from 559 to 330 B.C. and are best
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remembered by their first names: Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes. All but
Cyrus are entombed in the cliffs around Persepolis.
One of the more remarkable aspects of modern Iran is that no statesman entertains irredentist claims to any of the “lost provinces” of the ancient empire,
whether in Africa, Europe, or closer to home in Iraq, Turkmenistan, or Afghanistan. Indeed, there was much domestic groaning—and an international outcry—when Shah Muhammed Reza went to Pasargadae in 1971 to visit Cyrus’s
tomb. Since his homage to the first Achaemenian—“You are sleeping, we are
awake”—seemed to portend a reconquest of the Persian Empire, even the usually solicitous Nixon administration recoiled. (The Saudis went farther, demanding that Washington remove the shah.) But that was the stillborn extent of
Iranian irredentism. Contrast this apathy with nationalism like Hungary’s,
where even today peddlers do brisk business in the sale of wishful maps depicting a reborn Hungary astride the entire Carpathian Basin.
No less interesting than the ruins of Persepolis are those of the Shah’s notorious “Persepolis party” of October 1971. Held to commemorate “2,500 years of
Iranian Empire,” the Persepolis party cost $500 million at a time when most Iranians lived in grinding poverty. I remember reading at the time that the shah
lodged his guests in luxurious tents. Passing through a cut in the barbed wire, I
entered the old encampment, which is set up like a Michigan suburban subdivision, semicircular cul-de-sacs thrown out from feeder roads divided by exposed,
dried-up fountains and water mains. The tents are still there, rusted steel frames
flying forlorn scraps of blue and gold canvas. Inside are cracked tile floors, water
and waste pipes (if only camping were really like this!), broken toilets and sinks,
and amputated power lines. The tents get bigger as one approaches the grand pavilion, where the infamous royal banquet was held—infamous because malnutrition and disease were still chronic in Iran when the shah sat down to that
banquet, the culmination of his three-day spectacle. Although the celebration
drew only a “B list” of dignitaries—men like Spiro Agnew, Josip Broz Tito, Haile
Selassie, Nicolae Ceaucescu, and Jeremy Thorpe*—no expense was spared. The
Pahlavis flew in chefs and 180 staff from Maxim’s of Paris and fed their guests
ninety peacocks, stuffed roast lamb and truffles, quail’s eggs, two thousand
pounds of golden imperial caviar, mousse of crayfish tails, champagne sorbet
made with wine of the 1911 vintage, and creamed figs with raspberries in port
wine.
By a marvelous coincidence, the British foreign office was declassifying all
documents relating to this bacchanal when I stopped in London on the way
*Vice president of the United States under Nixon, 1969–73; president of Yugoslavia, 1953–80;
emperor of Ethiopia, 1935–74; president of Romania, 1965–89; leader of the Liberal Party in Britain,
1967–76.
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home from Iran. I looked over some of the documents while engaged in other research at the Public Record Office in Kew. They reveal that Queen Elizabeth, who
had considered going to Persepolis, was dissuaded by her minders, who called it
“an event too tasteless and dangerous for the Queen of England.” Yet relations
between Iran and the United Kingdom were so delicate that the queen felt constrained to offer up the Prince of Wales, so as not to offend the shah at a moment
when the Pahlavis were weighing the purchase of 760 Chieftain tanks. Setting a
sterling example for war college students everywhere, Prince Charles actually refused, declaring that he could not miss a few days of classes at the Royal Naval
College. In the end, Princess Anne and Prince Philip joined what the British foreign office judged “a motley collection of heads of state or, more likely, their representatives.” Anyone who remembers it as a glamorous event was hoodwinked;
a foreign office analyst reminds us that “it [was] the greatest nonevent of our
time, a creation of royal despotism taking advantage of the bedazzled mass
media.”
Today the grand pavilion of the Persepolis camp stands erect and apparently
intact, in contrast to the smaller tents. Closer inspection, however, discloses a
Potemkin facade. The rear of the pavilion has been crushed, as if by a bomb or tornado. Air conditioning ducts hang crazily, interior doors and walls are smashed in,
exposing expensive wallpaper and trim. It is an eerie, evocative place.
Back in Shiraz, I successfully penetrated the Madraseh-ye Khan, a serene
seventeenth-century theological college. In my diary I afterward wrote, “I have
wondered where all the hard-liners are, and here they are.” The madrasehs are
where the mullahs train; most of the novices are seventeen to twenty-one years
old. If not exactly the shock troops—most are too dim for that—these are the
foot soldiers of the Islamic Republic; they will become the men who intersperse
Friday prayers all over Iran with anti-Western, anti-Enlightenment injunctions
or flesh out the lower ranks of the civil service. As I strolled around the courtyard, admiring the architecture and mosaics, I felt eyes boring into me. The boys
live five or six to a room along the second story of the stone-walled school. They
were peering curiously down at me, my interpreter, and two young Frenchmen
who had joined us in the bazaar. “Where are you from?” an English-speaker
called. “America and France.” Shock! “We don’t let Americans into Iran, how did
you get in? Have they reopened the embassy?” There was a burble of excited conversation. The youngsters seemed half-scared and half-interested. Gradually
they descended from their rooms to crowd around, many sniffling and coughing
despite the summer heat. I was shocked by their appearance; all were dirty and
rank, their palms sweaty when they shook hands—and this was the Harvard or
Yale of Iranian madrasehs. I was reminded of Nasir-ed Din-Shah, one of the
westernizing Qajar kings of the nineteenth century, who deplored “the vermin-
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infested priests who lurk in the corners of the madrasehs.” They did seem rather
lousy, and I was scratching afterward.
It suddenly dawned on me that this might be a truer representation of Iran
than the beautiful people whom I had been admiring on Mullah Sada Street.
These boys were from the villages and the slums, educated just enough to begin
to take in, along with the Koran, the prejudices of
their elders, several of whom approached to glare
at us and then stalk away. They brimmed with
questions—that is, for me. The French did not exist for them. The questions give insight into the
curriculum at the average madraseh: “Why does
America support Israel?” “Why do Americans favor Jews over Palestinians [philistines, in Farsi]?”
“Why does America arrest people who go to
Cuba?” “Why does America accuse Iran of bombing Khobar Towers when everyone knows that it
was the English secret service?” “Why did Clinton
have sex with Lewinsky?” “Jesse Jackson had a girl
like Lewinsky too, didn’t he?” These credulous
boys are exempt from military service. They attend state schools until the eighth grade, spend six
years in the madraseh, then three more in Qom,
the Vatican of Shi’ism. Their education complete,
most return to mosques in their natal villages or
neighborhoods. None of the boys could think of
anything to say to the two French visitors, not even thanks for succoring Imam
Khomeini after he was expelled from Iraq in 1978. Soccer, however, is as avidly
followed in the madraseh as everywhere else, and as we left the students shouted
their only words of French: “Jean-Pierre Papin!” (a retired player) and “Paris St.
Germain!” (a team). My two French companions looked rather glum; such is the
hypnotic power of America everywhere you go.
The mausoleum of Shah-e Cheragh is a holy place in Shiraz; there the brother
of Imam Reza, one of the twelve imams of Shi’ism, is buried. Sitting inside the
mirrored great hall, I saw my first revolutionary guards, members of the Sepah.
Although their uniforms are the same faded khaki as those of the soldiers of the
Artesh (regular army), they are invariably better turned out and are sometimes
armed. These “revolutionary guardians,” or Pasdarans, are also recognizable by their
beards and mustaches; the Artesh are clean shaven. The guards also seem pious.
In two weeks in Iran, I never saw an Artesh in a mosque, with the sole exception
of the Disneylike Imam Khomeini shrine south of Tehran, which is not really a
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mosque anyway. Every large mosque had its complement of barefoot Pasdarans,
fervently bowing and praying, kissing the holy objects, and backing away
from the shrines so as not to turn their back on them (few others observe this
nicety). This is not to suggest that all guards are zealots. The Sepah is manned the
same way the Artesh is, with twenty-month draftees; many are volunteers from
the draft pool who requested assignment to the guards, but others are simply
eighteen-year-olds forced into the IRGC to fill quotas.
I met three revolutionary guards of the latter category in the Hafez Gardens
of Shiraz. All were from Isfahan, all very nice and oh, so innocent. They thought
I was English, because I had said that I speak “Ingilisi.” When my guide came up
and explained that I was from the United States, one of the boys asked him, “So,
does he speak English or United States?” The other two laughed uproariously.
These three had been drafted into the IRGC and were unhappy about it: “They
make us pray more than the Artesh,” one of them told me. All three were delighted to meet a real live American and asked me shyly to write or draw something in their little notebooks, which all Iranians seem to carry. I asked them
what they planned to do after military service; all three wanted to go to university, but places there are limited, so one would be an electrician, the other two
didn’t know.
In another park I met a nineteen-year-old in army uniform. He hated the service but would soon be done with it. All he was interested in was Western music.
Iron Maiden, Back Street Boys—he whispered the forbidden names, as if letting
me in on a great conspiracy. I asked him what he knew about America: “At
school and from the government we hear bad things, but we believe the opposite
of everything we hear. We think America is great!” I asked him if any of his
friends studied at madrasehs: “Thank God, no!” Who, then, attends the
madrasehs? “Poor kids, stupid kids, usually from religious families.” What kind
of government would you like to see in Iran? “Democracy—but I guess I don’t
really know what democracy is. They say that we have ‘democracy’ here, but it’s
not democracy, because it never matters what we want, things just get decided
for us.” Like most other places, Shiraz is full of Afghan laborers, who work like
mules for four dollars a day, contributing to the 25 percent unemployment
among Iranians.
From Shiraz we flew to Bandar Abbas, Iran’s principal port and naval base.
This is a seedy place, the temperature well over a hundred degrees and humid in
summer. It is filled with Afghan traders, who buy on the duty-free island of
Qeshm, sixty minutes away, and sell on the streets of Bandar at a slight markup.
(I bought a toy for my son from a trader and paid seventy cents for it; he had
bought it on Qeshm for fifty cents and seemed content with the transaction.) I
saw more junkies here, strung out and passed out on the sidewalks. Dealers
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would flit past whispering, offering not drugs as I assumed but CDs: “Mariah
Carey, Britney Spears, Madonna.” Propaganda murals here were more explicitly
anti-American than elsewhere in Iran: a wall-sized rendering of two martyrs
downing a U.S. Navy helicopter from a motorboat, a ghostly Koran rahl (a
wooden rack) hovering above a U.S. guided-missile destroyer to bat away its
missiles, or a plump American soldier with his boots straddling the Gulf and
something hateful scrawled underneath. I drove eighty-five kilometers west
along the coast from Bandar Abbas and passed the naval base, but there was not
much to see from the land side, as the base is walled. It is huge, encompassing the
navy’s shipyard, where three 1,200-ton corvettes are being laid down.
We crossed to Qeshm, flanking the Strait of Hormuz. One gets there on rental
Boston Whalers that blast through high seas, slamming sickeningly up and
down. Viewed in the shah’s time as strategically vital, the island seems little valued today (aside from its duty-free privilege), with only a drowsy police presence and a few rusted coils of barbed wire here and there. Still, in a trip in which I
was largely left alone, someone thought to send us two gentlemen who claimed
to be from the (nonexistent) Ministry of Tourism but looked more like Stasi
agents. They accompanied me everywhere and saw me down to the water’s edge
when I left. We drove around much of the island but saw little besides gas lines,
dhow yards, and the occasional sleepy village, invariably filled with Afghan refugees. The island of Hormuz to the northeast, famous for its ruined Portuguese
castle, was largely deserted, with no military or naval presence that I could see. It
is ironic that the last shah seized nearby Abu Musa and the Tumbs in 1971 on the
pretext that islands like these could be seized in a coup de main by “terrorists” to
block the flow of Gulf oil. It is no exaggeration to say that I, my guide, and the
two Polish tourists we were traveling with that day could have taken Hormuz
with our jackknives.
“Isfahan is half the world,” or so the locals boast. I thought it a most disappointing city, but that was probably because it was even hotter than Bandar
Abbas. It reminded me of Florence in August, the big central maidan, or square,
crammed with rug and souvenir shops whose owners were busily dickering with
foreign tourists. (Like Florence, Isfahan is famed for its ancient bridges, but the
river has been dry for years. It is strange to stroll back and forth across the
bridges in the evening as the locals do and not hear the gurgle of water below.)
Isfahan is also unexpectedly pious, like one of Stendhal’s provincial capitals,
where everyone apes the Bourbons and the clergy. To a woman, females in
Isfahan wore the chador; only Qom is more severe. I toured Isfahan with an
Emirati from Dubai who now teaches at Ohio State. He marveled at the changes
here. The last time he had been in Iran was before the revolution, when Arabs
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had come here to drink and carouse with legal prostitutes. This straitlaced Iran
was as alien to him as a Puritan Las Vegas would be to Americans.
On the road from Isfahan to Qom, we stopped in Kashan. There I had a long
conversation with Ansarian, a young mullah who teaches school in the nearby
town of Natanz and was supervising a field trip to the famous Fin Gardens.
Ansarian was rather frightening; smooth and assured, he gave voice to the worst
prejudices of the mullah state. “The American people are not the Great Satan,
the American government is the Great
Satan—Bush, Carter, and so on.” I
asked him why the Islamic Republic
represses dissident politicians, scholars, and editors if it is truly a republic.
“We are a republic, but we will not tolerate anyone who does not respect our
martyrs or Islam. All others, yes.” Why
do you restrict the freedom of your
people by banning Western films, music, literature, and television? “If it is
Hafez tomb and garden, Shiraz
sunny and you pull a shade across the
window, is that bad? Westernization is like a plague of flies, and we are trying to
put screens on our windows. Is that bad?” Are you worried by the prospect of
counterrevolution? “There might be some trouble like that, but it would be
against God, so it would fail.”
Leaving the gardens, I chatted with an Artesh and a policeman on duty at the
gate. Both were draftees. Pondering my discussion with Ansarian, I asked them if
they would fire on rioting students at Kashan University if ordered. They both
twisted uncomfortably for at least thirty seconds before answering. Finally, the
policeman said: “Well, they’d never ask us to—they’d get the basiji to do that.”
There are perhaps three million basiji in Iran. They are the “minutemen” of the
Islamic Revolution. In a crisis they would be called to arms by the Friday prayer
leaders. They tend to be fourteen-to-seventeen-year-olds but can be as old as
sixty. They are volunteers, paramilitary boy scouts, ultimately controlled by the
Sepah and used to intimidate or thrash restless students.
Qom has always queered Iranian politics, the mullahs demanding a share of
political power even in secularizing times like the Pahlavi era. The city is a bastion
of bureaucratic Islam, redolent of Rome in the seventeenth century, full of robed
clerics and functionaries in the service of the Supreme Leader. I visited Ayatollah
Khomeini’s humble house in a back alley and sat for tea where he had sat before
his exile to Iraq and France. The Imam Khomeini Educational and Training Institute is an aggressively political body masquerading as a nongovernmental

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/27

98

War College: Winter 2002 Full Issue
WAWRO

121

organization. When I was there the staff had just folded up an exhibition entitled
“The White Coup.” Intended chiefly for the novices and clergy who throng Qom, the
exhibit had aimed to dispel “doubts and assaults on sacred truths” and “put viewers on their guard against poison pens and questionable foreigners.” The closed
walls of provincial madrasehs close even tighter here. Whereas mullahs are a rare
sight in most Iranian cities, there are legions of them in Qom. In the 1930s, the
wife of Reza Shah, the last shah’s father, was once insulted by a mullah here; the
king drove down in an armored car with four hundred troops, motored into the
holy shrine of Fatimah, and slapped the offending cleric. Looking at the vast
domed shrine with its army of mullahs and pilgrims, I had an inkling of how daring
that act had been. Timid Muhammed Reza—the introverted product of a Swiss
boarding school, not the Iranian Cossack Brigade—would never have done it.
En route to Tehran we stopped at Behesht-e Zahra, a cemetery of the Iraq war
south of the city. It is a heartbreaking place, as grandiose as the Omaha Beach
cemetery but even more affecting, because of the way Shias display their dead.
Whereas we erect plain white crosses, the Shia builds a glass case with mementos,
and in many cases a photograph of the corpse, no matter how badly burned or
pummeled. The photos of smiling boys turned to armless or legless trunks, their
faces constricted with pain or blasted away entirely, were shocking. My guide,
who had served in the war, was reduced to tears. His teenaged son, who had
come along, wandered off, bored by the whole thing. I remembered the assumption of Americans during that war that the Iranians were “fanatics.” Here I was
reminded of their ordinariness.
The penultimate stop was Mashad, which used to be an important halt on the
Silk Road. Once it glittered; today, it chokes under smog and heat. The people
here, hard by the border of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, look more like
Turkmen than Persians, with broad Asiatic faces. Mashad seemed limitless, an
ugly sprawl of shanties and garages out to the horizon. The masses come here on
pilgrimages to the shrine of Imam Reza. Inside the shrine, I was reminded again
that many Iranians are devout and superstitious; they will travel thousands of
miles at great expense to prostrate themselves at this shrine. Infidels are not allowed inside, but I went in anyway; there was nothing else to do in Mashad. No
one stopped me or took much interest. Outside, the courtyards were full of Pakistani Shias, sitting in circles, singing prayers and hymns. There were no cafénets
anywhere in the city, my guide conjecturing that Khorasan Province—seat of
this “place of martyrdom”—might forbid them on cultural grounds. Wanting to
contact my wife, I asked the head of the Imam Reza shrine’s library if I could use
his Internet connection. Now here was an interesting man—not a mullah but a
loyal servant of the theocracy, his desk heaped with the regime’s propaganda.
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After forcing me to sit through a lecture on America’s ills and the urgent need for
a “dialogue of civilizations,” he decided that I could not use his e-mail after all.
Two weeks earlier I had thought Tehran a grimy, stinking, third-world city.
On my return there, it felt like London, New York, or Paris. Northern Tehran,
which rises steeply from the center, is where the shah and the rich people
lived during the Pahlavi era, and where the rich people today live as well. The
million-dollar villas of the old regime’s “petro-bourgeoisie” are now inhabited
by bazaar merchants (bazaari) and other creatures of the new regime.
Threatened by the shah’s program of westernization, which was opening their
captive markets to foreign competition, the bazaari allied with the mullahs to
oust the shah in 1979. The “Islamic Association of Bazaar Merchants” remains a
principal prop of the Islamic Republic, for all trade great and small passes
through its hands—as long as westerners are excluded. To hear the bazaari
splashing in their swimming pools behind high walls on the heights two thousand feet above the suffocating streets of Tehran is to understand at last their
otherwise inexplicable support for the theocracy. (Has there been another case
in history where merchants supported priests in a revolution against
“secularism”?)
Then there are the Islamic “new men,” who cling to this not-so-new government as adeptly as the shah’s money-grubbing parvenus clung to the last one.
One such is Supreme Leader Khamenei’s private physician, who has been made
an army general and promoted to chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces despite a complete lack of military experience. Another example, and perhaps the
most striking one, is Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, a humble nobody who, beginning as
Ayatollah Khomeini’s chauffeur in 1979, rose to command the Revolutionary
Guards ministry before ending as chairman of the ten-billion-dollar Foundation
of the Oppressed and Disabled, the most notorious of Iran’s extragovernmental
bonyads, or foundations, which covertly finance terrorism, vigilantism, death
squads, black propaganda, and other skullduggery for the Supreme Leader.
Rafiq-Dust’s sycamore-shaded mansion is near the shah’s old palace complex
at Saad Abad, where the Pahlavi White and Green Palaces are now open to the
public. To reach them, one passes the ex-Hilton and the ex-Hyatt Hotels. I
stopped at the former, to see how it has fared since 1979. It is a time warp, filled
with sixties decor and furnishings, like a set from I Dream of Jeannie or The
Brady Bunch: Naugahyde-padded bar, burnt-orange shag rugs, harvest gold curtains, lime chairs. The famous pool patio where American businessmen once
sold their wares is crumbling, the pool and sundeck filled with Iranian males in
black Speedos who jerk to attention every time a (fully clothed) female crosses to
the hotel.
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At the palace complex, my guide led me inside with a guilty air. Middle-aged
Iranians still do not feel quite right trespassing here, where the “king of kings”
once roamed. The White Palace is in the Nazi style favored by its builder, Reza
Shah, who was forced to abdicate by the British and Russians in 1941 because of
his fondness for Hitler. It resembles nothing so much as Rudolf Hess’s “Brown
House” in Munich—which is, of course, not brown but white. Since the revolution, the bronze statue of Reza Shah that once stood at the entrance has been
sawn off at the boots. Yet half a boot is still man-tall, which suggests the
Brobdingnagian proportions of the vanished monument. If the palace’s exterior
reflects the father, however, the interior is the son’s. There are oil portraits of Napoleon, wall-sized paintings of Frederician grenadiers in action, and statuettes
of the last shah on horseback with toga and broadsword, à la Marcus Aurelius.
Every guidebook I consulted deplored the shah’s lack of taste, and rightly so.
The elegant wood-paneled billiard room was ruined by the addition of a Space
Invaders machine, which squats odiously between leather club chairs. Upstairs
were only two memorable sights, the first of them the last shah’s bedroom, which
is a frilly, feminine place modeled on Marie Antoinette’s Versailles boudoir.
Since the shah and his queen kept separate bedrooms, this is a revealing detail.
(In the Green Palace, favored by Muhammed Reza’s father, there is no bed in the
shah’s bedroom; the old Cossack preferred to sleep on the floor.) The other is a
cheap-looking nineteen-inch Zenith television on a steel cart in Queen Farah’s
bedroom. It was easy to picture Farah sprawled on the bed watching Dallas reruns while the air conditioners roared and her husband, fifty yards down the
hall, sat up in his own bed looking at the pictures in Jane’s Defence Weekly.
I sat in a tearoom by the palace-complex guardhouse, puffing on a hubble-bubble
pipe—moist, spiced Egyptian tobacco inhaled through water—and reflecting
on what I had seen and heard in the last two weeks. I had met dozens of Iranians
and joined briefly in the whirl of their lives. My deepest impression was of a gulf
between the Iranian government and its people. Educated Iranians seem tired of
the mullah state, with its pieties and hypocrisies. How can a self-styled “religious
democracy” wield oppressive powers of “public supervision” and still expect the
support of its citizens? Young and middle-aged Iranians—96 percent of the population—chafe at the restrictions and often defy them. The “sexy hejab” in
northern Tehran is even more advanced than in Shiraz, and cars there sometimes pull alongside playing forbidden Western music.
As yet, no one talks about a counterrevolution, because of the likely bloodshed and the absence of any counterrevolutionary organization. A coup by secular, pro-Western officers seems out of the question; the military has been
effectively “coup proofed” by its division into competing forces, the Artesh and
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Sepah. Nor is there a conspicuous political alternative to the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s first constitutional movement, in the early 1900s, was snuffed out by the
military. The country’s last monarchy disgraced itself through waste, corruption, and a secret police that maintained sixty thousand agents and three million
informers in a country of just thirty million. The liberal movement led by
Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1950s was brought down by its own irrational
flailing, but also by the mullahs, who feared Mossadeq’s irreligiousness and so
joined with the British and Americans in Operation AJAX, the coup that restored
full powers to the last shah.
In Iran today there is no obvious answer to Lenin’s famous question, “What is
to be done?” Hence people watch and wait, enduring their gloomy government
for want of an alternative. What seems clear is that Iranians are anything but
“fundamentalists.” They are weary economic refugees with no place to go and
few prospects. They judge their government corrupt and insincere, interested
only in clinging to power. Most rate the mullahs better than the last shah, but
that is not saying much, and Iran’s refusal even to consider supporting a restoration in Afghanistan of the eighty-seven-year-old former king, Zahir Shah, suggests that the theocracy is more than a little concerned about the possibility of a
Pahlavi restoration. Their concern can only have been deepened by the “soccer
riots” of October 2001, when more than a million Iranians assembled after each
of three World Cup qualifying matches to denounce the clerical regime and demand an easier, more secular government and way of life. If oil prices—down 33
percent—continue their fall, public pressure for jobs and relief may become
unbearable. The street mobs that chanted “death to the Islamic republic” in
October 2001 will collide with Sepah and basiji units ordered to defend the revolution. The martyrs may yet have their day of blood and tulips, or the whole regime may pass peacefully away like Honecker’s East Germany or De Klerk’s
South Africa. Or the Islamic Republic may right itself, pulling just enough support from the slums and villages, the Sepah, and the bazaari to get it through this
crisis and the next. Iran is that unpredictable.
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A DISSERVICE TO RUSSIAN DEMOCRATS

Sir:
I am pleased that in his review of my book, The Russian Presidency (Naval War
College Review, Summer 2001, pp. 165–8), Sergei Khrushchev agreed with me
(and we are among a very few in the scholarly community who have agreed on
this issue) that presidentialism will serve Russia better than the parliamentary
alternative. But elsewhere, Dr. Khrushchev disagrees with me, and I am writing
not only to clarify to readers of the Review the nature of that disagreement
but also to take issue with places where I believe he has mischaracterized the
book.
First, it is understandable that Dr. Khrushchev objects to my argument that
the current state of affairs in Russia is largely the result of the horrific policies of
the Soviet era. His father helped to build, and then headed, the Soviet system,
and no one can blame Dr. Khrushchev if filial loyalty hampers his objective evaluation of that era. However, he is flatly wrong when he writes that placing the
blame on the Soviets is “a usual mistake of Western studies.” Even a cursory
reading of Western academic opinion reveals that most scholars (many of
whom, ironically, are ardent fans of socialism) think the problem with Russia is
the current environment of capitalism, not the legacy of Soviet authoritarianism.
Dr. Khrushchev may not like the latter argument, but it is in no way a typical one.
Likewise, his assertion that “seventy years of Soviet rule did not change the
Russians” is staggering; the Soviet system not only increased levels of urbanization and education but also, let us never forget, murdered tens of millions of
people. To say that this did not change the Russians or have an impact on current
Russian political culture defies the evidence as well as common sense.
Also, a few matters of fact are worth clearing up. Dr. Khrushchev asserts that I
paint figures like Ruslan Khasbulatov in “exclusively dark tones.” I realize—and I
say in the book—that Yeltsin and Khasbulatov represent two visions of the future of Russia. But the fact remains that Khasbulatov tried to ignite civil war (he
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called on the army to mutiny) and shared a podium during the 1993 standoff
with a renegade general who promised to see to it that Yeltsin’s supporters would
“wash in their own blood.” If there is a lighter way to depict such people, it will
have to come from a more imaginative author than I.
The review also claims that “Nichols declares it to be well known that [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky and his party have always been controlled by the government.”
I said nothing so categorical. I noted, in a footnote regarding the late 1990s, that
it is widely believed in Moscow’s political circles that Zhirinovsky had been
bought off by the government with special perks and that this had made him a
less credible opposition figure.
Finally, Dr. Khrushchev writes that my drawing of a distinction between
Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin was “propagandistic,” “used without concrete evidence,” and “inadmissible,” that it “reduce[d]
confidence in the author.” (By contrast, he writes that “Lukashenko is the very
image of Yeltsin.”) If calling Russia democratic and Belarus authoritarian is
“propagandistic,” then it is propaganda that has been engaged in by the United
States, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe. As I noted in The Russian Presidency, the OSCE said in 1997 that
Lukashenko was “constructing a system of totalitarian government” and that
both the OSCE and the EU found the voting procedures in Belarus so clearly
rigged that they refused to send election observers. In Russia, American and European observers alike certified the voting in both the 1996 and 2000 elections to
be free and fair, despite occasional irregularities. If Dr. Khrushchev finds such
judgments “inadmissible,” I suggest that his quarrel is with the many observers
from the Western democracies and not with me.
The real problem in the review is that Dr. Khrushchev, like so many Russians who
cast a cynical eye on events after 1991, sweepingly dismisses Russian political life as
“merely reflections of a struggle for national power among oligarchic-criminal
groups that emerged as a result of fraudulent privatization.” That is a disservice to
the many Russian democrats who are trying, however imperfectly, to build a new
political system. But more disturbingly, if that is his starting point for analysis, then
any book on Russian politics, save one that is completely and scathingly critical of
every institutional change and political event in Moscow, will inevitably fail to meet
his standard of acceptability.
The fact remains that ten years after the Soviet collapse, democracy and its institutions survive and are deepening in Russia. Especially at such a crucial time
in history, when it is imperative during our war against terror to separate the civilized nations who might be our allies from the malefactors who are our enemies,
the readers of the Naval War College Review deserve a more judicious discussion
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of events in Russia than the relentless (and unfounded) pessimism represented
by Dr. Khrushchev.

THOMAS M. NICHOLS

Department of Strategy and Policy
Naval War College

CB IN DESERT STORM: SUFFICIENT CONDEMNATION

Sir:
While I appreciate Lieutenant Commander Pietro D. Marghella’s notes on my
“meticulous and forthright discussion” of chemical and biological (CB) warfare
during the Gulf War (Naval War College Review, Summer 2001, pp. 172–3), I take
exception to some of his criticisms.
My book did use acronyms extensively and was focused on the Army’s contributions to CB defense. The book was written to inform the members of the
Army community who do not know that the Chemical Corps had an effective
defense capability for the armed forces during this conflict, especially those misled by the media and other critics to believe we had little or no defensive capability during the Gulf War. Frankly, I had no good contacts in the other services
with whom to talk about their CB defense efforts. But I will note for the record
that in 1990 the Army had the most credible operational and logistics capability in that area; the other services were very unprepared, due to their parochial approaches in developing service-specific CB defense—none more so than
the Navy, with its unique chemical detectors, chemical suits, and biodetection
research-and-development program, and lack of any decontamination capability. The unpreparedness among the services is the reason Congress directed a
joint program approach by the four services in 1994, the services having continued their separate acquisition efforts after the war.
Marghella takes issue with my use of the term “weapons of mass disruption.”
I contend that CB weapons are mass casualty agents only if used as long-line
resources against an unprotected population, as General John J. Pershing noted
after World War I. How many people did sarin kill in the Tokyo subways in 1995?
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Twelve. How many people has anthrax killed (as of late October) in the terrorist
letter campaign that began in September 2001? A very few (four victims to date).
How many lives did these acts disrupt? Tens of thousands. Our failure to acknowledge this simple fact has caused the logjams in defense policy and continued failures to model and simulate the realistic effects of CB agents.
I am sorry Marghella takes issue with my treatment of medical topics. I did
not mean to imply that the doctors and medical specialists could not recognize
chemical and biological casualties (although there was an acknowledged intensive education effort conducted during DESERT SHIELD). What we lacked as a
force was the ability to treat and evacuate mass casualties; we had no ability to
decontaminate and move contaminated human remains; and we certainly had a
very limited biological vaccine capability. The 101st Airborne Division’s commander flatly asserted that it would have been better to have no vaccines than
enough for only a third of the force. That in itself should be sufficient condemnation of our medical capability during the Gulf War.
Last, Marghella says the United States “never considered the use of chemical
weapons in the Gulf War.” This is flatly untrue. The Defense Department leadership, with Army Chemical Corps advisors, discussed the chemical option as a
counter to Iraq’s chemical weapons threat and decided against it. The department’s policy envisioning the use of chemical weapons had been negated only by
the U.S. signature of the Chemical Warfare Convention. My sources were in the
room where the discussion took place and participated in it; I doubt that
Marghella’s could say the same.

ALBERT J. MAURONI

Senior Policy Analyst, Analytic Services, Inc.
Washington, D.C.
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REVIEW ESSAYS

A QUESTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

Robert L. Gallucci

Lodal, Jan. The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership. New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001. 234pp. $19.95
Quester, George H. Nuclear Monopoly. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, Rutgers Univ., 2000. 234pp. $44.95

Both books are about America’s strategic nuclear weapons policy. Jan Lodal, author of The Price of Dominance, knows a lot about the subject from having
helped make nuclear weapons policy in both the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford
administrations, and at the Pentagon during the Jimmy Carter administration.
George Quester, author of Nuclear Monopoly, is also an expert, having written
important books about nuclear strategy and nuclear proliferation for more than
three decades. Lodal analyzes the current U.S. strateRobert L. Gallucci became the dean of Georgetown Unigic posture and, finding it wanting, advocates a
versity’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in
change in policy. Quester analyzes that brief period in
1996, after completing twenty-one years of government
service, serving since August 1994 with the Department
America’s past when it was the only nation with nuof State as ambassador-at-large. In March 1998, the
clear weapons, and asks why U.S. policy was not then
State Department announced his appointment as
different from what it was, and what lessons might
special envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass debe learned for future policy. These are very different
struction. In July 1992, Dr. Gallucci was confirmed as
books, from authors with quite different experiences,
the assistant secretary of state for political-military afbut both speak to America’s unique position of power
fairs. He earned his master’s degree and doctorate in
politics from Brandeis University. Dr. Gallucci is the
in the world and what the United States might do with
author of a number of publications on political-military
that power.
issues, including Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam (Johns
Lodal begins by identifying the proliferation of
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975).
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the most
immediate serious threat to the security of the United
Naval War College Review, Winter 2002, Vol. LV, No. 1
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States. He then asserts that “intense international cooperation” will be essential
if the United States is to deal with that threat but that America’s overwhelming
nuclear power and the current direction of policy undermine cooperation.
Thus, the price of America’s strategic nuclear dominance will be increased vulnerability to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the hands of many
states.
There is an assertion here of a direct link between the U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons posture and its nonproliferation efforts; Lodal finds the strategic vision that should constructively connect the two to be absent or confused. Specifically, he sees recent U.S. policy as informed by a muddle of three visions: one
that would require more of the same kind of negotiated arms control that
the United States has been pursuing for decades; one that would replace arms
control with a robust missile defense; and a third that would move the United
States to the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. The first he describes
as stalled, caught in gridlock without the cooperation from other countries necessary if it is to succeed; the second he pronounces technically impossible to
achieve; and the third he easily puts aside as politically implausible. The way
then is clear for Lodal’s new strategic vision of deterrence and cooperation, the
central features of which are a strategic force of a thousand nuclear weapons deployed aboard B-2 bombers and submarines, plus an additional two hundred
weapons in Europe to maintain “coupling” with Nato, and a “thin” missile defense of one hundred interceptors, with deployments in space limited to sensors
for warning and tracking.
This prescription follows from the view that America must avoid adopting a
force posture with the combination of offensive strategic nuclear forces and a
robust missile defense that would imply overwhelming dominance. Lodal notes
that current strategic nuclear-strike plans call for the United States to maintain a
capability to respond to the warning of an attack with the prompt launch of a
counterstrike at an enemy’s forces to reduce the amount of damage suffered and
to ensure that U.S. forces are used before they are destroyed. However, this requirement, he says, is a fiction because of the short time available to make such a
decision to “launch on warning.” The capability to attack promptly and destroy
an enemy’s forces is really a preemptive capability. Moreover, if present U.S. offensive forces are maintained or reduced to a level no lower than 2,500 weapons,
and if even a “thin” missile defense is deployed, America would appear to have a
first-strike capability—the ability to launch preemptively a disarming strike
against any combination of enemies and deter retaliation by a combination of
retained offense and deployed defense.
Before this begins to sound too appealing, we are reminded that the United
States should not want this strategic dominance, because of what it would cost
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in other nations’ willingness to cooperate with American efforts to control
WMD—the real threat to U.S. security. There are other benefits to Lodal’s
slimmed-down, purely deterrent strategic posture besides avoiding an alienating dominance. First, mutual de-alerting of offensive forces becomes possible,
since all U.S. forces are survivable and have no prompt-response mission. Second, the thin defense would be available to cope with accidents, unintended
launches, and irrational rogues, and to improve crisis stability by forcing an enemy to launch, or threaten to launch, a significant strategic attack if it sought to
prevail by escalation or intimidation.
There is much to recommend Lodal’s prescription but less reason to believe
it will be embraced. While he is surely right about the emerging American
first-strike capability if U.S. offensive forces are not drastically reduced as a national missile defense is deployed, there is no reason to believe that the Bush administration (or any other administration, for that matter) would assess the
price of such dominance the way Lodal does or decide not to pay it. But Lodal’s
discussion of this central argument is the best part of the book. It is stronger
than his brief treatment of the complex issues of regional WMD proliferation,
and it deserves careful reading and serious discussion.
Quester’s critique of U.S. nuclear policy addresses the period beginning in
1945, when the United States built its first nuclear weapons, and ending in 1949,
when it was sure the Soviet Union had done the same. The author finds it fascinating that a nation that had just emerged from a world war with a monopoly
(which it could be sure would not last long) on nuclear weapons did not do
something to keep its advantage and thus avoid a foreseeable eternity of vulnerability and dependence on deterrence.
The reader, of course, initially may not find the point nearly as fascinating as
Quester, believing instead that launching a nuclear attack against the Soviet
Union’s nascent nuclear facilities and cities—that is, “using” its monopoly to
start a preventive war—was and is unthinkable in terms of American values. It is
precisely this attitude that troubles Quester. He argues at length that a number
of important thinkers in the United States and Britain considered “using” the
monopoly and that U.S. explanations for why Washington did not try harder to
preserve its position of dominance are not all that persuasive. As the author puts
it, this book is “all about” the idea of “imposing rather than proposing the
Baruch Plan.”
As it turns out, whether one finds the essential question as compelling a paradox as the author does is less important than the analysis and argument of the
case with all its variations. It is unfortunate, though, that with all the creative
rigor Quester brings to his discourse, he is not more careful to distinguish between the case for attempting compellance, intimidation, or just more assertive
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diplomacy predicated on a military posture of nuclear monopoly, on the one
hand, and the actual launch of a nuclear strike in a preventive war, on the other.
Too often the many uses of America’s nuclear monopoly are lumped together,
when clearly some are much more “thinkable” than others.
In sum, both these books should be read by strategists, military professionals,
and concerned citizens, because each speaks to the question of American nuclear dominance and how it ought to be used in the broader national interest.
Lodal’s book is clearly more sharply focused on current policy prescription, and
it is easier to find in this work propositions to embrace as well as those with
which to take issue. Quester’s book is a more enjoyable read, however, providing
at least as much to argue over, particularly for those who thrive on counterfactual
propositions.
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IS THIS THE END OF THE NATION-STATE?
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Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and
Power in the Coming Century. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
287pp. $26
Kaplan, Robert D. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the
Dreams of the Post–Cold War. New York: Random House,
2000. 198pp. $21.95
Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York:
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Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge. A Future Perfect:
The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization. New York:
Crown, 2000. 386pp. $27.50

Like the proverbial demise of Mark Twain, rumors of the death of the nationstate may be exaggerated, but in recent years they have become rife. The end of
the great-power standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, and
the ensuing surge in global economic relations, gave rise over the past decade to
a flood of books and articles postulating a new age in international relations. A
general theme has been that the era that began in 1648 with the Treaty of
Westphalia is ending, that we are witnessing a no less dramatic transition in
which both transnational and local forces will eclipse the importance of national polities. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 can only reinforce this
argument, having apparently been orchestrated by a globally based, subnational
network that targeted the World Trade Center, the paramount symbol of economic and cultural globalization.
On the other hand, those who accept the basic premise that the importance of
the nation-state is declining differ as to the implicaDr. Modisett has been chairman of the Decision Strategies
Department at the Naval War College since 1996. The
tions of that development, and some scholars condepartment’s projects have included Y2K, the evolving
tinue to deny it is occurring at all. For the U.S. Navy,
“New Rule Sets” of today’s globalized economy, a transthe debate is far from academic; the image of the fuformation strategy for the Navy, and the implications of
South Asian nuclear programs. He was a political anature that prevails will shape tomorrow’s fleet and inlyst for the Central Intelligence Agency for nineteen
fluence its employment.
years, focusing on Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
Visions of a future that is no longer state-centric
and Russia. Dr. Modisett holds a Ph.D. in European
history and a master’s degree in foreign service from
range from utopian to menacing. An early optimist
Georgetown University. He has contributed to several
was Francis Fukuyama, who in a seminal essay in 1989
books on the Soviet Union and Russia.
postulated that “the end of history” had arrived: with
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the global triumph of liberal democracy, no further evolution of human inter1
course was necessary or desirable. Similarly sweeping assessments emerged
from the business community. Management guru Peter Drucker wrote of a
“post-capitalist society” in which the four-hundred-year dominance of the na2
tion-state faced challenges at every level, from the transnational down to the tribal.
In addition, quintessential banker Walter Wriston, seeing a transition from a “material” economy to an “information economy,” concluded that the ability to transfer
instantaneously huge amounts of capital was undermining national boundaries
3
and sovereignty.
Of the authors whose books are here reviewed, Richard Rosecrance falls most
squarely in the lineage of those with a positive view of the effects of globalization. We may call them “post-nation-state optimists.”
Rosecrance, a professor of political science at the University of California, Los
Angeles, is the only author reviewed here who is not a journalist. Using quantitative analysis to buttress his arguments, he bases his case upon the proposition
that money and power no longer derive from land—a fixed asset—but from
capital, labor, and information—assets that are mobile. Moreover, he asserts
that “the most mobile—information—has created the greatest value.” Because
the key factors of production have become so mobile, the importance of boundaries is diminished, and Rosecrance considers this a good thing: “The theory this
book offers is fundamentally optimistic. It sketches a future with an ever-widening
zone of international peace.”
A balanced and systematic thinker, Rosecrance presents his case in four parts.
The first outlines his theory and attempts to refute the “conflict as usual” thesis.
The second discusses political and international implications. The third undertakes a global tour, assessing where each major country stands in the process of
becoming a virtual state, which Rosecrance defines as one where “services total
as much as 80 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] and manufacturing less
than 20 percent (with the remainder in primary products).” He maintains that
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are already virtual states and that among
major developed countries the United States has advanced the farthest. The
Middle East and South Asia, by contrast, remain part of the “old” world, where
land remains the dominant economic factor, and nineteenth and twentieth-century patterns of conflict endure.
The fourth part of Rosecrance’s book looks at the new international system
from a combined political and economic perspective. It concludes that “worldwide economics is no longer captured by the parochial organization of nationalist states. Rather, states are trapped in the international coils of economics.” This
does not mean, however, that it is time to write the obituary of the nation-state.
Indeed, Rosecrance predicts that in the twenty-first century, “nation-states will
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remain the major organizing factor in international politics.” They “will continue to compete,” although this competition will be economic, not about land.
At the same time, the global economy will require “some form of political coherence among great states, supervising and protecting the market. If such protection succeeds, the twenty-first century will be the first epoch in history to offer
the prospect of peaceful transformation and enduring global stability.”
Against the optimists like Rosecrance stand those who see the decline of the
nation-state as more likely to bring conflict than prosperity. We may call them
“post-nation-state pessimists.”
Four years after Fukuyama’s visionary article appeared, Samuel Huntington
offered a far darker prognosis. He first broached it in an article entitled “The
Clash of Civilizations?” in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs. Despite the
question mark in its title, the article strongly argued that “the fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” Breaking with the traditional
paradigm of the nation-state, Huntington maintained it had become more
meaningful to group countries in terms of their culture and civilization rather
than their political or economic systems or level of development. He predicted
that the “central axis of world politics” would become one of conflict between
“the West and the Rest,” the latter in particular constituting a Confucian-Islamic
4
connection that would challenge Western “interests, values and power.”
Huntington’s thesis sparked a firestorm of controversy, which received new
5
impetus when he expanded it into a best-selling book. It remains controversial,
especially the prediction of an anti-Western “axis” uniting Asia and the Middle
East. Nonetheless, the unfolding of events in recent years has gained Huntington
many adherents. The events of 11 September seem bound to strengthen his
credibility.
A year after Huntington’s article appeared, a different but equally disturbing
portrait of the future made its debut in the Atlantic Monthly. In the February
1994 issue, contributing editor Robert D. Kaplan, who had previously written
the influential best-seller Balkan Ghosts (1993), published “The Coming Anarchy.” It portrayed the underdeveloped regions of the world as marked by “the
withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains,
the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.” Kaplan
shared the pessimism of the neo-Malthusian Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon,
who foresaw spreading disease, malnutrition, and competition for resources.
Kaplan also accepted the conclusions of Martin van Creveld that future conflicts
would be low-intensity and subnational. He elaborated on these themes in a second best-seller, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy, in
which he recounted his observations in West Africa, the Near and Middle East,
6
Central Asia, India, and Cambodia. While his judgments and degree of pessimism
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varied from region to region, his common themes were the breakdown of authority, increased violence, and a trend toward rule by warlords or their equivalents—“guerrilla armies and urban mafias.”
The Coming Anarchy reprints Kaplan’s article and a series of subsequent essays that reflect the evolution of his thinking. The latter includes an emerging
philosophy of international relations that may be characterized as stark realpolitik. Warning of the perils of attempting to implant Western democracy
where it does not fit, he compares its potentially disruptive effects to those of
Christianity in the fourth-century Roman Empire, observing that “democracies
do not always make societies more civil.” To oppose the breakdown of order in
the underdeveloped world, he recommends that the United States adopt
“proportionalism.” Under this policy, foreign aid would not increase, but its
focus would shift from political reform to population control, women’s literacy,
and projects aimed at preserving or renewing dwindling resources. American
policy makers would have to be constantly on the lookout for trouble, but they
would also have to be highly selective about intervening. A decision to do so
would require consideration of the difficulty of the operation, the strategic value
of the location in question, and the potential for the operation to influence
events elsewhere. Even with these policy modifications, Kaplan sees U.S. ability
to influence the trend toward global anarchy as limited.
By the time New York Times foreign correspondent Thomas L. Friedman published The Lexus and the Olive Tree, he had the benefit of previous writings on
the decline of the nation-state by both optimists and pessimists. His own approach was to offer a synthesis of the two. Thus the “Lexus” of his title symbolizes the revolutionary changes globalization is bringing to national security,
politics, culture, finance, technology, and the environment, while the “olive tree”
represents resistance to those changes from traditionalists struggling to preserve
their cultural roots, often suffering the dislocations of globalization without enjoying its benefits. In other words, the Lexus represents the world of Fukuyama
and Rosecrance, and the olive tree that of Huntington and Kaplan.
In his introduction, Friedman compares his feelings about globalization to
his feelings about the dawn—“It does more good than harm,” and in any case, it
is inevitable. While not blind to globalization’s negative effects, particularly on
the environment, he emphasizes the positive, especially democratization. The
attractiveness of his arguments is enhanced by his ability to coin a phrase. Thus,
the “Electronic Herd” refers to global investors who are capable of moving billions of dollars into or out of a country instantaneously in reaction to decisions
by its government. This phenomenon, previously noted by Wriston, contributes
to another, which Friedman calls “Globalution,” or “revolution from beyond.”
He argues that the need to attract and retain foreign investment is forcing
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nondemocratic countries to adopt practices that will become the “building
blocks” of democracy. These include transparency, international business standards, and intolerance of corruption. Once a country adopts these “rules of the
free market,” it puts on a “Golden Straitjacket” since its prosperity depends upon
continuing to observe them.
Like Rosecrance, Friedman is unready to write off the nation-state. In fact, he
stresses that “globalization does not end geopolitics.” What it does is create a
“much stronger web of constraints” on the foreign policy of nations plugged
into the system. Friedman sees the United States as occupying a unique position.
In a chapter called “Revolution Is U.S.,” he notes how closely globalization
equates to Americanization, a linkage that arouses both admiration and resentment—as became horribly apparent on 11 September. At the same time, Friedman believes the United States cannot retreat from its role if it wants to continue
enjoying the benefits of globalization, for world stability depends upon U.S.
strength and willingness to engage: “America truly is the ultimate benign
hegemon and reluctant enforcer.”
Not unlike Friedman, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge fuse elements of optimism and pessimism in A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization. Correspondents for the Economist, they previously coauthored Witch
Doctors, a survey of faddish management theories and those who hawk them.
The authors’ views on globalization, perhaps reflecting their ties to the international management community, are highly positive. Indeed, they state as “the
underlying message” of their book that “globalization needs not merely to be
understood but to be defended stoutly.” Their advocacy rests upon both economic and political grounds. They believe that the number of people who have
benefited from globalization is far larger than that of those who have been hurt,
and that many of the latter would have fared poorly whether or not globalization
took place. Like Friedman, they view globalization as a force for democratization, and they appear to share none of Kaplan’s reservations about the value of
democracy to the developing world.
However, as the quotation above suggests, Micklethwait and Wooldridge do
not share Friedman’s view that globalization is as inevitable as the dawn; they
believe it faces serious challenges and could even be reversed, like similar trends
a century ago. In language reminiscent of Kaplan and Huntington, they write,
“Far from bringing nations together, globalization has often helped awaken old
nationalist or fundamentalist impulses. In some cases, such as Quebec and Scotland, these revivals are merely inconvenient. In others, they are vengeful and
bloody.”
Like Rosecrance and Friedman, Micklethwait and Wooldridge take a measured
view of the degree to which globalization is affecting the role of the nation-state.
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While they maintain that the forces driving globalization—technology, mobility
of capital, and the internationalization of management—are blurring national
7
boundaries, they do not see those boundaries as disappearing. Indeed, in a
chapter entitled “The Strange Survival of the Nation-State,” they argue the opposite: “Globalization is fundamentally a democratic process, driven by individual choices, and what most people still want are senses of culture, place, and
nationality. National politicians are not powerless, history is not ending, and the
basic substance of foreign policy is, for better or worse, little different from what
it was a century ago.” They then cite Peter Drucker: “Whenever in the last 200
years political passions and nation-state politics have collided with economic
8
rationality, political passions and the nation state have won.”
Finally, some writers disagree with all the authors considered thus far, denying either that globalization is a major force or that the nation-state is in decline.
We may call these skeptics “nation-state traditionalists.”
A leading representative of this group is the renowned international relations
scholar Kenneth N. Waltz, author of the classic Man, the State and War (1965),
who challenged the apostles of globalization in an article in the spring 2000
9
National Interest. Waltz begins by noting that extravagant hopes for globalization, which he calls “the fad of the 1990s,” are nothing new. Sir Norman Angell’s
widely read The Great Illusion claimed in 1910 that the growing interdependence
of national economies ruled out future wars and promised an era of prosperity
and democracy. Within a few years, World War I had shattered that vision, and
events over the next fifty years fed the resulting disillusionment.
Waltz disputes the notion that economic activity is shifting to the international level, noting that the process called “globalization” is in fact leaving out
many regions, including most of Africa and all of the Middle East except Israel.
He further claims that economic interdependence in 1999 was no greater than in
1910, and that even financial markets, the most globalized, are no more integrated now than in 1900. Moreover, he maintains that “the range of government
functions and the extent of state control over societies and economies has sel10
dom been fuller than it is now.”
Waltz offers an alternative view to those who believe the world is increasingly
ruled by markets. He sees the distinguishing feature of today’s international politics not in the increased interdependence of states but in their growing inequality, which has become “extremely lopsided” since the end of the bipolar era.
Rather than elevating economic forces, he believes, these inequalities “enhance
the political role of one country.” He concludes, “Politics as usual prevails over
11
economics.”
As noted at the outset, the way these contending visions get sorted out will
have a direct impact on the future U.S. Navy. If the view of the post-nation-state
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optimists prevails, the Navy’s role might look at first glance much as it did to Alfred Thayer Mahan a century ago—protecting the shipping lanes for commerce,
while maintaining sufficient capability to deter any potential challenger. These
tasks, however, would be far less demanding than in Mahan’s era. Then, the
nation-state still reigned supreme, and several potential rivals had navies powerful enough to challenge even the strongest, or the capability to build such navies.
Today, the United States has neither a peer at sea nor a potential peer. In the
world of the post-nation-state optimists, the U.S. Navy could grow significantly
smaller and the tempo of operations shrink to occasional presence and minor
policing actions. America would still maintain some surge capability and a sufficient advantage in numbers and technology to dissuade any potential rival
from trying to compete, but it could size its fleet in the expectations that there
would rarely be a need to deploy for combat and that the prospect of a
navy-against-navy conflict would be practically nil.
On the other hand, if the post-nation-state pessimists prove correct, the evolution of the Navy would follow a very different course. The future force would
need to be capable of a wide range of operations. Many would be like those of the
1990s and today—widespread deployments to demonstrate presence, and active
engagement in low-end, littoral operations in support of ground forces. At the
same time, the Navy of this scenario would also have to hedge against challenges
of a higher magnitude. This would be a world from which regional hegemons
might emerge, and the prospect of using naval forces for missile defense could
raise demand for high-end platforms to be deployed abroad for early interception or off U.S. shores for homeland defense. These considerations point toward
a fleet at least as large as today’s, with significant capabilities across the spectrum
of conflict.
What if the world of tomorrow turns out to be much like the world of yesterday, that of nation-state traditionalists? Such a world might bring a reduction in
low-end conflict from today’s levels and a commensurate reduction in the
tempo of naval deployments. The rise of a peer competitor would remain unlikely, or at most a distant prospect, but regional challengers could arise, and
planning would have to focus on the possibility of navy-to-navy conflict at the
theater level. Force levels might be somewhat lower than today’s, but the emphasis would be on high-end capabilities.
With views of the future varying so sharply, the challenge of planning tomorrow’s Navy has never been greater.
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1. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”
National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18.
Fukuyama expanded his ideas into a book,
The End of History and the Last Man (New
York: Free Press, 1992). In it he describes a
transition period marked by the coexistence
of two “worlds.” In the “post-historical world
. . . the old rules of power politics would have
decreasing relevance,” and “economic rationality” would “erode many traditional features
of sovereignty.” In a continuing “historical
world,” on the other hand, the nation-state
would remain the “chief locus of political
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Bell, Christopher M., The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy
between the Wars. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000.
232pp. $51

Stephen Roskill’s two-volume Naval Policy between the Wars (London: Collins,
1968 and 1976) has dominated the history of Britain’s interwar navy.
Roskill—author of the official British naval history of World War II—had a vast
store of knowledge, as well as personal experience and contacts with many of the
individuals about whom he wrote. However, it is now well over a generation
since his volumes were published, and it was inevitable that over time more and
different questions would be asked, new material would be uncovered, and existing material would be reconsidered, until even the finest scholarly work would
become subject to modification. Consequently, Christopher M. Bell’s new history of the Royal Navy between the First and Second World Wars is of considerable interest, though Roskill’s work remains the basic reference.
The “silent service” emerged from World War I with great, though aging, materiel strength and in certain fields, such as naval aviation, a significant technological lead. That preeminent position quickly eroded (the lead in naval aviation
disappeared, never to be regained), and by the late 1930s the Royal Navy had to
determine how to address the difficult problems of a resurgent Germany, an expansionist Japan, and responsibilities in both European and Far Eastern waters—problems compounded especially after 1935, when the Mediterranean
could no longer be considered secure.
Bell is currently a research analyst for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at
the Naval War College. He establishes his aims in a clearly written introduction:
“This book identifies and analyzes the central body of
Paul Halpern has been a professor of history at Florida
ideas which guided navy policy-makers during the
State University since 1965. His books include: The
interwar period, and explores how these ideas influMediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1971); The Naval War in the Mediterraenced Britain’s naval and strategic policies. Here it will
nean, 1914–1918 (Naval Institute Press, 1987); and A
be applied principally to the naval profession, a group
Naval History of World War I (Naval Institute Press,
which is often thought to have held no important
1995). He is currently working on a study of the Mediterranean naval situation in the interwar period, as well
ideas of its own, but which did in fact possess distinct
as on a shorter work on the action in the Otranto Straits
views about the nature and application of seapower.”
in May 1917.
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In his first chapter, “The Politics of Seapower: The ‘One-Power Standard’ and
British Maritime Security,” Bell examines the question of “naval standards,”
which were subject to change and which he considers “little more than a bargaining tool.” “Only by viewing them from this perspective is it possible to understand how the navy attempted to secure the resources it needed.”
Bell relies heavily on Admiralty war plans and strategic appreciations to show
what British naval leaders thought seapower might accomplish in future conflicts. The titles of the relevant chapters give a good indication of their content:
“‘Main Fleet to Bermuda’: Naval Strategy for an Anglo-American War,” “Far
Eastern War Plans and the Myth of the Singapore Strategy,” “‘The Ultimate Potential Enemy’: Nazi Germany and British Defense Dilemmas,” and “The Search
for the ‘Knockout Blow’: War Plans against Italy.”
The idea of potential war with the United States makes odd reading now, but
Bell draws an interesting link between this contingency and the possibility of
war with Japan. The Admiralty realized that “if British seapower alone could not
hope to defeat decisively a major non-European naval power, then war with that
power would have to be avoided at almost any cost. This proved to be a sound
appreciation, and one which was based on a clear understanding of the limitations of seapower.” As for the “Singapore strategy,” Bell derides haphazard use of
the term. He points out that there were actually several “Singapore strategies,”
and that the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore was not an end in itself but rather
only the opening move in “a prolonged war of attrition.” Bell concludes that the
Far Eastern plans were not based on obsolete thinking but that the navy planners
had to struggle with inadequate means to preserve British interests. “In the end,
they failed to preserve all of these interests, but the explanation lies in the magnitude of the threat facing Britain in 1941 rather than in any fundamental errors in
the navy’s strategic planning.”
Bell also gives credit to the Admiralty’s planning for a war against Germany.
He believes insufficient attention was given to the problem of antisubmarine
warfare but considers the British strategic defensive strategy—similar to that
which it had adopted in World War I—sound during the first eight months of
the war, until the fall of France undermined existing assumptions and created a
new and grave situation.
Bell has an interesting chapter on the navy’s effort to help British industry. It
is appropriately titled “‘Showing the Flag’: Deterrence and the Naval Armaments Industry.” Even though the results of the program were not up to expectations, Bell argues, they were not misguided and cost little. He is more critical in
his chapter on naval propaganda. The title is most expressive: “‘Something Very
Sordid’: Naval Propaganda and the British Public.” The navy’s aversion to
“self-promotion” may have diminished during the course of the interwar period,
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but it was still strong enough nearly to cause the loss of what Bell calls the battle
for the “hearts and minds” of the British public. He concludes that given “the
service’s declining popularity, . . . if the Second World War had not broken out
when it did, the navy would have been in a difficult position to withstand Treasury attacks when the debate over naval expansion was resumed.”
Bell’s overall conclusions, however, remain positive. While not understating
flaws and mistakes, which are fully analyzed in the text, Bell believes that the Admiralty was “largely powerless to prevent the government undermining the
foundations of British seapower after the First World War.” But this was not due
to bad advice from the Admiralty. Had the government in the period between
1921 and 1934 listened more carefully to the navy’s pleadings, it could have
averted the decline and greatly strengthened Britain’s strategic and diplomatic
position in the following decade. Bell’s final assessment is well put: “The navy
did make many mistakes of its own, both before and during the Second World
War, but few of its failures were the result of a fundamental misunderstanding of
the nature and application of seapower.”
To appreciate fully the quality and sophistication of Bell’s analysis, one must
read the book. The text is solidly based on Admiralty records in the Public Record Office, Kew. It is clearly written, and even those who are primarily interested in the U.S. Navy will find it accessible and useful for comparison with the
American experience during this era. Those interested in the Royal Navy will
find Bell’s study indispensable.
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Luce Hall, c. 1938. Recruits of the Naval Training Station (housed in what is now Sims Hall)
are pitching tents on Dewey Field.
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TIMING IS EVERYTHING
Snow, Donald M., When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Forces. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2000. 221pp. $ 24.95

“Timing is everything,” so the saying
goes. Timing was certainly a factor in developing a fair and reasoned review for
this book; it arrived in this reviewer’s
mailbox on 12 September 2001. Since the
major thesis of Donald Snow’s concise
and cogent work is that peacekeeping will
be the most likely type of early
twenty-first century military operation
for the United States, the book initially
appeared quaint and somewhat nostalgic:
how nice and simple it would be to deal
with questions of how to bring and sustain peace to other lands.
However, when the inevitable strong feelings associated with the horrific attacks
of 11 September dissipate somewhat, one
finds this book to be a valuable, if flawed,
addition to the professional national security studies student’s library. There is
no other single work available comparable in scope to this book in its thorough
investigation of the driving forces, necessities, and demands of peace operations.
Snow, recognizing the ad hoc nature of
much, if not most, national security literature, has attempted to develop an integrated approach, connecting theory to
practice, and yielding findings and
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conclusions that should awaken and disturb those in the national security
strategy establishment. He begins with a
broad diagnosis of a national security
policy “adrift” in the first decade following the end of the Cold War, explaining
well why realist and neorealist paradigms
of international relations and the use of
force no longer can explain or predict
real-world behaviors. Similarly, he introduces the concept of a two-tiered world,
with developed free market democracies
in the first tier, and all others in the second. It is with this second, heterogeneous
group of nations that Snow finds that the
realist paradigm cannot explain or describe behaviors and relationships, which
in that group are sometimes chaotic.
Snow uses this observation to develop in
the second chapter a theoretical construct by which the United States can
adapt its strategic “lens” to focus better
on security problems with second-tier
nations, combining the still-relevant aspects of the realist legacy with idealist
paradigmatic tensions (between internationalism and isolationism). Carefully
constructing his case, Snow then describes the spectrum of conflict that he
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believes the United States might experience. He finds that the most likely form
of conflict will be Kosovo-like peace operations, and he explains why operations
addressing these conflicts are so difficult.
This section provides some of the most
dramatic and compelling information
and analysis in the book, particularly
concerning his operational distinctions
between conflict suppression and state
building (the latter being the most problematic for this country). When America
Fights concludes with a recommendation
of realistic internationalist national strategy based on five major influences of
modern grand strategy, and it offers the
reader fifteen guidelines on how to increase the probability of success in peace
operations.
The book provides a consistent thread of
argument and analysis on the use of
American armed force. However, notwithstanding the author’s preface, When
America Fights is a highly opinionated
work. It does not comprehensively analyze the implications of other possible
points on the spectrum of conflict, nor
does it pursue alternative or possible
conflictual guidelines that might be generated by applying the theoretical framework to those other types of conflict.
Further, the two-tier world concept simply is neither the only way nor the most
widely accepted one of attempting to organize the chaos of the post–Cold War
international environment. Finally, the
conclusion that there are two types of
armed force employments—of necessity
(forced on the nation) or of choice (at
the nation’s discretion)—is most intriguing (I have already adopted the lexicon in
my courses) but it is not the only
typology that one might consider.
There are two admittedly minor but irritating faults in the book. First, being a
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very old-fashioned academic, this
reviewer appreciates the value and information provided by footnotes; they are
totally lacking in this work. True, there is
a bibliography following each chapter,
but that is an empty vessel for serious research. Second, Ralph Peters, a most insightful strategist of the current age who
is quoted in the last chapter, is a retired
Army, not Air Force, officer.
When America Fights is an excellent book
on the use of armed force as applied to
peace operations. It is a book with a
point of view and a strong theoretical
base. Regardless of whether one agrees
with the author on the flow and form of
his argument, the reader will find the
material engrossing and invaluable—
even though this nation is now engaged
in what Snow has viewed as the less likely
scenario for force employment, that of
necessity.
JONATHAN E. CZARNECKI

Naval War College, Monterey Programs Office

Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White, eds. Keeping
the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 326pp. $50

This book “addresses a need widely recognized but long neglected: to adapt and
modernize the system by which the
United States manages the largest and
most successful security establishment in
history.” Do not be misled into thinking
that the word “managing” in the title
suggests a dry treatment of managerial
practices requiring extensive change.
Keeping the Edge deals with that, but it
primarily examines many key organizational strategy issues; these studies will
have comprehensive value to anyone
within academia or the national security
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environment wishing to improve what
the authors regard as management and
organizational shortfalls that impede implementation of wise strategy and policy
choices. Collectively, the distinguished
editors and authors contend that, if unattended, these shortcomings will seriously
diminish our unmatched military capability. At the same time, they hold that
the “national security establishment is
deficient not so much in deciding what
to do” as in lacking the means to implement defense policy effectively.
The book is organized into eleven chapters, each of which discusses deficiencies
in a key area of national security. Each
chapter describes the changing security
environment relevant to the subject of
discussion, then offers comprehensive
suggestions to improve the execution of
whatever policy choices are made. Most
of the chapters also provide superb insight into what future policy choices
should be. Among the chapters are:
“Managing Defense for the Future,”
“Keeping the Edge in Joint Operations,”
“Exploiting the Internet Revolution,”
“Keeping the Edge in Intelligence,”
“Countering Asymmetric Threats,”
“Keeping the Technological Edge,” “Advancing the Revolution in Business Affairs,” “Ensuring Quality People in
Defense,” “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” “Strengthening
the National Security Interagency Process,” and “Implementing Change.” Each
chapter is comprehensive and would
serve as an excellent guide to new policy
makers who wish actually to see their
policies implemented. I doubt that any
organizational or managerial improvement has been omitted.
The material in the book resulted from a
research collaboration project between
the Kennedy School of Government,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

147

Harvard University, and Stanford
University. The list of contributors represents a who’s who in national security experience and in the study of national
security processes: Ashton B. Carter,
David Chu, Victor A. DeMarines, John
Deutch, Robert J. Hermann, Arnold
Kanter, Michael J. Lippitz, Judith A.
Miller, Sean O’Keefe, William J. Perry,
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Brent
Scowcroft, John M. Shalikashvili, and
John P. White. The core group of authors
have occupied practically every senior
position in the national security environment, while others have dedicated their
professional lives to the study of national
security policies and supporting structures. They speak with as much authority
as one could possibly find in a single
book.
This book addresses those in policy positions who wish to reform organizations
and practices that, according to the authors, increasingly sap the vitality of our
military capability; it is concrete as well
as comprehensive in its recommendations. Keeping the Edge will also help people who are not currently in positions to
affect policy to understand the substantial flaws in the anatomy and physiology
of the organizations that implement national security policies. Experienced national security scholars and practitioners
will respond to the authors’ contention
that existing policy-implementing practices themselves are a threat to future
U.S. national security.
The book must be read by anyone interested in improving these processes and
structures; it contains important guides
for people who can marshal the influence
at least to begin organizational and managerial change, if only on the margin. The
preface warns that the authors have no illusions that the chronic organizational
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and management problems will be solved
any time soon. One can only hope, nevertheless, that this book’s comprehensive
recommendations will encourage and
guide courageous leaders to make a start.
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE

Naval War College

Steinbruner, John D. Principles of Global Security.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
270pp. $44.95

Unconvincing—that one word accurately
describes this effort of the prolific author
and former Brookings fellow John
Steinbruner to explain why and how the
“potentially catastrophic consequences of
traditional security practices” mandate
radical changes in U.S. defense policies.
Steinbruner argues that discontinuities in
the international system make obsolete
the realist view that nation-states need to
rely on military power for their security.
From this premise, he implies that the
United States should not seek to maintain military superiority over potential
opponents. In this new formula, deterrence, which he describes as a Cold War
doctrine, should be “subordinated to the
countervailing idea of reassurance.”
Globalization, Steinbruner holds, has
made it “too expensive to rule by force,”
and competition among nations or societies is being replaced by cooperation;
therefore, the whole notion of needing a
strong military defense is dangerous. Unfortunately for his premise, Steinbruner
then turns around and uses a pseudorealist argument to explain why other nations would “naturally” seek to oppose
and confront American military superiority in a world in which they are
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benefiting from United States–led
globalization.
At its core, the book’s fundamental problem is that it approaches all military issues as if they were but subsets of
strategic nuclear deterrence. The irony of
this approach—Cold War thinking at its
grimmest—appears completely to have
eluded the author, who spent much of
his scholarly career worrying about issues
of deterrence theory and nuclear command and control. At the same time,
Steinbruner does not see the end of the
Cold War as a victory for deterrence or
democratic ideology. Referring to it
rather as an unexpected “spontaneous
event” that took everyone involved by
surprise, he sees it as the result of “the
working of very large forces”—presumably the forces of globalization, although
he is never very clear on that.
Steinbruner’s treatment of globalization
itself—which he describes only in terms
of advances in technology and population dynamics—is disappointing. Others
have written much better treatments. The
book does not contain a serious examination of the direct impact of globalization on national security or military
forces, only a continuing assertion that
globalization has effects and that, whatever they are, they justify adoption of the
author’s “reassurance” policies. These
policies are similar to, but more radical
and seemingly less practical than, those
put forward as “cooperative security” by
former secretary of defense William
Perry. He certainly would not agree with
Steinbruner that all national militaries
must be equalized in capabilities and
force structure. Steinbruner cites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the founding of Nato as examples of
reassurance and equal treatment of nations
in regard to security, but he forgets to
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mention violations of the NPT or to explain why nations would have joined Nato
had there been no inequitable Soviet threat.
Even those who share the author’s beliefs
in a smaller American defense structure
or minimal deterrence would be confused by many of his supporting reasons.
At one point, Steinbruner castigates the
former colonial powers for not intervening quickly enough in the civil wars of
their violence-prone former colonies.
How would they do so without possessing superior military force? Steinbruner
describes the internal conflict that
plagues much of the world, including terrorism, as a “contagion”—as if it were a
theoretical illness that had nothing to do
with actions of actual people. As in the
logic (some might say illogic) of the prisoners’ dilemma and tit-for-tat games
once used to describe the theory of nuclear deterrence, neither the magnanimity nor the fears of the human spirit play
a role in this book’s equation.
Despite the publisher’s reputation and
the implied support of influential
(mostly retired) authorities, serious students of globalization or defense policy
should avoid this book. It is not merely a
weak argument; these are not principles
of global security for the real world.
SAM TANGREDI

Captain, U.S. Navy
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Williams, Cindy, ed. Holding the Line: U.S. Defense
Alternatives for the 21st Century. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001. 289pp. $21.95

This is the rare book that actually lives up
to its blurbs. It should be required reading for U.S. defense planners, especially
Bush administration officials for whom
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increasing defense spending rather than
“holding the line” is an article of faith.
They would profit greatly from the volume’s analysis of where not to look for
the savings that might pay for the administration’s promised transformation of
the military. Hint: cutting infrastructure
will not pay for military transformation.
Cindy Williams, a senior research fellow
in the Strategic Studies Program at MIT
and a former assistant director for national security at the Congressional Budget Office, has assembled an impressive
group of contributors. In a focused, well
integrated volume, they take on a range
of pressing defense issues that converge
on a central, critical question: how can
the U.S. military be reshaped—transformed—while holding the line on defense spending? Holding the line means
maintaining defense spending at about
$300 billion (in fiscal year 2000 budgetauthority dollars) for ten years. That
amount, it is argued, is sufficient for
transformation if it is spent effectively
and efficiently—which requires merely
discarding outmoded strategy and force
structure.
In her introductory chapter, Williams
lays the foundation for what follows with
an instructive discussion of the post–Cold
War drawdown, the pressures generating
rising defense costs, the reasons we
should not succumb to those pressures,
and the need to reconcile strategy and
practice and to recalibrate the twomajor-theater-wars yardstick that was
used to size U.S. conventional forces after
the Gulf War. An effective force-protection
device, the two-major-theater-wars standard is both the source of rising defense
costs and an obstacle to a fiscally responsible transformation of the U.S. military.
Williams is especially struck by the fact
that each service’s share of defense
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spending has been held essentially constant since the end of the Cold War.
Strategy and force structure alternatives
advanced by three of the contributors
propose to take care of that problem.
Lawrence Korb develops Williams’s account of contemporary defense planning
with a critical appraisal of the Pentagon’s
three post–Cold War reassessments—the
first Bush administration’s 1990 “Base
Force,” which introduced the two-majorregional-wars construct; the Clinton administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review;
and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which also embraced the two-war
view. Korb also delightfully exposes the
misleading assumptions that inform the
conventional wisdom about the inadequacy of current levels of defense
spending.
The search for ways to utilize Department of Defense monies more effectively
and efficiently begins with nonsolutions.
Williams convincingly argues that infrastructure reform—eliminating functions,
consolidating and collocating activities,
privatization, and outsourcing—“will not
be the miracle cure for the Pentagon’s
budget woes.” Gordon Adams finds that
for strategic, political, technological, and
economic reasons, contemporary burden
sharing by America’s European allies can
yield no more of a budgetary payoff than
it did during the Cold War. Further cuts
in nuclear forces will not result in significant savings either, according to David
Mosher, who expects, not unreasonably,
that “missile defenses will be the most
likely cause of budget growth.”
The resources required for transformation can only be extracted from the conventional force structure. It is the Army,
Air Force, or Navy (and Marines)—take
your pick—that will bear the brunt of restructuring. Owen Cote advances the
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alternative likely to be most popular
among readers of this journal—a navalcentric strategy and force structure that
features a significantly more innovative
Navy. Under this alternative, a somewhat
smaller Air Force and a more significantly reduced but more mobile Army
would be the bill payers. James Quinlivan
proposes what he considers a balanced
future force structure centered on a reorganized, modernized Army. The Navy
would lose two carrier battle groups under this alternative; the Marine Corps
and the Air Force would be smaller as
well. To support what he labels a “flexible
power projection strategy,” Karl Mueller
would shift resources from the Army and
Navy to a modernized, more capable Air
Force. The Army would give up 30 percent of its active combat forces and
two-thirds of its National Guard units,
while the Navy would have to make do
with nine rather than twelve aircraft
carriers.
Cote, Quinlivan, and Mueller each identify the strategic assumptions upon
which their respective force structures
are built. Their assumptions about the
future security environment differ significantly. Unfortunately, we do not know
what that security environment will actually look like. Defense planners, by nature cautious and conservative in the face
of uncertainty, will want to hedge against
each set of problems the authors identify;
one way of doing this is to acquire the
full range of capabilities they describe. In
the end, while we know we should look
to the conventional force structure to resolve the resource dilemma, the dilemma
remains unresolved. What we still need is
a reliable means of choosing among the
assumptions—no small intellectual challenge. A larger dose of grand strategy
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than provided in Williams’s introductory
chapter is required for that undertaking.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Brasher, Bart. Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987–2015. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
257pp. $67

Bart Brasher begins his retrospective discussion of Implosion with a simple synopsis in chapter 1, “The Last 1,000 Days
of the Cold War.” Mentioned in this
chapter is a discussion of the period of
the Reagan administration when Defense
personnel numbers and budget authority
reached their peaks. He includes interesting USA Today statistics about defense
spending in the United States and in the
USSR, as well as a breakdown of how
many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines were serving. He also discusses
how each service recruits, tests, and promotes its enlisted and officer personnel.
Brasher then proceeds to the topic of the
security environment (primarily by describing where U.S. military forces are
deployed and in what numbers), the demise of the Soviet Union, and various
operations that the U.S. military was involved in through the end of the 1980s.
He closes this chapter with a discussion
of the base realignment process, military
readiness at the end of the Cold War, and
the size of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, reserve components, and
nuclear forces.
The book’s style is readable, and Brasher
takes time to explain acronyms, even to
describe how civilian control of the military is organized. His explanations about
the military and government processes
are clear even for the uninitiated.
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However, it is clear well before the end of
the first chapter that the author’s approach consists primarily of stringing together information gleaned from various
sources; the first thirty-four-page chapter
contains 151 endnotes. Also, the book is
replete with numbers and statistics; the
average paragraph contains at least two
or three. For example, the following is
the concluding paragraph of the discussion of Operation JUST CAUSE: “Casualty
figures for the invasion included 24
Americans dead, including two who were
killed accidentally by their own forces.
The number of U.S. wounded was 324,
while the PDF suffered 314 killed, 124
wounded, and 5,313 captured. Serious
estimates of Panamanian noncombatants
killed ran from 100 to 202. Within a few
years, Panama was a democracy and
Noriega was in a stateside prison, convicted of the narcotics charges brought
against him.”
The next several chapters fall into a pattern. For each year from 1990 through
1994, Brasher uses statistical tidbits to
discuss human resources, the security environment, the “Base Force” (and other
alternate force structures), military readiness, and downsizing. Each chapter sets
forth the “security environment,” a chronological account of defense and military
issues, primarily illuminated by forcedeployment statistics. Subchapters cover
in a clear and concise fashion such subjects
as contingency operations, the BottomUp Review, the base closure process,
modernization, and “topsizing.” Chapter
7 covers the downsizing of the military
from 1995 and 1996, and chapter 8 covers the “Quadrennial Defense Review and
the Out-Years, 1997 to 2015.” Brasher’s
conclusions, which occupy two pages, include: “Although many equate the initiation of personnel and force structure
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reductions with the end of the Cold War in
1989 or the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, DOD, as a whole, started downsizing in 1988. The Army and Air Force
started trimming forces in 1987 and the
Marine Corps followed suit the following
year. The Navy did not start reducing
numbers until 1990”; “For the most part,
it seems though DOD has managed to
keep the cream of the crop in a smaller
labor pool. . . . [T]he quality of the Army
officer contingent, already high, has been
improved by the SSB and VSI initiatives,
as most of the commissioned soldiers accepting the bonuses were from the bottom third of their year-groups”; “Some
were concerned that AfricanAmericans, as well as other minorities,
might bear a disproportionate share of
military personnel cuts, but that has not
transpired. Along the same line, opportunities for women in the armed forces
have not been put on hold because of the
downsizing. In fact, their representation
has reached record levels”; “Local communities have been hurt by the reduction
in the number of DOD installations that
started in 1988. However, in many cases,
that damages have been significantly less
than originally estimated. Thanks to a
higher percentage of personnel cuts than
base closures, the infrastructure of our
fighting establishment is now even more
out of sync with force structure than it
was in 1987.”
Other conclusions address the need for
increased modernization funding, force
hollowness (although not on the scale
seen in the 1970s), and reductions in personnel and funding (unaccompanied by
reductions in global security
commitments).
The author (a former Air Force officer of
thirteen years’ service) has consulted
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hundreds of sources for his book. The
bibliography is sixteen pages long. The
numbers and statistics are interesting individually, though their sheer volume is
overwhelming. The appendices are simple graphs showing a downward trend
from 1987 to 1998. What is missing are
conclusions and projections (beyond
those contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review) about the implications.
Implosion does a credible job of describing, with key statistics and simple explanations, the magnitude and process of
the downsizing of the military (the active
components were reduced 35.3 percent
between 1987 and 1998), but Brasher
seems too enamored of statistical pronouncements, leaving the reader waiting
for an answer to the question “What does
it all mean?” What will this massive force
and budgetary reduction mean for the
future of the United States military and
its role on the international stage?
If you are looking for a book full of quotable, surprising, and interesting statistics,
or for a concise, clearly explained, chronological timeline of how the military
was downsized since 1987, this book is
for you. However, you will not find pronouncements or predictions about how
the reduction in military forces and
funding, so carefully detailed and described, will affect the future. Nor does
this book pass judgment or offer praise
or criticism of how the downsizing occurred. Brasher discusses downsizing
much as a good reporter might (just the
facts), rather than as a commentator or
political analyst. Given the time frame
advertized in the title (1987–2015), the
author has done only half his job.
CARL CARLSON

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning
Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 343pp. $26.95

Since the end of the Cold War, Nato has
been experiencing an identity crisis that
has not yet been completely resolved. In
the last decade instability has been Nato’s
principal adversary, and the Balkans, as a
result of the atrocities of Slobodan
Milosevic, became its prime area of interest. In March 1999, following the Serb tyrant’s driving of eight hundred thousand
Albanian Kosovars from Serbia, Nato
fought, and won, a war to return and
protect Kosovo’s Albanian population.
Winning Ugly is a recounting of the
causes, conduct, and consequences of
this war. It is derived from interviews of
many of its central players by experts on
Balkan policy and security affairs. Not
surprisingly, this conflict has been dissected and closely scrutinized by many
pundits, because its lessons will play a
central role in fashioning future alliance
defense policies, as well as U.S. force
planning and doctrine development.
Daalder and O’Hanlon scrutinize virtually all elements of the Kosovo operation,
and they are both understanding and
critical. As to the causes and inevitability
of the conflict, the authors conclude that,
given Milosevic’s perfidy and malice, it
would have been difficult for Nato to
avoid taking military action. As to the result, they unabashedly declare Nato the
victor, with few qualifications. In fact,
the authors’ assessment should be labeled
“near term,” since we have yet to witness
enduring stability in the region as a result of the conflict and the subsequent
Nato “occupation” of the province.
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Daalder and O’Hanlon’s examination of
the conduct of the war, however, is the
best part of the book, bringing to light
the strategic and tactical mistakes
committed by Nato’s heads of state, diplomats, and generals alike. Perhaps the
most important of the internal conflicts
were between (and among) Americans, a
point underlined in General Wesley
Clark’s recent account of the Kosovo
conflict, Waging Modern War.
The role that the air campaign played to
achieve overall success in the war is a
point hotly debated in defense-policy circles. Kosovo was proclaimed exclusively
an air war, President Clinton having
promised that the United States had no
intention of fighting a ground war in the
Balkans. It was a remarkably successful
one, at that; air defense capability by the
Yugoslav armed forces was moderate, yet
no Nato pilot lost his life in combat. But
this was not initially the air war that U.S.
Air Force strategists had envisioned—pilots were restricted to flying above fifteen
thousand feet, and target sets were limited early in the war due to asset availability and bad weather. Most
importantly, the thrust of “effects-based
operations” (in this case, bending the enemy’s will through paralyzing the country’s infrastructure) was diluted, as the
Nato alliance pursued elusive Yugoslav
tanks in the Kosovo countryside.
However, as the war progressed, American air-combat strategy increasingly held
sway, while Milosevic continued to hold
firm. The authors conclude that the diplomatic consensus was that the Yugoslav
dictator did not consider blinking until
faced with a united alliance that began
talking seriously about a ground war.
Milosevic eventually yielded when his last
possible ally, Russia, conspicuously associated itself with the message of alliance
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resolve. The authors leave us with the
(lukewarm) lesson that airpower, properly employed, is a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool of defense and foreign
policy.
The Kosovo war provides today’s students of international affairs a textbook
case in the traditional art of statecraft in
the world of realpolitik. Many old lessons
are emphasized: strategy must be driven
by policy, coercive diplomacy works only
when one possesses military might and
resolve, armed forces must be given
proper strategic direction, and alliance
solidarity is crucial.
However, Winning Ugly adds new lessons
as well, because Kosovo was Nato’s principal test to date in conducting military
operations outside its borders against a
sovereign nation for essentially humanitarian purposes. Nato’s performance in
Kosovo may have helped define the practicality and desirability of this role in the
twenty-first-century world. This book
enhances our understanding of what may
become the future of Nato as well as
some part of the future of war.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

House, Jonathan M. Combined Arms Warfare in the
Twentieth Century. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2001. 364pp. $45

A retired Army officer formerly on the
faculty of the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Jonathan House has written an updated edition of a text he authored in the
1980s to support the education of Army
officers. His express intentions are to
strip the jargon in order to make the
subject intelligible to a more general
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readership, and to update the book with
an analysis of combined-arms progress
in the 1990s. The result is a readable and
lucid analysis of combined-arms warfare
in the twentieth century, a work that a
layman can follow without keeping a dictionary of military terms handy.
For those with a genuine interest in military affairs, this book is ultimately rewarding. However, it is more about
organizational dynamics than about battles and tactics, and that may prove tedious to the casual reader. House
methodically traces the development of
combined-arms practice in the major armies of the world, offering just enough
description of battles and campaigns to
illustrate the effects of the various technical and organizational developments over
the years.
House tends to focus his analysis through
the lens of organizational design (an inclination shared by this reviewer) and
comes up with some interesting results
that do not always conform to conventional wisdom. For instance, he makes
the case that the French and British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France can be
adequately explained by their centralized
and “stovepiped” organizational structure, which inhibited the formation of
flexible combined-arms task forces.
Moreover, the lack of experience in defending against a fluid combined-arms
offensive caused the allies to create a
rather brittle, forward-focused defense
instead of the defense in tactical and operational depth that was later found effective against the blitzkrieg. In addition,
the failure of the German advance into
the Soviet Union in 1941 was due not so
much to the oft-cited reduction in panzer
divisions (which House cites as an actual
advantage, in that it created more balanced divisional structures) as to the
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failure of the Wehrmacht to prepare logistics support suited to the resulting
depth of the theater.

campaigns. Although his points are otherwise well made, on this issue he seems
to overreach a bit.

If the book has a fault, it lies in the numerous maps and organizational charts
that accompany the text. Though
House’s prose is clear and straightforward, the maps do not help the layman
really grasp the dynamics of the battles.
Similarly, although House thoughtfully
includes a key to the numerous symbols
that soldiers use to depict units on maps
and tables of organization, he leaves out
a number of the more esoteric ones that
inhabit the book. This is a minor irritant—in general the book is well supported by a glossary of technical terms
and acronyms, liberal annotations, and
an extensive bibliography—but it should
be fixed in the next edition if the book is
to be considered a true introductory text.

In summary, Jonathan House has produced a useful and readable text for anyone who wants a better understanding of
how modern armies fight.

House has a clear thesis that permeates
his analysis: combined-arms structure
(comprising tanks, artillery, infantry, helicopters, engineers, etc.) should be integrated at the lowest practicable level and
balanced to provide the most flexibility
to the commander. (In practice, this
seems to occur only at the division or
sometimes the brigade level.) The commander can then select various types of
units to form combined-arms task forces
that can address the type of operations
planned. House’s discussion of the long
and painful history of armies’ struggles to
achieve this balance and flexibility brings
to mind the equally painful attempts at
jointness among services.
House inevitably addresses the issue of
air support as a piece of the combinedarms puzzle. He analytically describes the
objections airmen have to integrating
airpower into a combined-arms ground
organization, but in his conclusions he
argues against separate, air-only
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McBride, William M. Technological Change and the
United States Navy, 1865–1945. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000. 352pp. $45

This is not a technological history of the
U.S. Navy per se but rather an exploration of how the dominant culture of the
Navy’s leadership drove specific technological choices in the transition from the
sailing ship of the line to the battleship and then to the aircraft carrier.
McBride’s thesis centers on two points:
that the organization and culture of the
U.S. Navy have traditionally been defined
by its capital ships; and that new technologies challenging the relevance of the
current capital ship are generally resisted
by senior leaders, who seek both to maintain control over change and to inhibit
any developments that suggest a transfer
of power to individuals with the skills,
functions, and organizational relationships of a new “technological paradigm.”
These themes are familiar to those who
follow the academic literature on technology and culture, but McBride is undoubtedly correct in his contention that
there is no widespread understanding of
the specific impact of the dominant service culture on technology selection. A
thorough appreciation of the full range
of forces that drive technological choices
would appear to be particularly
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important in the post–Cold War era, in
which the technological options are so
numerous and specific requirements for
the Navy are so uncertain.
One of McBride’s major goals in this
work is to refute the idea of technological
determinism and demonstrate instead
the importance of culture in technological innovation. He explores in some
depth the intense professional competition between the Navy’s line officers and
engineers during the transition from sail
to steam, and between surface officers
and aviators in the transition from the
battleship to the carrier. He also offers
interesting historical insight into internal
competition for control over the design
details of capital ships during different
eras, with an informative analysis of the
role of naval-industrial relations in the
early debate over the adoption of
turbo-electric drive.
Unfortunately, McBride’s argument
against technological determinism tends
to the opposite extreme, ascribing almost
every technological choice to singleminded efforts by the Navy’s leaders to
maintain the social and cultural status
quo. He characterizes the battleship “paradigm” at the end of the nineteenth century as a “pre-Copernican Ptolemaic
cosmogony,” as if the battleship were not
only the wrong technological choice but
somehow a violation of natural law. He
castigates the U.S. Navy for rejecting a
cruiser-centric commerce-raiding strategy and attributes the choice to blind adherence to the “paramount status” of the
battleship. Yet ultimately McBride does
not refute the case that the transition
from the sailing ship of the line to the
battleship was essentially a deterministic
outcome, nor does he objectively evaluate the failed efforts by others in the
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nineteenth century (most notably the
French) to render the battleship obsolete.
In contrast, McBride largely admits that
the adoption of the aircraft carrier was
more a matter of fortuitous events than
of technological determinism. As he
points out, a narrow difference in timing
in the appearance of radar and the proximity fuse might have doomed the aircraft carrier to irrelevance; it was not
until well into World War II that a carrier could muster sufficient striking
power to hold a combat-ready battleship
at risk. Yet he condemns the Navy’s “battleship thought collective” as early as
World War I for failing to move rapidly
to a sea-based air strike force—including
early adoption of torpedo bombers
(which actually took another twenty-five
years to achieve technological maturity).
There have unquestionably been
Luddites in the Navy’s senior ranks
throughout its history, but there is great
cost and risk in abandoning major military systems that have proven their
worth. McBride is far too prone to condemn the technological caution of past
decision makers, who lacked the benefit
of our hindsight.
It is not clear whom the book was meant
to inform. McBride’s insistence on turgid
academic jargon like “intra-artifact combat” and “obdurate boundary artifact” to
express fairly simple ideas suggests that
he did not intend this work for the reader
inside the military who might actually
make the best use of it. On the other
hand, an academic audience unfamiliar
with naval operations might accept without question McBride’s somewhat preposterous assertions that the “blip
enhance” mode of the ULQ-6 was intended as a suicide device, that an “old
World War II–era destroyer” could sink a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, or that
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the cruise missile has long since replaced
the aircraft as the primary means of
strike from the sea.
This volume does add some historical
substance to the important topic of military innovation, but the prospective
reader should be cautioned that it is neither a well balanced nor a comprehensive
account of the impact of technological
change on the U.S. Navy from the Civil
War through World War II.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS

Naval War College

Key, David M., Jr., Admiral Jerauld Wright: Warrior
among Diplomats. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower Univ.
Press, 2001. 438pp. $22.95

For more than two-thirds of a century, a
host of diplomats, military officers, and
statesmen have been entertained in their
wardrooms, clubs, and drawing rooms
from London to Manila by Jerry Wright’s
stories and vignettes drawn from his remarkable career. After every session, the
inevitable reaction would be, “Jerry,
you’ve got to write a book.”
Now that book has been written by David M. Key, Jr., a nephew of the admiral.
Key, making good use of his Harvard
A.B. in English, does an excellent job in
letting his uncle and his contemporaries
tell the story, while himself providing the
historical context, one that is unusually
rich in drama and import. Fortunately,
Key had much to draw on, and he has
done a thorough and discriminating job
in his research. Wright wrote copiously—leaving journals, memos, articles,
and letters—all flavored with the special
brand of low-key, wry wit that was characteristic of him. Wright had plenty to
write about. His career was replete with
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one-of-a-kind assignments, from being
in charge of President Calvin Coolidge’s
yacht to commanding a British submarine in World War II (though he was neither British nor a submarine officer).
Born in 1898 into an Army family,
Wright adored his father, and clearly the
feeling was mutual. “Pop” took his son
on hunting and fishing trips around the
world, and the young boy relished the experience. When Wright was only thirteen, then-Major William Wright,
stationed in Luzon as commander of the
Philippine Scouts, took the youngster,
armed with his own shotgun, on a military expedition to Mindanao to suppress
an uprising by the rebellious Moros,
Philippine Muslims. It was an adventure
from America’s brief colonial period,
more Kipling than Hemingway.
In 1914 Wright entered the Naval Academy (at sixteen) because there was no appointment available at West Point. He
graduated in only three years, because of
World War I. He was sent to Europe on
blockade duty, which also provided the
opportunity to visit his father, now Major General Wright, commanding the
89th Infantry Division on the Western
Front. However, the trip became more
than just a visit with “Pop” at his tented
headquarters when Ensign Wright was
caught in a German artillery barrage.
It did not take the young naval officer
long to realize that the U.S. Navy was the
right place for him. He derived personal
as well as professional satisfaction from
his assignment as naval aide to Coolidge
and from his subsequent deployment to
the China Station as executive officer of a
four-pipe destroyer.
Wright remained a bachelor as a junior
officer, but with his special charm and
tall good looks, he was much in demand
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in the social whirl of Washington, D.C.
There he met Phyllis Thompson, a society reporter for the thriving Washington
Star. They were married within a year.
Throughout the rest of his career they remained a devoted couple. Phyllis was always the exemplary Navy wife (she
published a book by that title), uncomplaining about the frequent moves and
long separations, and a pillar of support
for her husband in all his varied endeavors and often bizarre adventures.
During World War II, Wright commanded
major forces in action and served on personal liaison missions for the Allies. After
the war he served in the Pentagon, where,
because of his combat experience, he was
assigned to develop the operating policies
for the postwar Navy.
The real star in Wright’s crown, however,
was his tour as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, one of the two top
posts in Nato. He handled that job with
such distinction that he served for six
years in what was normally a two-year assignment. His experiences in that critical
post at the height of the Cold War should
be of special interest to naval historians
and students of modern history.
After retiring from active duty as a
four-star admiral in 1960, he performed
his final service to the country in 1963,
when, at the urging of the secretary of
state, President John F. Kennedy appointed Wright to serve as U.S. ambassador
to Taiwan. Again Wright answered the
call of his country to serve in an assignment of great responsibility and unusual
sensitivity, one especially significant because of the instability of the Chinese
Nationalist government and the potential
threat to U.S. vital national interests.
David Key’s lack of familiarity with military jargon has allowed an occasional
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error to creep in, but these are few and
minor, limited generally to a garbled acronym or the misspelling of a ship’s
name. Otherwise the book rings with the
authority of an action report.
Admiral Jerauld Wright is a delightful
book, easy to pick up and hard to put
down. It is a biography of a splendid individual whose service and contributions
to his country constitute a significant historical record in itself. It is a story that
unfolds with the candor and humor of a
special person whose intellect and charm
made him a “diplomat among warriors.”
J. L. HOLLOWAY

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired

Hoffman, Jon T. Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant
General Lewis B. Puller, USMC. New York: Random
House, 2001. 629pp. $35

In the heralded history of the U.S. Marine Corps, Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller occupies a unique position. Long revered as
the greatest hero in the Corps, Puller is
the only Marine to earn five Navy
Crosses. His career spanned thirty-seven
years, during which he mastered the entire spectrum of warfare, from chasing
the guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino in
the jungles of Nicaragua to commanding
a Marine regiment in the bitter fighting
near the Chosin reservoir. Most Marines
are familiar with Burke Davis’s 1962 account of Puller’s life, but fellow leatherneck Jon T. Hoffman has produced what
is likely to become the definitive biography of this extraordinary officer.
Hoffman is no stranger to biography. His
Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the
Marine Raiders earned rave reviews from
a number of distinguished military historians and editors. As he did with Edson,
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Hoffman uses private papers, personal
military records, and recently declassified
federal documents in his attempt to discover the “real” Puller, stripped of decades
of mythology and near canonization.
What makes this current biography so
intriguing is Hoffman’s willingness to
confront the more controversial aspects
of Puller’s career, such as his performance at Peleliu, where his unit’s casualty rate exceeded 54 percent, as well as
his alleged indifference toward junior officers and to other services.
Puller was born in the Virginia Tidewater
in 1898 and enlisted in the Marine Corps
on 25 July 1918, too late to fight in
World War I. He first saw combat during
the interwar period, when the United
States frequently dispatched Marines to
quell domestic disturbances throughout
the Caribbean. The Puller legend was
born in Haiti and Nicaragua, where he
earned the sobriquet “El Tigre” and established a reputation as a brilliant
small-unit leader. His aggressive leadership won two Navy Crosses. Extended
foreign service in China and aboard Captain Chester Nimitz’s flagship, USS
Augusta (CA 31), added new laurels to
Puller’s growing reputation.
With the advent of World War II, Puller
actively sought combat duty. In September 1942 his battalion deployed to
Guadalcanal. One month later, he had
earned his third Navy Cross, in the defense of Henderson Field. Following a
short interlude, Puller won a fourth Navy
Cross in the battle at Cape Gloucester, on
New Britain Island. On both occasions,
Puller’s spirited leadership prevented the
desperate and determined enemy from
penetrating his defenses. On Guadalcanal
particularly, his officers and men were almost universal in their praise of his courage and leadership under fire.
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It was on New Britain that Puller first attracted a great deal of criticism for allegedly using his own casualty figures as a
measuring stick of how aggressively his
men were fighting. This criticism reached
new heights after Peleliu in September
1944, where a visibly tired Puller, now a
regimental commander, sustained disproportionate casualties in eradicating
the Japanese defenders. Hoffman rushes
to his defense, noting that Puller’s unit
did not have as much naval gunfire support available as the other regiments did,
and that service doctrine dictated maintaining momentum, which Puller’s regiment had gained. Moreover, Hoffman
points out, the terrain at Peleliu offered
little opportunity for maneuver; frontal
assault is almost always costly.
Allegations of Puller’s lack of tactical
imagination resurfaced in Korea, where
his regiment was instrumental in retaking Seoul in the immediate aftermath of
the Inchon landing. House-to-house
fighting proved slow and deadly, but
Puller took justifiable pride in his regiment’s role in seizing the South Korean
capital. Puller’s leadership during the
fighting withdrawal from the Chosin reservoir, in contrast, attracted a great deal
of favorable publicity. It was in fact nothing short of inspirational, earning him
his fifth and final Navy Cross.
Unfortunately, the years following Korea
brought only disillusionment to Puller.
Like General George S. Patton, Chesty
Puller was ill suited to the peacetime establishment. He was never politically astute; his blunt remarks about rugged
training and a “soft” American public
created a hailstorm of criticism from a
country long tired of war. What Puller
desired most was command of a Marine
division, but soon after he finally
achieved that lofty ideal in 1954, a stroke
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felled him, and he was relieved of command. Rather than retiring gracefully,
however, Puller fought the medical examiner’s board for over a year before the
secretary of the Navy informed him in
October 1955 that he would be retired.
For Puller, his forced retirement from active service was the ultimate betrayal by
the commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps. In his twilight years, however, Puller mellowed a bit and took
personal satisfaction in seeing his family
reach maturity. He volunteered for active
service during the Vietnam War (his request was understandably denied). A vocal critic of government policy during the
war, Puller watched his son, Lewis Puller,
Jr., carry on the Puller name in combat.
As a sidelight, Hoffman provides an intimate portrayal of the relationship between father and son in the elder Puller’s
last days. Lewis Jr., who later recorded
his own experiences in a Pulitzer
Prize-winning autobiography, Fortunate
Son, was at his father’s side when Chesty
Puller, the greatest Marine in history,
succumbed to pneumonia and kidney infection on 11 October 1971.
The Puller who emerges from these pages
is not an altogether appealing figure but
one who merits the accolades that generations of Marines have bestowed upon
him. The fact that his Navy Crosses were
awarded for leadership during critical
stages of battle as opposed to individual
acts of bravery in no way diminishes
what Puller accomplished during his distinguished career. An unparalleled warrior and an enlisted leatherneck at heart,
Chesty Puller remains the most famous
and most revered Marine. It is fitting that
we finally have a biography that does justice to this extraordinary officer.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
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La Bree, Clifton. The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver
Prince Smith, USMC. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ.
Press, 2001. 268pp. $32

Oliver Prince Smith was not present at
Belleau Wood or Chateau Thierry. Neither did he chase Sandino in Nicaragua.
He never served in Shanghai with the 4th
Marines. He missed the fighting on
Guadalcanal and Tarawa—early 1941 saw
him with the 1st Marine Brigade in Iceland, returning to the United States in
May 1942 for an eighteen-month stint in
the newly formed headquarters Division
of Plans and Policies. Consequently,
Smith’s first taste of combat did not
come until early 1944—fully twentyseven years after commissioning—at
New Britain, where he served initially as
chief of staff for the 1st Marine Division
and shortly as commander, 5th Marines,
for the Talasea Peninsula assault. Subsequently, at Peleliu he had the distinct
misfortune to serve as assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division under
Major General William H. Rupertus. He
would finish his World War II service as
Marine deputy chief of staff for the Tenth
Army at Okinawa.
Smith went through the Reserve Officers
Training Corps program at the University of California, Berkeley, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1917.
He was ordered to Guam, followed by
shipboard duty, then Washington, D.C.,
three years in Haiti, and the Army’s Field
Officer School at Fort Benning in 1931.
Subsequently, Smith taught at Marine
Corps Schools in Quantico, following
which he became the first Marine officer
to matriculate at the French École de
Guerre. Returning to the United States,
he was again assigned as an instructor at
Quantico, where, because of his obvious
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intellectual power, he acquired the nicknames “the professor” and the “student
general.”
Smith was not a colorful character. A
practicing Christian Scientist, he did not
drink (although he did smoke a pipe),
and he did not use profanity. In fact,
when he spoke at all he rarely raised his
voice above a normal speaking level.
“Taciturn” probably describes him best.
Consequently, when in spring 1950, after
serving as Marine Corps assistant commandant, Smith received orders as commanding general, 1st Marine Division,
there was not a little heartburn among
other Marine general officers, which only
intensified when that division deployed
to Korea.
Yet if ever there was an officer with the
right qualifications at the right place at
the right time, it was Major General Oliver Prince Smith.
It was O.P. who worked closely and effectively with Rear Admiral James H. Doyle
on a very short time line to plan the September 1950 landing at Inchon, with
higher echelons back-dating their operation orders to conform with those produced at the lower levels. Like Doyle,
O.P. was a practical-minded, hardheaded
professional who cared not a whit for
high-blown rhetoric or elegant maps,
only for getting the job done. It was O.P.
who wisely resisted great pressure from
his corps commander to accelerate his division’s advance on Seoul in order to
meet an artificial schedule for securing
that city; urgings to make a dangerous
night attack once in Seoul; and attempts
to interfere in his division’s internal
chain of command.
The extraordinary performance of the 1st
Marine Division at Chosin is widely
known. Less obvious was O.P.’s
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contribution to that performance. Again,
he wisely resisted considerable pressure
from his corps commander to quick-pace
the division’s advance to the Yalu. Cognizant of the danger posed by the Chinese entry into the war, O.P. doggedly strove to
keep his division concentrated. Smith developed a main supply route with defensible redoubts that made possible the
division’s long fighting retreat from Chosin
to Hamhung. Earlier, in the belief that the
war would extend well into the bitter Korean winter, he had insisted on coldweather gear for his Marines. He kept in
continuous personal contact with his regimental commanders by means of helicopter (the first field commander to do so) and
jeep, and yet he refrained from interfering
with their exercise of command.
By these deeds, this reviewer is persuaded
that O. P. Smith saved a great many fine
men from certain capture, injury, or
death. Much beloved by his men, O.P. reciprocated; in his personal log he kept
handwritten daily and running casualty
figures for the division. Perhaps the
best-known photo of O. P. Smith is of
him standing alone among graves of his
men in the cemetery at Hamhung.
Smith was neither good news material
nor well known outside Marine circles;
he was a very private and modest person.
For example, he confided to his wife his
deep embarrassment on receiving a Silver
Star from General Douglas MacArthur,
an award he deemed inappropriate for a
division commander not directly in the
line of fire. Such humility and personal
reserve neither attract biographers nor
render their task easy (in Korea he was
easily eclipsed by his 1st Marines commander, the colorful “Chesty” Puller).
Thus, the absence of a biography of
Smith until now is no surprise, but the
lacuna has been a serious one. That there
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is now such a biography is owed to the
perseverance of the publisher’s executive
director, who served in the 1st Marine
Division after the Korean War.
Fortunately for his biographer, O.P. kept
meticulous records of his professional
life, comprising some three dozen boxes
in the Marine Corps University Archives
and, more important, a detailed, daily
personal log of his Korean War service.
La Bree conducted interviews with officers who had served with O.P. to help fill
in the blanks.
Gentle Warrior would have benefited had
the author provided a broader context
for the historical events in which its protagonist participated. It would also have
been improved by more attention to the
first decades of O.P.’s career, which are
largely omitted—official records could
have provided at least grist for the mill
here. That O.P.’s youth and college years
are absent from this account is due principally to his family’s desire for privacy,
which the author respected. Thus we do
not really know the father to the
man—the account really starts with
O.P.’s deployment to Iceland.
Nonetheless, this is a good, honest book.
It is probably not the definitive account
of O.P.’s life and career, but we are fortunate to have it. He emerges as a consummate, dedicated professional military
officer who served his country and his
Marine Corps extremely well and did so
with little fanfare or expectation of public approbation. On more than one occasion, Smith risked his career to speak
truth to power. In short, there is much
worth emulating in the character and career of O. P. Smith. Serving officers
would do well to read this book and absorb its lessons.
DONALD CHISHOLM

Naval War College
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Probert, Henry. Bomber Harris, His Life and Times:
The Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir
Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command. London: Greenhill, 2001. 432pp. $34.95

In the 1920s, early in his career, when Arthur Harris commanded 45 Squadron in
Iraq, he was concerned with improving
the accuracy of his unit’s bomb aiming.
Can this be the same man who, twenty
years later, was responsible for leading
the Royal Air Force Bomber Command’s
area-bombing campaign against the cities
of the Third Reich, the apogee of which
was the apocalyptic raid on Dresden in
February 1945?
Yes and no. As Henry Probert demonstrates in his admirable biography of this
most controversial Allied airman, Harris
did indeed stress the need for his bombers to operate efficiently and effectively as
they policed their corner of the British
Empire, and he continued to emphasize
these qualities for the remainder of his
career. Harris cannot be made to bear
personal responsibility for either the
area-bombing strategy in general, or the
Dresden raid in particular. Although
Harris became a lightning rod for postwar criticism of the strategic air offensive, the critical decisions were made
higher up the chain of command by the
Chiefs of Staff , the War Cabinet, and
Winston Churchill. In pointing out this
simple but often overlooked fact,
Probert, like Robin Neillands in his recent The Bomber War (Overlook Press,
2001), seeks to debunk myths and set the
record straight by putting Harris in his
proper historical context.
In some respects this task is not an easy
one, but Probert is well qualified to make
the attempt. A retired RAF air commodore with a long record of service,

140

War College: Winter 2002 Full Issue
BOOK REVIEWS

Probert is also a former head of the Air
Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence. For this biography he was given
unrestricted access to Harris’s substantial
collection of personal papers. Probert has
made good use of this archive and of the
interviews he conducted with Harris’s
friends and associates. His aim, he writes,
is to present a biography of the man
rather than yet another history of the
bombing campaign, and there is much
detail here that cannot be found elsewhere, even in the authorized biography
by Dudley Saward, which was written in
the 1970s but not published until after
Harris’s death in 1984. Probert rightly
judges Saward’s book to be disappointing, not least because it leaves many
questions unanswered.
Yet while the author attempts to offer a
rounder picture of the man by examining
Harris’s pre- and post–Bomber Command life, readers will inevitably be
drawn to those chapters dealing with the
war years. Despite Probert’s desire not to
retell the story of Bomber Command, he
feels it necessary to offer some verdict on
the air campaign itself. Here he wisely
follows the lead of Richard Overy (King’s
College, London) in concluding that the
night area offensive did much more damage to the German war effort than it has
been given credit for, mainly by diverting
resources to the defence of the Reich,
putting a ceiling on industrial production, and generally disrupting economic
and social life.
The picture of Harris that emerges is in
some ways all too familiar. He was just
the tonic that was needed at Bomber
Command Headquarters in High
Wycombe when he took up his appointment in February 1942. He was a
strong-willed, opinionated, and forceful
commander who promised to inject a
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sense of purpose into a force that was
flagging, and to do his utmost to build up
its striking power. In this he was spectacularly successful, but his success came at
a price. Harris’s personality was a liability
as well as an asset, and this was never
more apparent than in his dealings with
the staff officers of the Air Ministry. One
of Probert’s strengths is his understanding of the decision-making machinery
and the bureaucratic and institutional
framework within which bombing policy
was made, a dimension of the story that
is too often neglected or misunderstood.
Relations between Bomber Command
and the Air Ministry’s Directorate of
Bomber Operations were frosty, due in
no small part to Harris’s contempt for
what he believed to be the Air Staff’s
ill-advised criticism of, and interference
in, the operation of his command. To a
certain extent his views were justified, although one does not get from Probert a
full sense of the deep distrust that some
members of the Air Staff had of Harris’s
judgment and of his readiness to obey
orders. Yet it takes two to tango, and
too often Harris was overeager to
dance. In addition to possessing a
weakness for exaggeration, he could be
inflexible, intolerant, scathingly sarcastic, and narrow minded in his view of the
war. The results were frequently counterproductive, introducing unnecessary friction into the business of running the
bomber offensive. Sometimes he was
right, as in his denunciation of the pointless attacks on the concrete-reinforced
U-boat pens on the French coast. At
other times, however, he was dead
wrong, as in his dogmatic dismissal of oil
as just another “panacea” target.
Probert is too conscientious a biographer
to excuse Harris’s lapses uncritically, but
he also seems a bit too willing to give his
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subject the benefit of the doubt,
suggesting in his concluding remarks that
others might have misinterpreted or misunderstood what Harris was trying to say
or do. He is surely right in judging him
to be one of the great commanders of the
Second World War. If that is the case,
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however, it is equally true to say that
Bomber Command achieved as much as
it did not only because of Sir Arthur Harris but in spite of him.
LORNE BREITENLOHNER

University of Toronto
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